

---

# HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

---

(JOURNAL OF HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION)

NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, United Nations

---

Vol.10 No.4

October - December 2006

---

## **KAZAKHSTAN SPECIAL**

**Kazakhstan Today**

*Kairat Umarov*

**The Geopolitical Realities of Central Asia**

*Aigul Kurganbayeva and Galia Movkebayeva*

**Russia's Policy towards Kazakhstan during Yeltsin Period**

*K. Warikoo*

**Kazakhstan-US Relations: Some Perspectives**

*Fatima Kukeyeva*

**Kazakhstan-China Trade and Economic Relations**

*Alia Akataeva*

**Trans-border Nationalities and State Relations:**

**A Case Study of Kazakhs in Altai (Xinjiang)**

*Xu Qinhua*

**Democratization and Political Stability in Kazakhstan**

*Kuralay Baizakova*

**Elections in Kazakhstan**

*Saifolla Sapanov*

**Nazarbayev Emerges Stronger After Polls**

*Indranil Banerjee*

**Kazakhstan and the International Organizations**

*Mara Gubaidullina*

**Kazakhstan and the United Nations**

*Klara Makasheva*

**OSCE Activities in Central Asia**

*Ailuna Utegenova*

---

## HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

**Editor** : **K. WARIKOO**  
**Associate Guest Editor** : **KURALAY BAIZAKOVA**  
**Assistant Editor** : **SHARAD K. SONI**  
**Sub-Editor** : **MAHESH R. DEBATA**

© Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi.

- \* All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without first seeking the written permission of the publisher or due acknowledgement.
- \* The views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation.

### SUBSCRIPTION

<b>IN INDIA</b>			
Single Copy (Individual)	:	Rs.	200.00
Annual (Individual)	:	Rs.	500.00
Institutions	:	Rs.	700.00
& Libraries (Annual)			
<b>OVERSEAS (AIRMAIL)</b>			
Single Copy	:	US \$	7.00
		UK £	5.00
Annual (Individual)	:	US \$	30.00
		UK £	20.00
Institutions	:	US \$	50.00
& Libraries (Annual)		UK £	35.00

This journal has been published with the partial financial assistance of the Central Asian Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. However, the responsibility for the facts stated or opinions expressed is entirely of the authors.

***Himalayan and Central Asian Studies is indexed and abstracted in  
PAIS International, CSA, USA***

*Subscriptions should be sent by crossed cheque or bank draft in favour of HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION, B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029 (India)*

Printed and published by Prof. K. Warikoo on behalf of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029. Printed at Print India, A-38/2, Mayapuri-I, New Delhi-64 and published at New Delhi.

---

---

## EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

**Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Hridaya Kaul**  
New Delhi (India)

**Prof. Harish Kapur**  
Professor Emeritus  
Graduate Institute of  
International Studies  
Geneva (Switzerland)

**Prof. Touraj Atabaki**  
International Institute of Social  
History  
University of Amsterdam  
The Netherlands

**Prof. Devendra Kaushik**  
Gurgaon, Haryana (India)

**Dr. Osmund Boppearachchi**  
Director of Research at CNRS  
and Professor, Sorbonne  
Laboratory of Archaeology  
University of Paris (France)

**Dr. Sanjyot Mehendale**  
Executive Director  
Caucasus and Central Asia Program  
University of California  
Berkeley, USA

**Prof. Jayanta Kumar Ray**  
Chairman  
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad  
Institute of Asian Studies  
Kolkata (India)

**Dr. Lokesh Chandra**  
Director  
International Academy of  
Indian Culture  
New Delhi (India)

**Prof. I.N. Mukherjee**  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi (India)

**Prof. M.P. Lama**  
Chairperson  
Centre for South, Central &  
Southeast Asian Studies  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi (India)

---

---

## CONTRIBUTORS

**Prof. K. Warikoo** is Director, Central Asian Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

**Kairat Umarov** is Ambassador of Kazakhstan to India.

**Dr. Aigul Kurganbayeva** is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Galia Movkebayeva** is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Fatima Kukeyeva** is Head, International Relations and Foreign Policy, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Ms. Alia Akataeva** teaches at the Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Xu Qinhua** teaches at the Institute of Russian, Eastern Europe and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Renmin University, Beijing, China.

**Prof. Kuralay Baizakova** is Dean, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Saifolla Sapanov** is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Indranil Banerjee** is Executive Director, SAPRA India Foundation, New Delhi.

**Dr. Mara Gubaidullina** is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Klara Makasheva** teaches at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

**Dr. Ailuna Utegenova** teaches at the Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

---

---

# HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Vol. 10 No. 4

October - December 2006

## CONTENTS

<b>Editor's Page</b>		<b>1-2</b>
Kazakhstan Today	<i>Kairat Umarov</i>	<b>3-8</b>
The Geopolitical Realities of Central Asia	<i>Aigul Kurganbayeva</i> and <i>Galia Mookabayeva</i>	<b>9-19</b>
Russia's Policy towards Kazakhstan during Yeltsin Period	<i>K. Warikoo</i>	<b>20-34</b>
Kazakhstan-US Relations: Some Perspectives	<i>Fatima Kukeyeva</i>	<b>35-44</b>
Kazakhstan-China Trade and Economic Relations	<i>Alia Akataeva</i>	<b>45-56</b>
Trans-border Nationalities and State Relations: A Case Study of Kazakhs in Altai (Xinjiang)	<i>Xu Qinhua</i>	<b>57-68</b>
Democratization and Political Stability in Kazakhstan	<i>Kuralay Baizakova</i>	<b>69-76</b>
Elections in Kazakhstan	<i>Saifolla Sapanov</i>	<b>77-83</b>
Nazarbayev Emerges Stronger after Polls	<i>Indranil Banerjee</i>	<b>84-90</b>
Kazakhstan and the International Organizations	<i>Mara Gubaidullina</i>	<b>91-106</b>
Kazakhstan and the United Nations	<i>Klara Makasheva</i>	<b>107-115</b>
OSCE Activities in Central Asia	<i>Ailuna Utegenova</i>	<b>116-129</b>
<b>HRCF File</b>		
Kazakhstan Today ( <i>Seminar Report</i> )	<i>Mahesh R. Debata</i>	<b>130-134</b>

---

---

## *Editor's Page*

With its borders touching Russia in the north, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the south and China in the east, Kazakhstan enjoys a central position in Eurasia, which also contributes to its unique strategic importance in the region. Its largest non-Asian and non-Muslim population in Central Asia has accorded it a distinct Eurasian character. Kazakhstan is striving to forge a common Kazakhstani identity, which would be shared both by the Kazakhs, Slavs and other minorities.

During the past fifteen years of its independent nationhood, Kazakhstan has evolved as a dynamically developing, market oriented and multi-ethnic state today. Socio-political stability has been made possible through a number of political reforms. Though Islam is practiced by 70 per cent of the population, tolerance is an important ingredient of the traditions and culture of the Kazakh society.

Kazakhstan's remarkable progress in the post-Soviet space is marked by its political, economic and social stability, which are the three main pillars forming the edifice of nation-building. The Kazakh government has identified the priority sectors of the country's economy as building infrastructure, e-governance, banking, energy (oil and natural gas, hydro-electricity), mining and tourism. On the economic front, Kazakhstan has become major exporter of oil and is set to become one of the top five producers of oil in this decade. Kazakhstan has also emerged as one of the fast growing economies of the world having a growth rate of ten per cent. Radical economic reforms have opened up the market and helped integrate into the world trade system.

Considered by many experts as the "Anchor of Stability in Central Asia", Kazakhstan occupies a unique place in the whole Eurasian region. Kazakhstan has devised a pro-active, multi-vector and balanced foreign policy to cope with the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Kazakhstan's geographic location and its vast territory are the determining factors in its foreign policy, which seeks to create stable,

---

secure and friendly surroundings. Kazakhstan views itself as a bridge between Europe and Asia laying stress on establishing multilateral economic and political relations with Russia, US, China, Central Asian Republics, European Union and other Asian countries. Kazakhstan has evinced keen interest in the establishment of a common economic space in Eurasia. The central Eurasian landmass which is a geographical continuum with historical commonality, is not divided by any land, mountain or sea barriers. According to President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, who broached the idea of Eurasianism, Kazakhstan being at the centre of Eurasia would be a connecting link between Russia, China and the Muslim world.

Kazakhstan has been making efforts to expand friendly relations with all countries, especially in close and extended neighbourhoods. India is one of the first countries that President of independent Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev paid his official visit to in 1992. According to Kazakhstan's statistics, overall trade between India and Kazakhstan in 2004 amounted to \$96.6 million. Though it is 22.4 per cent higher than in 2003 (78.9 million US dollars), still it is far behind the potential. Since 2002, Kazakh-India Joint Working Group on Combating International Terrorism has been working on the joint action against terrorism, extremism, drugs trafficking, illegal trade of arms and organised crime. Kazakhstan-India Inter-governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, Industrial and Cultural Cooperation has been playing a sheet-anchor role in cooperation between the two republics in the fields such as trade, economy, energy, information technology, science and technology etc.

**K. Warikoo**

---

## KAZAKHSTAN TODAY\*

*Kairat Umarov*

On 30 August 2005, the people of Kazakhstan celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Constitution, which was adopted on 30 August 1995 through a national referendum. It was based on the French model and proclaimed Kazakhstan a democratic, secular state with a Presidential form of government. The newly adopted Constitution has further ensured effective governance, guaranteed checks and balances in government and separation of powers. The distinct difference of this Constitution from the earlier one is that it declares the rule of law and protection of human rights and freedom as the highest priority.

Over the last ten years, the Constitution has proven itself as an efficient law that lays a legal foundation for overall development of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, today, is a dynamically developing, market oriented, multi-ethnic and secular state. Its remarkable progress in the post-Soviet space is marked by political, economic and social stability. These are three main pillars on which nation-building achievements rest strongly and due to these, Kazakhstan may be viewed today as a success story of nation-building from the scratch.

Political stability has been achieved because of the wide ranging and consistent democratic reforms, which were further spurred by the Constitution. What is important is that under the Constitution, no political discussions have developed into a crisis. All political disputes have been settled within the constitutional framework. What are the main features ensuring political stability in Kazakhstan? The right of every citizen to vote and participate in elections is guaranteed by the Constitution. Democratic representation of various views in decision making is ensured by free activities of eleven political parties and 372 public associations of different political affiliations contributing to promotion of a civil society and building a democratic community.

---

\* This is an updated version of the presentation made at the Seminar on *Kazakhstan Today* at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi on 29 August 2005.



Another important factor is the public accord, which is very significant for the society comprising more than 100 nationalities with various religious outlooks. According to the 2002 census, Kazakhs constitute 54 per cent, Russians - 30 per cent, Ukrainians - 3.6 per cent, Uzbeks - 2.5 per cent and Germans - 2.3 per cent of the population. The Kazakhstan Nationalities Assembly, consisting of representatives of all ethnic groups in the country, plays an important role in maintaining the inter-ethnic peace by having consultative power in legislative process and direct appeal to the President. Like a mini UN in Kazakhstan, it tackles issues in a peaceful manner and avoids ethnic conflicts. Due to that, all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan live in peace and harmony. As a result, there has never been any conflict on religious or ethnic basis since independence. Guaranteed freedom of conscience also contributes to the stability in Kazakhstan. Everybody is free to practice his or her own religion. Nowadays, there are 46 faiths and about 1,313 religious associations preaching peace, tolerance and values common to all. Islam is practiced by 70 per cent of the population. There are also followers of Russian Orthodox Church (25 per cent), Protestant (1 per cent) and others (4 per cent). To foster inter-religious dialogue at the international level and prevent the so called “clash of civilizations”, Kazakhstan has initiated, and now regularly convenes the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, in which Indian representatives also take an active part.

Freedom of speech is ensured. Censorship is prohibited by the Constitution. Dynamic rise in the number of Kazakh media outlets from 600 in 1991 to 2,110 today indicates that the mass media, 77 per cent of which is private, is thriving in Kazakhstan. News media in the country speaks 13 languages including Kazakh, Russian, Uzbek, Ukrainian, Polish, English, German, Korean, Uyghur, Turkish etc.

Vibrant civil society institutions are the main attribute of today’s Kazakhstan. There are over 5,000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in the country. Under the President, Human Rights and Women Affairs Commission, National Commission for Democracy and Civil Society Development, Public Council for Media are entrusted to promote human rights, empower women and help conduct

democratic transformations step-by-step. Human Rights Ombudsman has been established in Kazakhstan, who acts on the complaints over human rights violations. There is a moratorium on death sentences.

Success of the Kazakh model of development was also ensured by the principle adhered to by the country at the outset of its independence: *First Economics, Then Politics*. It was due to that approach that the political and social stability has been preserved and economic prosperity achieved. Radical economic reforms have opened up the market and helped actively integrate into the world trade system. As a result, macro economic indicators have grown substantially. Kazakhstan has been enjoying ten per cent average annual growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the last seven years in a row. If ten years ago, the GDP per capita was only \$700, today it is \$3,300. In 2004, the foreign trade volume reached 33 billion US dollars with a trade surplus of seven billion US dollars. The government is carrying out an Industrial and Innovation Development Strategy aimed at building post-industrial, high-tech, English-speaking economy with capabilities in aerospace, biotechnology, Information Technology (IT), peaceful atomic energy etc. Investment climate has been another key to rapid economic growth. Kazakhstan has been able to attract about \$50 billion foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1991. The annual FDI influx is 1.5 billion US dollars. The distinction of Kazakh investment policy is creation in 1998 the Foreign Investors' Council consisting of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of foreign companies working in Kazakhstan which meets twice a year under the direct chairmanship of the President of Kazakhstan. It gives recommendations on improving business and investment climate in the country. As a result, Kazakhstan is renowned as a reliable partner that guarantees investors' rights. The country is included into the World Bank list of 20 countries with the most investment friendly environment. The Kazakh financial system reform has resulted in making it the strongest in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area and beyond. In Kazakhstan, there is a free flow of capital and 100 per cent currency convertibility. Inflation is as low as 5 to 7 per cent.

Hydrocarbon reserves in Kazakhstan constitute about 1.5 per cent of the world resources. The prospective development of Caspian Sea oil deposits will surely place Kazakhstan in the ranks of five top world oil producers. Establishment of the National Fund for Stable Social and Economic Development in 2001, which has already accumulated eight billion US dollars from oil and gas revenues, is a valuable asset for the future economic progress and stability. In terms of social improvements, it can be noted that the vast majority of Kazakh citizens enjoy the fruits of economic prosperity. Reforms in pension, housing, education and healthcare sectors of the country have been carried out successfully.

There has been significant increase in pension, hardship allowances, etc. In July 2005, salary of the public employees was raised by 32 per cent. Another increase of 30 per cent will take place in January 2007. As the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev put it in his annual address to the nation, Kazakhstan aims to join the ranks of “effectively developing economies while ensuring a high standard of living for its population.”

According to the World Bank, Kazakhstan now belongs to the group of middle-income countries. Since the end of the last decade, average income has grown almost five fold; monthly salaries have increased by about six times; minimum wage has gone up 25 times; average monthly pension by 4.6 times; personal and average per capita banking deposits by 35 and 37 times respectively. Compared to 2003, state expenditures on free healthcare have risen by 1.7 times. Rapid economic growth has made it possible to expand substantially the social targeting of government expenditures. The Constitution guarantees free-of-charge state-financed education up to high school level. Under the Constitution, every citizen has a right to get free high education on the basis of competition. Soon, there will be 50 per cent increase in government-sponsored grants available to the students. Today, literacy rate in the country is 98 per cent. Every year, under the *Bolashak* (Future) Programme, 3,000 of our best students receive scholarship from the national budget to study at the leading universities of the world. To alleviate housing problem, the government plans to build twelve million square meters of residential houses, which is 195,000 apartments in the next three years only.

The three pillars of growth can not be sustainable without the favourable external environment. That is why Kazakhstan's foreign policy aims at creating stable, secure and friendly surroundings. We have pro-active, multi-vector and balanced foreign policy to cope with the challenges of the 21st century. Kazakhstan's geographic location and its vast area predetermine its foreign policy. Actually, in terms of area, Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world. Its territory is equal to 86 per cent of that of India. Kazakhstan has been making efforts to expand friendly relations with all countries, especially in close and extended neighbourhoods. India is one of the first countries that President of independent Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev paid his official visit in 1992. Since then, there have been intensified exchanges of official visits between the two countries at various levels. Because of the political will of our leaders and sincere friendship between our peoples, it has been possible to expand and deepen the relationship between Astana and New Delhi.

India's participation in the CICA process (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia), which is a Kazakh foreign policy initiative uniting 17 Asian countries (with South Korea intending to join as the 18<sup>th</sup> full fledged member) designed to build security mechanisms in the region, contributes a lot to the stability of the continent. Along with other countries, India was given an Observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at the Astana Summit in July 2005. This provides an opportunity for regular discussions of global and regional issues within the SCO framework. In our foreign policy, India is defined as a reliable and strategic partner. To match the bilateral political interaction, our economic partnership needs to be encouraged. According to Kazakhstan's statistics, overall trade between India and Kazakhstan in 2004 amounted to \$96.6 million. Though it is 22.4 per cent higher than in 2003 (78.9 million US dollars), still it is far behind the potential.

Kazakhstan's main exports to India today are mineral products, leather and raw materials, and imports from India include vegetable products, food stuffs, chemicals, plastic, machinery and equipment. However, there is vast scope for cooperation in various fields including

manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, construction materials, leatherwear, plastics, pharmaceuticals, information technology (IT), oil and gas, tourism, etc. It is especially relevant, since the government is establishing industrial clusters in tourism, oil and gas machinery building, food processing, textiles, transport logistics, metallurgy and construction materials.

There is need to raise the awareness of Indian business community about the huge opportunities awaiting them in Kazakhstan. Round Tables such as this one, seminars and business meets can help in this process. To intensify private sector interaction, it is much needed to establish direct trade routes between the two countries, in particular within North South Corridor. We also need to encourage people-to-people contacts. Some steps have been already taken. The Centre for Indian Studies was set up in Almaty in August 2005. We invited Indian movie producers and Bollywood stars to participate at the second International Eurasian Film Festival at the end of September 2005. A well known violinist and the Head of the Western Kazakhstan Symphonic Orchestra, Marat Bisengaliev is working with the National Centre for Performing Arts (NCPA) to launch the first ever professional Indian National Symphonic Orchestra in Mumbai.

Kazakhstan is one of the most attractive tourist destinations, which awaits to be discovered by Indian travellers. “Air Astana” flies from Delhi to Almaty and back twice a week, on Wednesdays and Saturdays, by comfortable Boeing airplanes. Almaty is only three and a half hours away from New Delhi by air.

There are a lot of opportunities today opening up for developing closer and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries. With Kazakhstan’s stable growth and becoming a strong economic powerhouse in the region and India emerging as a global power, it is in the interest of both the nations to work together to ensure peace and stability regionally and globally.

Kazakhstan is a dynamically developing country with stable political system, prospering economy and thriving democracy. This is Kazakhstan today.

---

## THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA

*Aigul Kurganbayeva*  
and  
*Galia Movkebayeva*

The creation of newly independent states of Central Asia in 1991 has radically changed the political landscape of the Eurasian region. Since then Central Asia has become the focus of diversified political and economic interests of various global and regional powers. With the declaration of independence, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) faced the problems of self-identification and defining of foreign policy, economic and civilisational priorities. The favourable geographical position, huge stocks of hydrocarbons and other precious minerals in this region attracted the attention of world powers.

Central Asia borders on the strategically most important regions of the Eurasian continent. Situated in the east are - China and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region; in the south - Afghanistan, Middle East and a number of other Islamic states; in the west and the north - Caucasus, Turkey, Europe and Russia.

All the Central Asian Republics as well as other former Soviet republics have inherited numerous problems from the erstwhile USSR such as deep economic inter-dependence rooted in a state planning system, paternalism, raw materials based economy. Besides, these states were riddled with other problems like - crisis of the system, geopolitical competition, subjective mistakes of the country's political leaders etc.<sup>1</sup> An increasing diversification and incompatibility of the economic, political, strategic interests; distinctions in levels of economic development of the states, trade and economic relations, raw materials supply; geopolitical factors such as historically disputed territories, limitations of communication, struggle between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for the leadership in the region etc., show the existing contradictions among the countries of Central Asia. Today when the Central Asian states are at a transitional stage, it is imperative to point

out some important points here: first, the communist political and economic system is dismantled; and second, the initial stage of the state building process has been over and the fundamentals and priorities of internal policy have been determined. Though the absence of a civil society has predetermined the region's internal political development and set up, the main question about foreign policy priorities and creation of a stable system of the national and regional security is still open.<sup>2</sup>

It is impossible to comprehend and understand the present geopolitical situation in Central Asia without analysing the peculiarities of the region. Central Asia comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One of the major factors of political and economic stability of the Central Asian republics is their significant natural resources. Despite this advantage, these states find themselves in the closed transport space with limited access to the world markets and poorly developed internal and external communications. In addition, problems of uneven availability and distribution of water resources, existence of numerous zones of environmental disasters, demographic imbalance, migration problems and limitation of living space in some states of the region, economic, transport and communication dependence on Russia etc. are important so far as Central Asia is concerned.

The above factors influence the mutual relations in the region and the choice of foreign policy priorities. In terms of geopolitical strategy, each of the five Central Asian states chose their own way of development proceeding from own national interests, and economic and political situation. However, they all had one goal - to become full-fledged member of the world community. The most significant example of mutual relations of the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics is the evolution of the Central Asian Union created in January 1994, which was renamed as the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) on 28 December 2001. This shows that the Central Asian states gave priority to mutual economic relations rather than political ones.

Despite all the distinctions of internal political development and the contradictions in the region, Central Asia today is an object of steadfast

## ***THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA***

---

attention of USA, China, Russia, Western Europe, Iran, Pakistan, India and Turkey. All these countries are actively aiming at strengthening their positions in Central Asia. The main reasons why these states are attracted to the Central Asian region are the availability of large quantity of natural resources, commodity markets of goods and services and other geopolitical, geoeconomic, civilizational-cultural reasons etc. For the above global and regional actors, the Caspian Sea with its unique hydrocarbon and biological stocks has a special strategic importance. Japan, Saudi Arabia, and also the Newly Industrial States (South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia) and other countries, continental and trans-continental economic structures (MNCs and TNCs) also have their respective interests in the region. The inter-dependence of antagonistic strategic interests of the external actors leads to the formation of the international tension zone that influences the stability of the development of the region and the balance of geopolitical forces and thus, leading to a new 'Great Game' of the big powers and global interests. The countries of Central Asia are interested in strengthening their statehood which is the main guarantee against the present chaotic situation. Two other guarantees are military-political coalitions and international organizations. The newly independent states of the region, with unequal political and economic power and insufficient military potentials, have the risk of being "pawns on the chess board of Eurasia."<sup>3</sup>

Geographically, being situated at the crossroads of Russia, People's Republic of China and the Muslim states, it was important for the Central Asian countries not to allow occurrence of a certain geopolitical vacuum in the region at the initial stage of development. Each state of Central Asia has specific interests, but there are a number of large geopolitical problems which could be solved by a single bloc of the states of the region. For example, the conflicts on the perimeter of external borders of Central Asia (the Afghanistan problem, separatism in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Indo-Pakistan conflict etc.) have the potential to affect a significant part of the Central Asian territory because of porous borders.<sup>4</sup>

The US foreign policy strategy concerning the new states of Central Asia is based mainly on geopolitical reasons, a pragmatic



approach considering its own strategic priorities and interests. American Scholar Z. Brzezinski believes that the basic US interest in the region is to create such conditions in which none of the global and regional powers could have control over this region, and the world community would have an unobstructed financial and economic access to it. According to him, the geopolitical pluralism will become a steady reality only when the network of oil pipelines and transport routes connect the region directly with the big centres of world economic activities through the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Sea as well as through the overland routes.<sup>5</sup>

The other main actor in this region is Russia. The reorientation of foreign economic relations of Russia towards the “far abroad” in the beginning of 1990s, and also the shortage of economic resources led to the significant decrease of Russian influence as a dominating partner in cooperation with the Central Asian countries. However, Russia still remains the most important neighbour and a partner in all fields of activity for the Central Asian countries besides being a guarantor of regional stability. Russia is also interested in strengthening its position in Central Asia because:

- i) There is interdependence between Russia and the Central Asian Republics on delivery of raw materials and finished goods. Besides, many of their products are non-competitive in the world market and can be sold only in the post-Soviet countries. It is believed that Russia can have its place in international relations only if it continues close trade and economic cooperation with the Central Asian states and the CIS.
- ii) Russian interests are connected to geopolitical problems such as control over the major transport especially the transit communications in Central Asia. However, Russian actions have been limited due to weakness of the Russian economy, an active advance of the US and other leading states. For example, the American capital investments in the region have surpassed the investments of Russia and even China.
- iii) The share of the Russian population in a number of Central Asian Republics is significant. The protection of the rights of

## ***THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA***

---

ethnic Russians is one of the most important concerns of Russia because Russian immigrants have been instrumental in the modernization of the Central Asian Republics since long and occupied key positions.<sup>6</sup>

- iv) Russian presence in this region has been ironically felt in order to check the spread of extremist and religious ideas, proliferation of drugs, weapons, arms and ammunition.
- v) The five Central Asian states manufacture some kinds of industrial and agricultural goods which are of special interest to Russia. The region has one of the world's richest stock of precious minerals. The Caspian Sea holds the second position in hydrocarbon stocks after the Persian Gulf. Central Asian Republics expect Russian participation in the mining and transportation of these resources across their territory. The share of the Central Asian countries in the Russian export is more than 25 per cent.<sup>7</sup>

The other two actors which are engaged in wielding their influence in the region are Turkey and Iran. With the decrease of Russian presence in the region, the first half of 1990s witnessed the rivalry between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia. Both these countries took steps to convince the Central Asian Republics to recognize their respective roles in the region. The West, in its turn, has been pushing Turkey to assume the role of promoting the process of modernization and maintenance of political moderation in the region. The USA continues to encourage Turkey by regarding the transportation of energy resources from the region. The US sees Turkey as the conductor of its policy, as the realization of other transportation projects (except for the Afghanistan and Caucasian ones) would mean strengthening of the positions of one of the three regional actors - Russia, China and Iran. Washington's efforts also aim at checking Iran, which the USA considers as one of the rogue states and which does not agree upon the "game rules" in Central Asia. Iran, on the other hand, offers the alternative project of transportation of hydrocarbons through its territory, which is much more favourable than the route through Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

For Iran, it is much easier to carry out trade and economic cooperation because it has the common overland and sea border with the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan is irritated with the vigorous activity of Iran on use of the religious - cultural factor, which has an important role in the social-political life of the states of Central Asia. Heads of the Central Asian states cannot ignore Iran, taking into account its possession of international seaports, its role as a centre of communications, its influence in Afghanistan, and also the oil stocks and technologies for their processing. Teheran will continue to aspire for expanding the sphere of its influence in Central Asia, considering it to be historically rightful and justified.

People's Republic of China, another important economic and military power, has been making efforts in spreading its influence in the Central Asian region. However, the Central Asian states perceive the relations with China quite cautiously, taking into account some moments from the history of mutual relations with China. Nevertheless, the Central Asian countries bordering on China have taken an unprecedented step by concluding multilateral agreements in 1996 and 1997 (between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and China) on demilitarization of the common border with People's Republic of China and strengthening of measures of trust in the military field on the border areas.<sup>9</sup> It is quite probable that these agreements dispelled some apprehensions of the Central Asian leaders about China's expansionist aspirations. It is believed that the basic efforts of China will be directed towards strengthening its position in Southeast Asia in the near future. In the long term, in the multipolar world and changing balance of forces in the international arena, the successful economic reforms of China and vigorous growth rate of its economy testifying to its huge economic potential, will lead to increased activism by China to expand the sphere of its influence in the western and northwest direction. Besides, the leading position of China in Asia will increase its role in Central Asia. This geopolitical process is tending to grow and it is an objective consistent pattern in the modern balance of forces and the present conditions of interstate mutual relations.<sup>10</sup> China will use all forms of cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral ones, the

## ***THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA***

---

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for example. According to some analysts, SCO is an instrument of China and Russia for influencing the Asian region as well as the relations with India and Pakistan. Russia and China also use the SCO for coordination of their positions on other global issues. Both countries do not agree with the alignment of forces in the international system and the US hegemony.<sup>11</sup> China aspires to use economic and technical opportunities of the countries of Central Asia to speed up economic development of its backward northwestern regions. However, separatist activities in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) will remain the most acute and complicated problem in the near future not only in China's relations with the Central Asian countries but also with Pakistan.

Pakistan has become a key player in the geopolitical situation in the Central Asian republics. Pakistan's importance in Central Asia stems from the following facts:

- i) Central Asia is a sort of "bridge" between "three" Asias (the term has been widely used recently by the majority of political scientists), as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (IRP) enjoys a unique position being part of both the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). Islamabad seeks to use the OIC platform to become an important element of the strategic communication network covering Central, Western and South Asia;
- ii) the historical affinity of cultures, traditions and customs based on religious affinity of people;
- iii) the favourable geopolitical situation of the Central Asian republics being at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, huge mineral resources and geographical proximity to Pakistan define the strategic course of Pakistan's foreign policy.
- iv) India, which was having close relations with the former USSR during the Cold War era, is an important factor defining the national interests of Pakistan in this region. In case of normalization of the Indo-Pakistan relations, India could conduct more profitable trade and economic relations with the countries of Central Asia.

- v) The Afghanistan conflict has been an essential obstacle in strengthening the position of Pakistan in the Central Asian region.
- vi) The creation of transit routes from the countries of Central Asia to the ports in Indian Ocean with the help of foreign participants has been of great interest for Islamabad. These routes are the important lever of influence on the development of cooperation with the Central Asian region.

Some international experts believe that the end of bipolar system in international relations has greatly improved the relations between the USA and India which was the traditional strategic partner and ally of the former USSR in South Asia. Now interests of both India and USA coincide on a number of issues. For example, both countries are concerned about the threat of “Islamization” of the Central Asian republics and consequently aspire to support existing secular regimes.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, India and Pakistan also compete for expansion of their sphere of influence in Central Asia. Central Asia holds an important place in the Indian foreign policy strategy in the context of strengthening regional and global security. Analysis of the geopolitical situation shows that countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have of late been strengthening their positions in the region, using economic, ideological and cultural - civilizational factors. In order to stop Pakistan playing the anti-India card, New Delhi has been advocating the secular model of development in the Central Asian states. The other factor which worries India is the attempt by Pakistan to create a radical Islamic bloc from Bosphorus up to Punjab and Kashmir.<sup>13</sup> India expresses concern over the Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the development of new Central Asian markets, which is confirmed by the Quadrilateral Treaty on Transit Trade on the Karakorum Highway, signed by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan in March 1995.<sup>14</sup>

The Central Asian region is situated in the so-called ‘arch of instability’, covering southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia, separating it from the ‘zone of both potential and existing local conflicts’ (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and India). Russia’s military-political interaction with the

### ***THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA***

---

countries of Central Asia, which form a buffer zone for Russia, would prevent actual and potential threats from the distant approaches. In this respect, Central Asia is a buffer to check the penetration of militant religious fundamentalism and extremism. Secular character of the ruling elites in the states of Central Asia, disapproval and/or limiting the politicization of Islam in the frame of its moderate forms is the major factor of stability not only in the region, but also in Russia itself. Moreover the mutual relations of “the post-Soviet Muslim states” and also with ‘external’ Muslims are not based on principles of Islamic solidarity. Except for the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan and growth of a level of religiousness in Ferghana Valley, Islam does not have any significant influence on the political course of these countries.”<sup>15</sup> Thus, Central Asia has become an arena for collision of interests between the neighbouring states. Considering its own strategic plans, Pakistan will be striving to realize its tasks, without damaging mutual relations and using similar positions of these countries on certain issues.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is actively moving ahead towards Central Asia with various projects and programmes. Membership in the NATO provided a foothold for the US strategic forces during the military actions in the Persian Gulf. The NATO closely cooperates with international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU). In order to strengthen the security system in the region, the NATO emphasizes preventive diplomacy, supports uniformity of the systems of military planning and introduction of uniform standards, thus trying to establish a new world order on the Eurasian continent. However, it has been pointed out that “appearance of the NATO on the coast of Caspian Sea in Central Asia means a radical transformation of geopolitical contours of this part of Eurasia, coming into a deep rear of Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, India and China. It also means an appearance of the new centre of pressure and potential threat to stability.”

The Central Asian Republics are mainly interested in the development of economic cooperation with all nearby and neighbouring states, including Islamic countries which can be possible only after the

construction of the transport communications running through the territory of Pakistan to the seaports of Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. In this situation, the effective strategy is the one aiming at coordinating the tactics of the Central Asian states in order to do away with the geopolitical pressure of external powers. Despite the internal contradictions existing in the Central Asian community today, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) plays a significant role in strengthening mutual relations inside the region. Thus, the important decisions on creation of inter-state consortium, adopting the common principles of a securities market formation, the order of signing the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) in 1998, the activity of “Central Asian battalion”, the creation of uniform economic union, etc. have been made within the UN framework. This shows that the relations between the states of Central Asia have reached a new level of economic and political development.

#### REFERENCES

1. N. A. Nazarbayev, *On the Eve of the XXI Century*, Almaty, 1996, p.9.
2. M. Esenov, “The Neutrality of Turkmenistan and its Influence on the Regional Security System”, *Central Asia and Caucasus* (Luleo, Sweden), February 2001.
3. A. Torkunov, “Security Problems on the Korean Peninsula”, *The Diplomatic Year Book*, 1996, p.184.
4. V.N. Moscalenko, *Pakistan and the States of Central Asia; the Western Asia, the Central Asia and Transcaucasia; Integration and Conflicts*, 1995, p.29.
5. Z. Brzezinski, *The Great Chess Board*, 1999, pp.178-179.
6. S.K. Kushkumbayev, “Regional Integration in Central Asia”, *Sayosat*, no. 18, 1998, p.72.
7. S.S. Razov, “In New Central Asia” *International Life*, no. 13, 1997, p.36.
8. Arshad Ali, “Pak - Central Asian Communication Links”, *Contemporary Central Asia*, 1995, p. 47.
9. K.K. Tokayev, *Under the Banner of Independence*, Almaty, 1997, p.218.

***THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA***

---

10. K.S. Sultanov, *Reforms in Kazakhstan and China: Peculiarities, Similarities, Distinctions, Successes, Problems*, Astana, 2000, p.456.
11. D.A. Kalieva, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects of Development", *The Analytical Review*, no. 3, 2001, p.38.
12. E.M Grushko, *Foreign Policy of Modern Pakistan*, 1997, p.43.
13. T. Shaumian, "Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Central Asian States", *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, 1998, p.71.
14. Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.75, no.1, January/February 1996, p.24.
15. S.K. Kushkumbayev, *Central Asia on the Ways of Integration: Geopolitics, Ethnicity, Safety*, Almaty, 2002, p.93.



---

## **RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN DURING YELTSIN PERIOD\***

*K. Warikoo*

Stretching over 1,600 kms. from north to south and over 2,000 kms. from the Caspian Sea in the west to China's frontier in the east, Kazakhstan in terms of area is the largest of the Central Asian Republics and the ninth largest country in the world. Its strategic importance is not only due to its central position in Eurasia sharing its borders with Russia in the north (about 7,000 kms.), with Caspian Sea in the west (2,320 kms.), with China (over 1,500 kms.), with Kyrgyzstan (1,000 kms.), with Uzbekistan (2,300 kms.) and with Turkmenistan (380 kms.), but also due to its abundant oil, gas and mineral resources. The Republic is multi-ethnic with Russians (30 per cent) constituting the largest minority followed by Ukrainians (3.6 per cent), Uzbeks (2.5 per cent), Germans (2.3 per cent), Tatars (1.6 per cent), Uighurs (1.4 per cent) and others. As such, Kazakhstan has the largest non-Asian and non-Muslim population which accords it a distinct Eurasian character. Kazakhstan and Russia have been part of a single state system for nearly two centuries. Due to its long common border with Russia, its large Russian population (second after the Kazakhs) and rich energy resources, Kazakhstan has been regarded highly important to Russia's interests.

### **THE SOVIET PERIOD**

Russia's push southwards in the Kazakh steppes began around 1730s with the acceptance of Russian control by Abulkhair, the Khan of the Lesser Horde. It was much before Russia had initiated its forward policy towards Central Asia following its defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56), which led to the transfer of Russian interest from

---

\* This paper is based on the presentation made at the International Symposium on *Rising Powers and Values in Eurasia* organized by the Ataturk University, Erzurum, Turkiye, March 1-3, 2006.

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

Balkans to Central Asia. From early 1850s onwards, numerous Central Asian cities and Khanates were taken over and incorporated. Thus started the process of migration of Russian farmers, artisans and workers for work and settlement in the vast Central Asian region. Large settlements of Russians came up in northern Kazakhstan. Soon after the October Revolution, the Kazakhstan Autonomous Republic, which included some regions of southwestern Siberia, mostly populated by Russians, was created on 26 August 1920 as part of the Russian Federation. On 5 December 1936, this Republic was reorganised into the Kazakhstan Union Republic. Kazakhstan was always treated in the Soviet terminology as being different from the other four Central Asian Republics. The region was referred to as *Srednyaya Aziya* (Middle Asia) and Kazakhstan. Even in the centralized economic planning, Kazakhstan and Central Asia were treated as separate regions, having two SOVNARKHOZ (Council for Running the Economy), one for each region.

With the launch of first Five Year Plan and also during the World War II, hundreds of industries were set up or relocated in Kazakhstan. Several hundred thousand Russian skilled workers, engineers, technicians, technocrats, doctors and teachers moved out of the western parts of erstwhile Soviet Union to Kazakhstan for work. Another wave of Russians settled in Kazakhstan in early 1950s under the Virgin Lands Scheme. Between 1959 to 1970, over one million Russians had moved into Kazakhstan.<sup>1</sup> So till early 1970s, the main direction of migration was from Russia due to the development of communication, irrigation networks, hydel projects, construction works, mining, machine building, chemicals, textile and other heavy industries in Kazakhstan. Thus ethnic Russians attained the numerical majority in Kazakhstan in 1959 and retained this status till 1970s. Later on, the Russians started losing their privileged positions in spheres of trade, education, culture, public health etc. The percentage of Russians in the total population of Central Asia began declining since late 1960s. In Kazakhstan, the Russian population declined from 42.7 per cent in 1959 to 37.8 per cent in 1989 and further to 29.9 per cent in 1999. So much so, Kazakhs became a majority in Kazakhstan for the first

time in 1989, since the early years of the Soviet Union, comprising 39.7 per cent of the Republic's total population as against 30 per cent in 1959. And the 1999 Census recorded their absolute majority putting them at 53.4 per cent.

**Table: 1**  
**Ethnic Trends in Kazakhstan**

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>1926</b>	<b>1959</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1999*</b>
Kazakhs	3,713,300 (57.1%)	2,787,300 (30%)	4,234,100 (32.6%)	6,534,600 (39.7%)	7,636,200 (44.3%)	7,985,000 (53.4%)
Russians	1,279,900 (19.6%)	3,972,000 (42.7%)	5,521,900 (42.5%)	6,227,500 (37.8%)	5,769,700 (35.8%)	4,479,600 (30.0%)
Ukrainians	860,800 (13.2%)	761,400 (8.2%)	933,400 (7.2%)	896,200 (5.5%)	820,800 (5.1%)	547,100 (3.7%)

*Source:* A. Elebaeva (ed.), *Razvitiye mezhnatsional'nykh otnoshenii v novykh nezavisimyykh gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoi Azii*, Bishkek, Ilim, 1995, pp.316-22, cited in Rafis Abazov, "Central Asia's Conflicting Legacies and Ethnic Policies". In *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol.5, No.2, Summer 1999, pp.62-90.

\*Census of Kazakhstan, 1999

1970s and 1980s were marked by an increasing tendency among the Muslim peoples of Central Asia towards national exclusiveness and ethno-centrism.<sup>2</sup> Though Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* and *glasnost* ushered in a new era of press freedom, political democratisation and decentralisation of decision making process, yet the removal of Din Muhammad Kunaev as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party and his replacement by Kolbin, a Russian, sparked off violent demonstrations in Almaty in December 1986. Slogans like "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs" and "Kolbin go to Russia." were raised openly. Various factors such as ethnic seclusion, nationalist and religious resurgence, socio-political assertion by indigenous educational, political and bureaucratic elites, growing unemployment, low productivity in farming and industry that resulted in shortages and decline in standard of living, led to heightened inter-ethnic tensions in Soviet Central Asia. Notwithstanding the Soviet

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

efforts to achieve the goal of assimilation of different nationalities, there was inter-ethnic discord. The indigenous people now openly expressed dissent against the Tsarist and later Soviet Russian policies in the region, and gave vent to their feelings and aspirations which were perceived to have been suppressed under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The bitter memories of Russian colonisation, rebellions against Tsarist and Soviet regimes that were suppressed, collectivisation campaign and the Stalinist repressions, famine, neglect of local religion, culture and languages, that are embedded in the psyche of Kazakhs, do influence the course of Kazakh policy and relations towards Russians and the Russian Federation.

### **POST-SOVIET PERIOD**

One may recall that the Central Asian Republics neither strived nor were actually prepared for their independence, which was thrust upon them. In fact, there was a move to form a confederation of advanced Slavic Republics of the former USSR-Russia, Belarus and Ukraine- to the exclusion of the Central Asian Republics, which did not materialize. Instead the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into being after eleven of the former Soviet Republics signed a Declaration in December 1991 at Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. The Central Asian Republics, being heavily dependent upon the subsidies from Moscow and with their economies being closely interlinked with Russia, were in favour of preserving in some form their links with Russia. All the road and rail links of Kazakhstan as well as its oil and gas pipelines moved northward towards Russia. But in spite of the existence of a single currency- the Russian rouble in the CIS, common economic space and other factors, the Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin and its reformers led by Prime Minister Gaidar and Foreign Minister Kozyrev followed a policy of Russian isolationism. They believed that Russia needed to distance itself from Muslim Central Asia in order to join the Western 'civilised' world. So in the period following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy was at the crossroads, primarily due to teething socio-economic problems within Russia and also due to the Western influence. During the Yeltsin period,

Russia found itself in a deep economic crisis. The year 1993 was marked by the closure of a large number of enterprises. The Central Bank of Russia could not make adequate supply of roubles to the Central Asian Republics, which were thus forced to have their own national currencies. The first phase of Yeltsin period (1991-93) marked the shift of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics away from Moscow, mainly due to Russia's indifference towards Central Asia. Quick political and economic initiatives by the West in Kazakhstan led to decline in Russia's influence in the region.

In the initial years, the Russian policy was marked by its initial lack of interest in Central Asian affairs. In the immediate aftermath of disintegration of Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy was oriented towards the West. Russia gave priority to build relations with Europe and USA, at the same time retreating from its previous geopolitical role in Asia. Pre-occupied with its own domestic problems and obsessed with the Euro-Atlantist approach in its foreign policy, Russia was indifferent to the developments in its 'Near Abroad'. Russia hoped to become a prosperous liberal democracy based on the Western model with generous aid and assistance from the West. There was a general feeling of viewing Central Asia as a "burden and an alien civilization."<sup>3</sup> Russia was in no position to lend any assistance to Central Asia, as it was besieged with its financial problems. Previously Soviet Union subsidised the Central Asian Republics to the tune of twenty five billion dollars a year. The pro-West political elite of Russia considered any association with the Central Asian Republics as burdensome which would hinder the 'speedy modernisation' of Russia. The Atlantists viewed Central Asia as a "burden for Russia" and "a source of instability, conflict and problems", which was considered to be beyond Russia's control.<sup>4</sup> This perception was also based on the past Soviet experience in Afghanistan which cost the Soviet Union too high in terms of men, materials and international image. It was in September 1992 that the Russian Foreign Ministry in its report on the Russian policy in the CIS, outlined its priorities as "(1) ensuring human rights including the rights of ethnic-national minorities; (2) achievement of stability and safety; (3) equal rights of all states; (4) obligatory fulfilment of

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

agreements by all states and (5) strengthening the security of Russia's borders."<sup>5</sup> However, this report did not define the place and role of Central Asia in the CIS.<sup>6</sup>

However, assumption of power by the Islamist extremist parties in Tajikistan in September 1992 and the escalation of fighting provoked prompt and strong reaction from Russia and the neighbouring Central Asian states. Just one day after the removal of Nabyev on 2 September 1992, the presidents of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan issued a warning to the government and political organisations of Tajikistan describing the unrest as threat to the CIS. They also announced their collective decision to deploy CIS troops along the Tajik-Afghan border to stop the large scale smuggling of arms and cross border movement of armed bands.<sup>7</sup>

It was in these circumstances that the Eurasianists' arguments in favour of restoring close relations with the Central Asian Republics gained ground in Russia. Whereas the Russian nationalists drew attention to the problems faced by Russians and the Russian speaking minorities in Central Asia, Russian military pointed to the dangers implicit in the dismantling of Russian military and strategic space facilities in Central Asia.<sup>8</sup> Now the need to secure the southern flank of Russia and to retain control over the external border of CIS was stressed. The Eurasianists wanted "Russia to prevent conflicts in Central Asia, neutralise attempts by third countries to take advantage of regional instability and create an effective peacekeeping mechanism built on the basis of the Russian military potential."<sup>9</sup> Now senior leaders of the Russian government and military openly voiced their concern over the security of Russian minorities and vowed to discharge their responsibilities on this account.<sup>10</sup> The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strongly worded statement on 15 October 1992 expressing concern over the "expanding fratricidal civil war in Tajikistan and the danger of conflict spreading to adjacent countries."<sup>11</sup> It warned that "Russia will do everything necessary to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Russians."<sup>12</sup> This signalled an end to the drift in Russia's policy towards Central Asia. Now Moscow took the lead and a summit involving the concerned Central Asian states and the Russian Foreign

Minister, A. Kozyrev was held at Almaty on 4 November 1992.<sup>13</sup> It was agreed that Russia's 201st Motor Rifle Division should remain in Tajikistan.<sup>14</sup> It was at the Minsk Summit of the heads of CIS states on 22 January 1993 that a formal decision to reinforce the Russian border troops by forces from the neighbouring CIS states for effectively closing the Tajik-Afghan border was taken.<sup>15</sup>

The massacre of more than 25 Russian Border Guards on the Tajik border post on 13 July 1993 sent shock waves in Russian official and public circles, jolting the government out of its indifferent and ambiguous policy towards Central Asia. President Boris Yeltsin called a special session of the Russian Security Council in Moscow on 26 July 1993 to take stock of the situation and take remedial measures.<sup>16</sup> Yeltsin described the Tajik-Afghan border as "the frontier of Russia."<sup>17</sup> Soon after, Yeltsin organised a summit meeting with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Moscow on 7 August 1993. Now the basic parameters of Russian policy towards Central Asia were outlined as preserving internal stability in Central Asia, protection of Russian speaking minorities, preventing Islamist extremism from destabilising the social and political situation in Central Asia, and treating the Tajik-Afghan border as the common CIS border. So from 1993 onwards, "Russia began to link its policy towards Central Asia particularly with the treatment of the Russian-speaking population there."<sup>18</sup> Russia's Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrev visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in November 1993. He pointed to Russian interest in developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the region but "linked it to the treatment of Russian speakers there."<sup>19</sup> Moscow was now getting concerned over the increasing influx of Russian refugees from Central Asia, which posed the problems of their employment, housing and rehabilitation.

The Russian foreign policy and military doctrines of 1993 declared the whole of the former Soviet territory as an area of 'vital interest' to Russia and also claimed the right to defend the Russian speaking population living outside Russia. In May 1992, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian Republic to sign a bilateral treaty with Russia on 'friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance', by which they were

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

obliged to render each other military assistance in the event of aggression against either party. Both countries agreed that they would form a "united military and strategic zone and jointly use the military bases, test sites and other military infrastructures."<sup>20</sup> In 1994, additional agreements on military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan were signed. Another agreement was signed with Russia leasing 6,000 kms. enclosing the Baikonour Cosmodrome for 20 years for 120 million US dollars per year.<sup>21</sup> Notwithstanding these agreements, the military cooperation achieved was considered by Russia as inadequate.<sup>22</sup> However, Kazakhstan and also the other Central Asian Republics demonstrated their keenness to be independent of Russia and they became part of UN, OSCE, NATO, ECO, OIC etc. Kazakhstan participated actively in NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme and joint military exercises.

On their part, the Central Asian Republics including Kazakhstan viewed Yeltsin as the best guarantor of their independence. The new regimes in Central Asia, though part of Soviet Communist *nomenclatura* now renounced Communist ideology and took concerted steps to promote nationalism and consolidate the sovereignty of the newly independent Republics. Finding themselves in the changed political and social situation, the Russians in Kazakhstan felt that they were suddenly reduced to the status of second class citizens.<sup>23</sup> With the Kazakhs assuming power and holding key positions in politics, government, civil and other services, they asserted claiming political, social and economic privileges for the indigenous people. Homogenisation and building a mono-ethnic state were viewed by the political elite of Kazakhstan as a means towards nation building. Emphasis was laid on the consolidation of Kazakhs scattered in Asia and Europe in their homeland. In fact during the three years 1990-92, over 190,000 Kazakhs immigrated into Kazakhstan from Mongolia, Russia and other Central Asian states.<sup>24</sup> The declaration of Kazakh as the official language in Kazakhstan spurred the exodus of Russians from Central Asia, since very few Russians know the local language which puts them into a marked disadvantage in the matter of securing jobs. The issue of protection of rights of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan



became an emotive issue in Russia, thereby influencing Russia's policy towards the region. In September 1996, the Committee on CIS Affairs of the Russian Duma expressed concern at the treatment of Russians in Kazakhstan. It called upon the Kazakh authorities to "stop the persecution and harassment of the Russian population and of Cossacks in particular."<sup>25</sup> It urged upon the Russian President and government to "use all their powers to prevent the violation of generally accepted international norms in Kazakhstan."<sup>26</sup>

**Table: 2**  
**Migration from Kazakhstan to Russia (1990-1994)**  
**(Year wise)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>
Kazakhstan	131,000	49,000	179,000	203,000	409,000

*Source: Z.A. Zainochkovskaya, "Migration in the Post-Soviet Territory", Geography, no.39, 1996.*

**Table: 3**  
**Migration of Ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan to Russia**  
**(1997)**

	<b>% of Total Emigration to Russia</b>	
Kazakhstan	167,475	48.5%

*Source : IOM, Migration in the CIS, 1997-98, Geneva, 1999, p.127.*

Kazakhstan which is geographically closer to Russia and where Russians form the second largest community after the indigenous Kazakhs, presents a special case. Russians had settled in Kazakhstan, particularly the northern parts, much before than they did in other Central Asian Republics. The Soviets never treated Kazakhstan as part of Central Asia. And the Russians "who lived there for several generations regard the steppes of northern Kazakhstan as their homeland."<sup>27</sup> Russians particularly in northern Kazakhstan, put up opposition to the Kazakhisation process. The Cossacks organised themselves under the banner of *Vozrozhdeniye* and other societies demanding secession of the Cossack dominated territory of Kazakhstan

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

and its merger with Russia. Influential circles in Russia including the Nobel Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy called for the incorporation of Russian speaking areas in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan into Russia. A joint meeting of the Cossacks of Siberia and Kazakhstan held in Omsk in early 1994, announced the merger of two Cossack Unions into a Siberian Cossack Force. Other Russian organisations - the Congress of Russian Communities and *Lad Movement*, which are based mostly in northern Kazakhstan, have been campaigning for decentralisation, recognition of official status of the Russian language and dual citizenship for Russian speaking population. Ust Kamenogorsk became the main centre of Russian activism. In February 1997, over 150 ethnic Russian and Cossack organisations joined together to create a bloc in Kazakhstan to defend their rights. They urged upon Russia to link its offer of economic and political cooperation with Kazakhstan to Kazakhstan's observance of respect for the rights of Russian minorities.<sup>28</sup> But the Kazakhstan authorities have dealt with the situation both tactfully and firmly.

Kazakhstan's Citizenship Law of 1991 provides citizenship to all those who resided in Kazakhstan permanently on the day of enactment of the law. Though citizenship was extended to ethnic Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan, dual citizenship was prohibited much to the discomfiture of Russians. In April 1994, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed a memorandum in Moscow agreeing that Russian residents in Kazakhstan and Kazakhs living in Russia be allowed to migrate freely to Russia and Kazakhstan respectively. A Russian- Kazakh treaty on the legal status of Russians living in Kazakhstan and Kazakhs living in Russia was ratified by the Kazakh Parliament in early 1995 and later by Russia's State Duma on 24 May 1996. The Russian Upper House ratified the treaty on 5 June 1996.<sup>29</sup> While the treaty sought to allay the fears of Russians in Kazakhstan, it in no way conferred dual citizenship upon them.

Whereas President Nazarbayev has been trying to maintain friendly contacts with Russia "at a healthy distance", he moved the Kazakh capital from Almaty in the southeast to Astana (formerly Akmola) in the north-central region which is predominantly Russian.

With the shift of capital, hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs belonging to administration, police, trade and political circles are expected to take up residence in the new capital over a period of time thus marking the Kazakhisation of the northern territory. This move would also help the Kazakh authorities to keep a check on any Russian secessionist or nationalist activity there. At the same time, stringent steps have been taken to deter any anti-Kazakh moves in the region. For instance in Ust-Kamenogorsk-the capital of East Kazakhstan Oblast, which has a majority of Russians, the Kazakh authorities arrested 22 persons on the charge of “planning to overthrow the Oblast’s leadership and proclaim the region a Russian Altaic Republic.”<sup>30</sup> Those arrested included 12 Russian citizens, who were not extradited to Russia.<sup>31</sup> Thus the Kazakh authorities have tried to thwart any possible challenge by the Russians to their strategy of building a homogenous Kazakh nation state. This task has been facilitated by the exodus of nearly one million Russians<sup>32</sup> from Kazakhstan to Russia and immigration of over 200,000 Kazakhs from outside Kazakhstan, which has drastically altered the demographic situation in Kazakhstan. The balance of power has shifted in favour of Kazakhs.

## CONCLUSION

Russia’s concern over the welfare of Russian minorities, national security, economic and energy cooperation, perceived threat of Islamic extremism and need to combat drugs and arms trafficking have been some of the key issues that factor in Russia’s policy towards post-Soviet Kazakstan. Ensuring the Russian presence over the Tajik-Afghan border was seen as a pragmatic way of protecting about 7,000 kms. long Russia-Kazakhstan border from the influx of illegal drugs and arms, Islamist extremists and also illegal migrants. The Russian Federation, which claims to look after the interests of Russians living in its ‘Near Abroad’, can assist in reviving the sick enterprises and industries in Central Asia, which in turn can provide the requisite employment to the skilled Russians thereby reducing the cause of their exodus. Russia can also render assistance to Kazakhstan in starting and rejuvenating Russian educational and cultural institutions, in order to

## ***RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN***

---

meet the educational and cultural needs of the Russians living there. But for all this, strong and vibrant political and socio-economic partnership between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on mutually advantageous basis is a requisite.

Kazakhstan looks itself as a bridge between Europe and Asia with its emphasis on establishing multilateral economic and political relations with Russia, US, China, Central Asian Republics, European Union and other Asian countries. Kazakhstan has evinced interest in the establishment of a common economic space in Eurasia. The central Eurasian landmass, which is a geographical continuum with historical commonality, is not divided by any land, mountain or sea barriers. Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia are the three Eurasian countries in geographical sense. In 1994, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan broached the idea of Eurasianism, during his address at the Moscow State University. According to President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan being at the centre of Eurasia would be a connecting link between Russia, China and the Muslim world. The years 2003 and 2004 were celebrated as the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan and Year of Kazakhstan in Russia respectively. The establishment of Collective Security Organisation, SCO, Single Economic Space, CICA are all manifestations of the Eurasian approach. The actual realisation of Customs Union will be an important step in this direction. Though Russia's trade with Central Asia has been declining since 1991, having dropped to about one-third of the volume of trade with the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, yet Russia's foreign trade with post-Soviet Kazakhstan has been substantive. Russia remains an important trading partner although the percentage of exports from Kazakhstan to Russia has fallen to 25 per cent.<sup>33</sup> Kazakhstan is one of the five leading countries engaged in economic/trade cooperation with Russia. With its vast resources of oil and gas, Kazakhstan is of special importance to Russia which still dominates the existing infrastructure for refining and transporting Kazakh oil and gas. A new pipeline from the Tengiz oil field to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk was opened in October 2001. That Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea Shelf, shows the importance attached by Russia to

**K. Warikoo**

Kazakhstan being an important energy source. Russia has invested over \$700 million in Kazakhstan. In October 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the treaty on the creation of Eurasian Economic Community in place of the Customs Union, which was created in early 1996.

**Table: 4**  
**Foreign Trade of Russia with Kazakhstan (US \$ million)**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
<b>Exports</b>	2198	2555	2550	2471	1893	1226	2246
<b>Imports</b>	1996	2675	3041	2743	1884	1398	2197

Both Russia and Kazakhstan share common perceptions about the need to have friendship and mutually advantageous economic relations. Russia and Kazakhstan are not only the co-founders of the CIS and the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Community, but both countries cooperate within the Collective Security Treaty system (CST) signed on 15 May 1992, the SCO, Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) and the CICA. Ensuring national security of Russia's southern frontiers constituting over 7,000 kms. long border with Kazakhstan, is going to be one of the key concerns of Russia's policy towards Kazakhstan in the coming years. This issue has assumed importance particularly after the withdrawal of Russian Border Guards from the Tajik-Afghan border, Russia's southern frontiers have become vulnerable to drugs and arms trafficking, illegal migration, influx of Islamist extremists into Kazakhstan from the direction of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. While under President Vladimir Putin, Russia is seeking to protect its national interests by consolidating its presence in Kazakhstan both in economic and security spheres, Russia is also trying to avoid any confrontation with the US in the region. On its part, Kazakhstan is seeking to balance its relations with the West on the one hand, and with Russia and China on the other. Since the US is striving to promote democracy, human rights and is seeking access to Kazakhstan's rich energy resources, Kazakhstan is building closer ties with Russia and China to insulate it from any undue pressure from the West.

**REFERENCES**

1. Gengchen Liu, "Ethnic Harmony and Conflicts on Central Asia," in Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds), *Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum*, London, St. Antony's College, 1998, p.75.
2. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asian in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu (eds.) *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi, 1992, p.62.
3. Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounov, "Russia and Russians in Central Asia", in Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds), *op. cit*, p.97.
4. *Ibid*, p.98.
5. Yuri V. Gankovsky, "Russia's Relations with the Central Asian States since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union", in Hafeez Malik (ed.), *Central Asia*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p.121.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid*, SU/1480, 8 September, 1992.
8. Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounov, *op. cit*, p.99.
9. *Ibid*, p.100.
10. *Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/1502, 3 October 1992.
11. *Ibid*, SU/1514, 17 October 1992.
12. *Ibid*.
13. *Ibid*, SU/1531, 6 November 1992.
14. *Ibid*.
15. *Ibid*, SU/1595, 25 January 1993.
16. *FBIS – SOV – 93 – 142*, 27 July 1993.
17. *Ibid*.
18. Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounov, *op. cit*. p.104.
19. *Ibid*.
20. *Itar Tass*, 25 May 1992.
21. C.N. Goodman, *Kazakhstan: The First Ten Years*, London, 2002, p.55.
22. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 October 1997.
23. Gengchen Liu, *op. cit*, p.79.
24. *Argumenty-i-Fakty*, Moscow, 4 January 1993.

**K. Warikoo**

---

25. *Inside Central Asia*, no. 139, 16-22 September 1996, p.4.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Algis Prazauskas, "Ethnopolitical Issues and the Emergence of Nation States in Central Asia", in Yongjin Zhang and Roubin Azizian (eds), *ibid*, p.63.
28. *Inside Central Asia*, no.160, 17-23 February 1997, p.4.
29. *Kyrgyzstanskaya Provada*, 2 March 1995; *Itar-Tass*, 24 May and 5 June 1996.
30. Liz Fuller, "Trial of 'Separatists' Highlights Plight of Kyrgyzstan's Russians", *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 4, 2000, pp. 29-30.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Kazakhstan: Forced Migration and Nation Building*, New York, Open Institute, 1998, p.6.
33. C.N. Goodman, *Kazakhstan: The First Ten Years*, London, 2002, p.55.

---

## KAZAKHSTAN-US RELATIONS: SOME PERSPECTIVES

*Fatima Kukeyeva*

Since the beginning of the 'New Great Game', several external actors have been trying to wield their influence in Central Asia, a region with huge hydrocarbon reserves as well as the hub of strategic and geopolitical importance. The United States of America can be named as one of the strongest players working in this region. The lone superpower has developed very good relationship with Kazakhstan, which is one of the leading Central Asian states so far as the presence of a huge stock of hydrocarbons and other raw materials, and the level of democratization and political reforms in the region are concerned.

The US policy in Kazakhstan, which is based on geopolitical approaches and the pragmatic interests, includes:

- Establishment and expansion of the US presence in the region as an element of its general strategy of consolidating global leadership in long-term prospect;
- Interest in maintenance of guaranteed access to hydrocarbonic stocks in the Caspian Sea region within the framework of the power policy realization, namely, the reduction of dependence on deliveries of energy from the Persian Gulf area and maintenance of the transport routes;
- Continuing influence on the country's political and economic development through the principles of democracy and market economy;
- Using Kazakhstan as a strategic base against international terrorism and religious extremism; and
- Making a new commodity market in Kazakhstan for the US industrial goods.

The US policy in Kazakhstan has been divided into four periods:

**First Period (1991-1992):** In the conditions of objective necessity of adaptation to the occurring geopolitical changes after the



disintegration of USSR in 1991, Washington did not have a consistent and thorough policy towards the five newly created Central Asian Republics (CARs). Initially, the USA limited its policy to the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The special attention to Kazakhstan was determined by the presence of the nuclear weapons in its territory. Up to 1995, the nuclear issue remained the main basis of the mutual relations between both the countries. The USA also carried out the general political agenda of the development of the process of democratization and carrying out of market reforms in all Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan.

**Second Period (1992 to 1995):** During this period, the economic component came to the fore in the US policy. Promotion of the US interests in Kazakhstan was carried out mainly by means of economic mechanisms and strengthening of position in strategic economic spheres, especially oil and natural gas. In the initial years of independence, big Western companies entered the local market. During this period, the NATO programme “Partnership for Peace” also began to develop.

**Third Period (1996 to 2001):** The USA decided to concentrate on the development of America-Kazakhstan and America-Uzbekistan relations.

**Fourth Period (2001 onwards):** After events like 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anti-terror campaign (the war on terror) led by the USA in Afghanistan, American policy in the region in general and Kazakhstan in particular has entered a new stage. It is characterized by the US aspiration to expand its political and economic activities in the region. This American strategy in relation with Kazakhstan has a well defined geopolitical context and strategic implications.

After the events of 11 September 2001 and the beginning of American military presence in Central Asia, a “new Washington strategy in the region” was being discussed in the scientific and social circles. The Kazakh scholars emphasize that with this, the USA started paying attention to the political problems in Kazakhstan. To quote K. Syroezhkin, “the Republican administration in US actively uses the

estimation of the human rights and degrees of democratic character in the state as the tool of foreign policy influence. Ironically, the administration has refused to employ such attractive tool for promotion of the US national interests.”<sup>1</sup>

The main element of the US led war on terrorism is the right of pre-emptive measures including possible military actions against the countries accused of aiding and abetting terrorist organizations. Geopolitical location of Kazakhstan, which is vulnerable to Islamic terrorism and extremist activities in Central Asia, is a major cause of concern for the USA. Astana has supported the US anti-terrorist operation which became one of the most important factors to influence the America-Kazakhstan relations after the 9/11 episode. On its part, Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian Republic to allow its air space to the US for carrying out anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. The construction of an oil pipeline named KTK in November 2001 strengthened the mutual relations between the two countries.

During Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s official visit to Washington, problems of interaction between both the states were discussed within the framework of the security policy and stability in Central Asia in view of the US anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, rendering of humanitarian help to this country, and also on the issue of cooperation in the energy sector.

The US Assistant Secretary of State on Affairs of Europe and Eurasia, E. Johns, stated during his official visit to Central Asia in January 2002, “when the conflict will come to the end, we shall not leave Central Asia. In all the five countries, we should expand constant support to democratic institutions, the local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent mass media.” The then US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld offered military and technical assistance to all the Central Asian states including the Kazakh Republic. However, security issues and development of the Caspian resources still remain the strategic priorities in the relations between Kazakhstan and the USA. With the re-definition of Central Asian countries as the “first line of combating terrorism,” the US State Department provided direct

*Fatima Kukeyeva*

---

support to independent mass media, the development of political parties, religious freedom, administrative reforms, education and health care. In the field of security, the US military presence in Kazakhstan is strategically important. Some security analysts feel that long-term US military presence in the region may bring an element of strategic uncertainty. However, like the majority of the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan too considers the presence of NATO military bases in the region as support in struggle against terrorism, and also as a guarantee of stability and a pledge for future prosperity.

Kazakhstan is a part of the transnational transport-power projects like TRACEKA and INOGATE. Programmes on training in the US educational institutions and centres, programmes of financing and carrying out of joint doctrines, formation of a peacemaking Kazakh battalion etc. are devoted to this goal. The Partnership for Peace programme, in which almost all the Central Asian countries are involved, is one of the major channels of cooperation between Kazakhstan and USA.

Despite the extremely intensive political and economic dialogue between Astana and Washington for strategic cooperation, the American political and academic circles criticize Washington's Astana policy. This is evidenced by the US criticism of human rights record and democratization in the Central Asian countries made in the annual reports of the US commissions and speeches and comments of American experts and policy makers. American administration's toughening of requirements on democratization in Kazakhstan is explained by the fact that Washington considers this process as one of the major points for victory in the global war on terrorism.

In analyzing the US policy in the region before the events of 11 September 2001, many experts deduced the conclusion that the degree of democratization and reform of the political system as well as the process of forming the civil society did not achieve the degree as expected by the West. To explain the "insufficient promotion of democratic reforms" in these republics, Kazakh scholars and authors specify the following factors: the Americans take a short-term view in

supporting the establishment of real democracy; the absence of democratic institutions of authority, the lack of a liberal social mentality and the lack of experience with private ownership in the post-Soviet countries etc., all complicate the creation of a lawful state, market economic relations and civil society, which are the social and economic preconditions for democracy. While recognizing the United States' role in the democratization of Central Asian countries, Kazakh political analysts criticize the US methods to achieve its policy and point to the contradictions in the American policy. However, the United States' interests in political stability, democratization and economic prosperity in Central Asia are linked with American strategic interests in the region.

Washington continues to assert that it is doing its best to support the democratization process in these states. At the same time, the United States determines its relations with the states of the region depending on their readiness to provide America with military bases and other strategic facilities in their territories. In this context, the question of further political and social reforms to strengthen democracy in the region appears to be minor priorities. Therefore, the Central Asian leaders while ignoring the American emphasis for democratic reform, continue their pursuit of policies in whatever direction they find necessary.

In a more anti-American vein, other researchers connect their aversion for Western values with the struggle against international terrorism advocated by the current Bush administration, which they see as the rigid imposition of alien social values and political cultures on the Muslim people. From this point of view, the American approach to the democratization of society in the Central Asian states shows a lack of desire by the policy makers in Washington to recognize and take into account the unique features of development in the region. As a result of Washington's shifting priorities, Kazakh analysts are doubtful about the motives of United States' foreign policy. One scholar argues that the United States asserts "responsibility for security and stability in the region using democratic rhetoric and economic control levers as the means of putting pressure on ruling elites with the goal of creating a net of political regimes which are effectively controlled by Washington."<sup>2</sup>

Murat Laumulin, one of the best known political scientists in Kazakhstan, says that Washington formally proclaims democratization and human rights “as principles of American foreign policy, but in reality ... (they are) often used as methods of political influence and tools of pressure.”<sup>3</sup>

To be precise, the Kazakh analysts criticize Washington’s strategy which appears to demonstrate that the United States, being interested in economic cooperation and military bases, prefers to keep authoritarian regimes in power, but is not keen to push these countries towards democratization of their social-political systems. These analysts consider that the slow rates of democratizing internal and external policy significantly encourage the growth of social movements or so called “Colour Revolutions” that have shaken the political systems of some countries, while raising concerns in other countries. Kazakh political scientists characterize the spring 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan as a “revolution”, a “coup d’etat” or the replacement of authority. They say that the Central Asian political elites should draw their own conclusions from the events in Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakh experts give two types of arguments while analysing the reasons of the “Colour Revolutions.” Some consider “revolutions” as a result of external influence by non-regional players, especially by the US, and others hold the internal situation responsible for this. Experts who support the first opinion believe in the impossibility of effectively integrating Central Asia as a significant geopolitical region in the global international system on the Western pattern. They argue that the Central Asian elites have no other strategy than to promote the authority of their clan. Therefore, American pressure provides the social base for “Colour Revolutions” through the use of such methods as the criticism of authoritarian regimes, allegations of human rights violations and corruption, and the political use of financial, economic, technical, or humanitarian assistance; mounting pressure by supporting NGOs and opposition groups, and public relations programmes to promote a positive image of the United States, etc.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, analysts who ascribe the causes of “revolutions” to internal political and economic processes, specify the following factors: the crises in existing regimes; serious contradictions within the ruling elite, active opposition

and its populist slogans; lack of authority to use the force; and unresolved problems between the more advanced north and the more underdeveloped southern part of the country. These authors identify external interests in regime change as the minor factors.

Thus, Kazakhstan which has set for itself high standards of economic development, now faces the objective necessity to increase its standards of political development. American assistance can only speed up this process. However, domestic analysts in Kazakhstan opine that significant successes in economic development of the country and superficial political reforms are not enough to fully enter the comity of advanced democratic nations.<sup>5</sup> There is no common view about the possibility of “Colour Revolutions” in Kazakhstan. The *Asar* party, is one of the first parties, which started discussion about the possibility of such revolution in Kazakhstan. According to D. Nazarbaeva, the leader of the *Asar* party, such kind of revolution would be based on “the new form of democratic expansion.” Reacting over D. Nazarbaeva’s statement, the Kazakh Ambassador in Russia, K. Kuserbaev pointed out that in Kazakhstan “Colour Revolutions” would not be successful. Well known political scientist M. Ashimbaev points to the absence of necessary base for such revolutions. According to Ashimbaev, “the only really functioning democratic system can give immunity to various radical variants and revolutions.” The convincing victory of President N. Nazarbayev has shown that the people of Kazakhstan voted for economic reforms and political stability.

However, analyzing political situation in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to take into consideration the following such factors: the independence of the Central Asian states and their integration into the world community is occurring under the conditions of globalization, which in turn is related to the process of democratization; the geopolitical characteristics of the region generate problems, such as closed transport space with limited access to world markets and the rather underdeveloped network of communications, especially external ones. The irregular distribution of water and other natural resources and of the population, numerous zones of ecological disaster, overpopulation and deficiency of vital spaces (for instance in Uzbekistan), enormous

empty territories, and inhospitable living conditions (as in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). These contradictions substantially amplify complex social and economic conditions, and aggravate the struggle for power by various political, ethnic, religious groups and clans and the increasing activities of the extremist and terrorist organizations, especially Islamic fundamentalists.

Finally, non-regional actors also play a very significant role. The active promotion of democratic values should affect the political situation in the states of the region. The success of the Georgian and Ukrainian opposition has emboldened Washington to promote democratization throughout the post-Soviet space. In March 2005, American President George W. Bush expressed his desire to actively assist the “Colour Revolutions” and to support the new democracies. However, this declaration has stimulated an ambiguous reaction in the Central Asian countries. For Central Asia, it means support to democratic transformation. As experts argue, “the United States most likely will not actively support the Central Asian opposition forces.” So, for example, the US expressed its support to Bishkek “revolution” by stressing the need for pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. This statement is true in case of Kazakhstan which is entrusted a role in the struggle against terrorism. Kazakhstan also accepts the role of the state that actively advances democratic principles in the region.

The following conclusions can be drawn with regard to the US policy of promoting democratization in Central Asia:

- As a result of globalization and the global reach of American interests, it is difficult to analyze processes occurring in Central Asia without taking into account the role of the United States.
- The American double standards allow authoritarian regimes to consider problems of democratization as minor and sometimes they entirely ignore them. This double standard not only damages the proper understanding of democracy, but also leads to a growth of anti-American attitudes in Central Asia. Although in Kazakhstan, there is a more open forum for information where it is possible to hear various points of view on American

policy in the region, anti-American propaganda is very much there in the Uzbek Republic.

- Washington probably prefers to maintain the existing forms of authoritative government in the region to avoid the establishment of what might be more democratic, but less predictable forms of authority.
- Some directions in American policy appear to be contradictory. Where the US State Department rigidly criticizes human rights conditions in the Central Asian republics, military policymakers seem ready to cooperate with any government that agrees to join the “war on terrorism.” In fact, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s meetings with the leaders of Central Asia demonstrate that the US strategy in Central Asia has not significantly changed despite the events in Uzbekistan (Andizhan) and Kyrgyzstan.
- In Central Asia, the American administration has a potential force for expanding the horizons of democracy. Opposition forces which are ready to promote the US efforts to spread democracy in the countries of the region, include average people (educated persons, representatives of the middle and small business, students and local NGOs), who support the Westernization of regional countries. They not only want to live in the US or Europe, but also believe that in case of political changes in their country within ten to fifteen years, this dream will be realised.
- The United States faces difficulties on its way to establish democracy in the Central Asian republics. It depends, on the one hand, on the need to base policy on a comprehensive regional vision. On the other hand, the policy in the field of democratization should be in consonance with the unique characteristics of regional states.
- Distinctions in political and economic development make possible regional strategy only in the field of security, but not in the spheres of democracy and human rights which develop on a bilateral level.



- The development of democratic political systems in Central Asian republics, which are capable to serve as an example for other countries with large Muslim population, will help the United States to solve some of the strategic objectives in the region: conducting war against terrorism; campaign against radical Islam and drugs trafficking; efforts to strengthen the regional economy and the most significant state institutions; the consolidation of regional trading communications and an adequate transport infrastructure.

### REFERENCES

1. K. Syroezhkin, *Russia-USA-China and Central Asia: US Political System and Democratization Problems in Central Asian States*, Almaty, 2005.
2. N. Omarov, *Kyrgyzstan and the USA: State and Perspectives of Intergovernmental Cooperation: US Political System and Democratization Problems in Central Asian States*, Almaty, 2005, p.93.
3. M. Laumulin, *US Policy on Supporting Democracy in Central Asian States: US Political System and Democratization Problems in Central Asian States*, Almaty, 2005, pp.31-33.
4. H. Khalil, "US State Policy in Central Asia: US Political System and Democratization Problems in Central Asian States", *Sayasat* (Almaty), no.11, 2003, p.11.
5. "Kazakhstan has all possibilities to prevent Colour Revolution", *Panorama*, no.131, 19 August 2005.

---

## KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

*Alia Akataeva*

Central Asia has been traditionally a sphere of geopolitical interest of China. During the Han rule, China maintained close contacts with the Western world through the Silk Route, which passes through the settlements of Turkestan (in the territory of modern Kazakhstan). Through the Silk Route, goods such as the Chinese silk, porcelain etc. were delivered to Europe, in exchange of metallic products and woolen clothes. Many elements of the Western and Asian culture have been disseminated in the countries through which the Silk Route passed.

The first official political contact between the Kazakh governors and China's Qing dynasty rulers began in the summer of 1755 AD. The Commander of Qing army came into contact with the Sultan of Average Zhuz, Ablay. However, in the autumn of 1755 AD, anti-Qing revolt broke out in Zhungaria and in the summer of 1756 AD, Qing army intruded into the Kazakh areas and in early 1757 AD, Ablay's and Amursana's groups entered into negotiations with the Qing Court as a result of which diplomatic and trade relations between the Qings and the Kazakh governors were re-established. "Tribute System", a system of offering traditional gifts to the Chinese Emperor was very much prevalent during that period. However, the Qing Court designated Kazakh Khans and Sultans as new vassals of the Chinese Emperor. By the middle of 1760s, there was a paradoxical situation in Kazakhstan when Kazakh Zhuzs in the Russian empire were considered by the Chinese as "Citizens of the Chinese Empire", and their territory was called as "the territory of the Celestial Political Instability."

China's trade relations with other countries began in the beginning of the reign of the Zhou dynasty (1122-247 BC). During the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 AD), China conducted trade and business with Korea at frontier fairs, where Chinese bought horses, sables, pearls, weapons etc. The Chinese historical annals record the existence of

constant 'Sea Trade' with southern islands, Japan, Korea, India, the countries of the Near East and Europe in the direction of Sianfu or to the north up to Koko Nor through Berude, Urumqi or to the south from Turpan aside Karashahr, Yarkand and Hotan. By the end of 15<sup>th</sup> century, China was the leading economic and political power of East Asia. At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the merchant class played a big role in the socio-economic life of the country. In the north of China, there was an exclusive association known as "Shanghai Traders", which was focusing on trade in salt and also strengthening commercial relations with Russia, Mongolia, Turkestan etc. At the end of 17<sup>th</sup> and in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Qing rulers waged successful wars against their western and southwest neighbours and gained supremacy at all levels.

In 1689 AD, China made its first treaty known as "Nerchinsk Treaty" with Russia. It was also her first treaty with any foreign country. Besides specifying articles concerning delimitation of territories on the rivers of Argun and Gorbitse, the treaty also determined the procedure of overland border trade between Russia and China. The trading routine stipulated by the "Nerchinsk Treaty" gave equal rights to Russian and Chinese citizens in trade and did not impose any restrictions on either of them. In 1851 AD, "Kuldja Commercial Treaty" between Russia and China determined a trading procedure for Russian merchants in Kuldja and Chuguchak. This treaty was based on the same principles which have been established by the Nerchinsk and Kyakhta treaties.

Border trade continued under the supervision of the Chinese and Russian authorities. It laid down rules and regulations for the Russian merchants for purpose of trade. Item 2 of the "Kuldja Treaty" provided for the supervision over affairs of Russian citizens by the Russian Consul, and over affairs of the Chinese merchant class by the official of the Ili Central Administrative Board. Under this treaty, the Russian merchants living in China received plots specially allocated for them in towns of Ili and Oàrbagatay to build residential houses, warehouses and shops. Russian and Chinese merchants were doing business in cash without any credit. Unlike the English-Chinese Treaty, which was signed in 1858-60 providing rights only to the Englishmen, the Russo-Chinese

## ***KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS***

---

Treaty of 1860 AD provided the right of free trade both for the Russian merchants in China and also for the Chinese merchants in Russia.

Under the “St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881”, Russia fixed the right of trade in frontier areas and in the territories of Xinjiang and Mongolia. In all major cities of these territories, Russian Consulates and trading houses were set up. This treaty gave overland Russian and Chinese traders the much required advantage. Trade was made duty-free and the right was distributed far beyond Xinjiang and Mongolia and other districts lying on the northern and southern slopes of the Tian Shan range up to the Great Wall of China.

The history of the Sino-Kazakh trade and economic relations has been influenced by the Russian empire’s relations with the Qing empire, Republican China and People’s Republic of China (PRC) in which Kazakhstan participated not as the sovereign partner, but as an administrative-territorial part of Russia. Specific conditions of this relationship opened opportunities for trade and economic contracts. On 27 May 1920, a protocol was signed in Kuldja determining conditions of trade relations between Soviet Russia and China on Turkestan and Xinjiang border, and other issues including the return of Russian refugees and Cossacks. As per this document, an Agency of the Soviet authority in Kuldja and an Agency of Ili authority in Verney (Almaty) were established to decide upon the diplomatic and trading issues. Ili Protocol had the political and legal importance for the countries of the East. It laid down a strong basis for commercial relations of Russia with Xinjiang region of China.

At the end of 1970s, social, economic and political reforms were implemented in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Now the foreign policy and external economic doctrine of China began to change. From the beginning of 1980s, Chinese leadership declared its readiness to renew dialogue on cultural, economic and political questions. Since 1983, frontier trade was being restored, but within the framework of northeast provinces of China and the Soviet Far East. In January 1986, the State Council of PRC decided to restore trade relations between the USSR and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

After the disintegration of USSR and formation of the new independent states, a new era of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China began. Due to joint efforts of heads of the states, Sino-Kazakh relations have been successfully and steadily developed. Friendly, good-neighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two countries continued to develop and strong partnership was established between the two countries.

First step towards the bilateral Kazakhstan - China cooperation has been made by Kazakhstan and China in July 1991 during the visit of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic President, Nursultan Nazarbayev to China. During this visit, an agreement on principles and the basic directions of the development of cooperation between Kazakh SSR and Xinjiang was signed. In the agreement, both sides declared that they consider each other as close neighbours and want to build the relations on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation. They also agreed to create favourable conditions for trade in goods and services and to strengthen economic cooperation.<sup>1</sup>

Diplomatic relations between the independent Republic of Kazakhstan and the People's Republic of China were established on 3 January 1992. The Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations stated: "according to interests and expectations of the people of two countries, the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the government of the PRC have decided to establish diplomatic relations between two states at Ambassadorial level since 3 January 1992. The governments of the two countries have agreed to develop relations of friendship and cooperation between them on the basis of principles of mutual respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and also peaceful co-existence." In February 1992, China opened its embassy in Almaty, and the embassy of the Kazakhstan was opened in Beijing in December 1992.

A Kazakh government delegation led by Kazakh Prime Minister S. Tereshchenko visited China in February 1992, which became the starting point of the subsequent top-level contacts between them. In their Joint Statement, both countries confirmed their intention to build

## ***KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS***

---

further good-neighbourly relations on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit. They agreed to carry out consultations between their Ministries for Foreign Affairs on the questions of mutual relations, other issues of mutual interest, and also to develop relations and contacts at all levels, including top-level meetings. They declared to use new ways and methods of economic cooperation, to develop all its forms in the framework determined by the legislation of both the countries. While signing nine documents to this effect, both countries gave a call to concretize development of relations between them, including the agreement on creation of the Inter-Governmental Commission on trade, economic, and scientific and technical cooperation. Besides, an agreement on mutual visits of the citizens and a visa-free procedure was signed. This agreement promoted development of trading contacts, and the frontier trade and “shop tourism.” However, the entry of a large number of Chinese citizens into the territory of Kazakhstan has been negatively perceived by the Kazakh people who feared “Sinicization of Kazakhstan.” To allay this fear, new agreements providing a visa-free procedure of mutual trips only for those possessing diplomatic and service passports were signed in 1993. During the visit of Kazakh Foreign Affairs Minister, T. Sulejmenova to China in August 1992, agreements on the development of bilateral cooperation in various areas were signed. One of the important documents signed was the agreement on encouragement and mutual protection of the investments. Both countries agreed upon the conditions, principles and the procedure of mutual investments. According to the agreement on opening of check points through the Kazakh-China frontier, international status was conferred on the “Horgos” (Kazakhstan) – “Horgos” (PRC), “Friendship” (Kazakhstan) – “Alashankou” (PRC), “Bahty” (Kazakhstan) – “Pokitu” (PRC) check points which were opened for the movement of people, vehicles and cargo.

Kazakhstan-China relations got a boost during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s first official visit to China in October 1993. During the negotiations between President Nazarbayev and his Chinese

counterpart Jiang Zemin, the main focus was on the issue of coordination between the two neighbours. The Joint Declaration stated that both countries would develop relations of good neighbourhood, friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation according to the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence, and also other conventional norms of international law. In the declaration, Kazakhstan and China attached importance to development of trade and economic relations. It was specified that the economy of Kazakhstan and China supplement each other which opens the prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation. They also agreed to create favourable conditions and to encourage all forms of economic cooperation, mutual contacts between departments, regions and the enterprises. Both countries showed readiness for bilateral economic cooperation particularly in the fields of industry, agriculture, biotechnology, transport and power.<sup>1</sup> Trade and economic relations between Kazakhstan and China continued to develop on the basis of the signed inter-governmental agreements determining the main principles of cooperation. Kazakhstan and China Inter-governmental Commission on trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation has been playing the role of a coordinator of bilateral cooperation in this regard.

In 1995, according to the Chinese Customs House, Kazakhstan's foreign trade with China was 390 million US dollars (an increase of 17.7 per cent as against the one in 1994.). In 2002, it became more than 650 million US dollars. Export in the year 1995 was 324.5 million US dollars (a growth of 47.5 per cent), China's import in 1995 was 65.5 million US dollars (showing a decrease of 37.5 per cent). About 90 per cent of the export of Kazakhstan to China is in raw goods, including black and non-ferrous metals- 42 per cent (steel, copper, aluminium), sheep wool- 14.3 per cent, cotton- 13.7 per cent, leather and skins- 8.6 per cent and mineral fertilizers- 10 per cent.<sup>2</sup> Imports from China to Kazakhstan comprise textile and knitted products (clothes), and yarn- 35.5 per cent, footwear- 9 per cent, electrical goods- 7.2 per cent, chemical- 6.6 per cent, and food stuffs- 22.8 per cent.

## ***KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS***

---

In 1996, bilateral trade was 497.5 million US dollars, of which export was 461.4 million US dollars and imports 36.1 US million dollars. However, since 1993, the quantum of exports and imports declined due to a reduction in the number of Chinese trading firms and increase in export duties on the fuel-raw materials. The main causes of reduction in exports from Kazakhstan were the growth of insolvency in the enterprises and liabilities. Despite this, many large enterprises and companies of Kazakhstan participated in their cooperation with China in 2002 to work on about 300 joint ventures. The volume of China's trade now is about 0.15 per cent of her total foreign trade that amounts to over 1.5 billion US dollars. The volume of Kazakhstan's export in 1997 remained low, i.e., seven per cent of all exports from Kazakhstan. In 1999, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China went up to 79.2 per cent, and in 2001, it was 36.7 per cent.<sup>3</sup>

Trade and economic relations between Kazakhstan and China began from a zero level. Kazakhstan has inherited already existing economic relations between the former Soviet Union and PRC. Now trade between Kazakhstan and China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region makes more than 80 per cent of the total trade turnover of Kazakhstan and China. In 1986, the volume of trade between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang was three million US dollars, and in 1989, it rose to 45.6 million US dollars. In the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China in 2002, the Chinese exports to Kazakhstan went up to 21.1 per cent (up to 599 million US dollars), and its imports grew by 48.5 per cent (up to 958 million US dollars). This growth was achieved mainly due to frontier trade with Xinjiang.

From the beginning of the 1990s, Kazakhstan became the basic trade and economic partner of China in the Central Asian region. Having the most extended border with China, and being a source of raw materials, Kazakhstan provided opportunities for China to improve the trade. The volume of trade on border transit points like Horgos, Dostyk-Àlashankou started growing. In 2002, other transit points were opened in Dulat and Kolzhat, which further enhanced the border trade. The Chinese imports to Kazakhstan constitute textile and knitted products, yarn-37.5 per cent, footwear-13 per cent, domestic electrical



equipments-7.2 per cent, chemicals-6.6 per cent, food stuffs-25.8 per cent (including sugar and confectionery products-9.8 per cent, juices and soft drinks-10 per cent).<sup>4</sup>

For Kazakhstan, China will apparently remain as one of the most significant trade and economic partner. The future of the Kazakhstan-China economic relations depends on many factors amongst which geopolitics is the main factor. In spite of the fact that Kazakhstan periodically toughens customs, tax quotas etc., these measures do not have a big influence on the trade turnover between the two countries. It is possible to assume that border trade and similar economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and China will dynamically develop and China can effectively use this cooperation to achieve both economic and political ends. For more than ten years of economic interaction, Kazakhstan and China have used all forms of foreign economic relations - from barter trade to universal methods of state regulation of foreign trade activities. It is obvious that for China, its momentum of “reforms and openness” occurs at the optimum rate due to the centralized control of the state which maintains the political framework of the society at the same time carrying out all-round modernization in the country. As for the West, it is possible to assume that the success of the Chinese economy is capable to supersede Western competitors in the Central Asian market.

The positive dynamics in development of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China stems from the agreement on good neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation, Programmes of Kazakhstan-China Cooperation for 2003-2008 etc. President Nazarbayev has expressed the hope that the volume of trade between the two countries would increase from two to five billion US dollars. He has called upon the domestic investors to pay attention to western China. Speaking at a press conference in Almaty on the results of 10<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of Council on foreign investors on 6 December 2003, President Nazarbayev said, “We should encourage, in every possible way, export of our investments abroad. The legislations of the Republic of Kazakhstan should not limit the process of Kazakhstan investments abroad. A good signal is that the Kazakh business operates in Russia and the Kyrgyz

## ***KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS***

---

Republic. At the same time, domestic investors should pay attention to western China. It is very important to formulate and determine a role and status of Kazakhstan in the global economy, not only as a supplier of power resources and raw materials to the world markets, but also as an advanced sub-regional economic power of the Central Asian region. Being the bridge between Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan can become the best platform for development of trade and business.<sup>5</sup>

Deepening of bilateral economic interaction between Kazakhstan and China is characterized by the rise in the volume of bilateral trade. In 2003, the trade volume was 3.3 billion US dollars (showing growth up to 68 per cent), and in January - February 2004, this trade grew 2.2 times. It is high time for both the Republics to diversify the structure of trade and to develop direct economic relations between the regions and enterprises of both the countries. To achieve this, the Kazakhstan-China Information and Consulting Centre in Beijing is now working for the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council of Businessmen which could give valuable recommendations to governmental bodies of both the countries in future. Besides, the Committee on cooperation on the further improvement of conditions for development of mutual trade and economic cooperation has been operating successfully.<sup>6</sup>

There is dynamic cooperation between the two countries in the field of infrastructure development. For cooperation in the field of development of the railway and automobile sector, it is necessary to take into account the situation in Kazakhstan, China and also in the entire region as a whole. The infrastructure in Central Asia and the western region of China is less advanced, which is one of the obstacles for regional cooperation. In Kazakhstan, the infrastructure is still as it was in the Soviet period, and therefore, requires reconstruction. Railways in Xinjiang were built about 20 years ago. Roads connect only the basic industrial centres. The centres for extraction of minerals and the mineral processing centres do not have transport or communication facilities. The present condition of railways is characterized by the low level of technical equipment, and many sites require reconstruction. In these conditions, revival of the Silk Route has huge advantage for all the Central Asian states participating in the project ORASAEA.

As compared to the Trans-Siberian Railway, the distance from Lyanjungan to ports of Latvia – is much less (about 1,500 kms), and transportation by sea route takes 20 to 30 days, and eleven days by rail. Some sites of the Trans-Asiatic highway beginning at the east coast of China and passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, and connecting the ports of the Persian Gulf has been put in action. Each state covers the expenses on arrangement of a site of the railway within the limits of its borders. It has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, it gives viability to the project as the state keeps monopoly over the lining of tracks and receiving profits upon their use. On the other hand, the opportunity of participation of foreign investors does not guarantee non-interference of one state in the internal affairs of others.

Analyzing the development of bilateral cooperation in this area, it is necessary to note that the key point of the Trans-Asiatic Trunk Railway is the development of the East West Transport Corridor. During the first nine months of 1992, Kazakh delegation visited China nine times for carrying out negotiations, including the development of infrastructure. Opening of check points along the border, construction of railways and highways, and also an air communication between the two countries were high on the agenda. As a result, in Xinjiang, seven national highways, 68 provincial and 28 international passenger and cargo routes have been constructed. Significant part of the negotiations with Kazakhstan concerned the official beginning of the operation of the railway which, as it was declared, will connect the east coast of China with Rotterdam in Europe. Negotiations for cooperation in the sphere of railway transportation on 1 June 1994 facilitated the unobstructed passage through a railway crossing named “Friendship – Alashankou.” It also facilitated the movement of all cargo from Kazakhstan to all areas of China and back, from all areas of China, and from other countries to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states. Though the “Friendship - Alashankou” has international status, it serves bilateral and regional trade. In 1999, the turnover of goods through “Friendship- Alashankou” was 3.68 million tonnes, and it rose to 4.7 million tonnes in 2000. And the number of passengers through the Kazakhstan-Chinese border grew by 12.8 per cent during this year.<sup>7</sup>

## ***KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS***

---

The creation of a transcontinental highway known as “Bridge of Europe-Asia” has given new stimulus to the expansion of cooperation among the countries of the central part of the Eurasian continent. The concept of “Triangles of Economic Development” offers to create special areas with international status on the borders of China and Kazakhstan. “Bridge Europe - Asia” will make basic changes to the character of development of Xinjiang, Kazakhstan and the entire Central Asia region. To continue this process, China and Kazakhstan, have to devise a policy of external economic openness, which will give opportunities of expansion of contacts to other countries, development of market relations, creation of the whole spectrum of new branches and achievement of general prosperity. The transcontinental “Bridge Europe-Asia” will be equipped with a set of branch lines, stations and bridges. It will begin in the east from the Pacific coast, and will cross all territories of China as well as the countries of Central Asia and East Europe and will end in the west with the countries of the European Union. This will form an important economic corridor, connecting these territories to rich natural resources and increasing economic interdependence. This will also create wide opportunities for scientific and technical cooperation and will serve as a stimulus not only for those regions through which the highway will pass through, but also for economic integration of all the countries of the Eurasian continent. Finally, it will result in stable economic development of the whole world. Besides, “The Big Triangle”, on the frontiers of China and Kazakhstan, is formed by the cities of Urumchi, Akdochi and Almaty, connected by each others’ railway and highways. This region, by rail from Xinjiang through Lanchow and up to Shanghai, has an exit to the east, in the north borders on Russia, in the south with the countries of Central and West Asia. These are the main gateways to China, the West and the Central Asian Republics and the East, with a big potential of development.

In this age of globalisation, economy holds the key in any bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation. People’s Republic of China is an economic powerhouse with high economic growth rate. Therefore, it is very important for Kazakhstan to deepen and strengthen bilateral

economic cooperation with China, which will be beneficial for its economy in particular and the entire Central Asian region in general.

### REFERENCES

1. "Joint Declaration between Kazakhstan and China, 18 October 1993; "Collection of Bilateral Treaties between Kazakhstan and China: 1992-2002", *Xinhua*, Beijing, 2002, p. 97.
2. I. Avazovsky, "Silk Road on the eve of XXI century", [http://www.cac.org/journal/cac-03-1999/st\\_06\\_azovski.shtml](http://www.cac.org/journal/cac-03-1999/st_06_azovski.shtml)
3. "Priority Directions of Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and China: Collection of Articles, Documents", Almaty, Urumqi, May 2004, p.18.
4. [www.kazinvest.kz/main.htm](http://www.kazinvest.kz/main.htm).
5. <http://almaty.keden.kz/zakonadat.zakon/cgi?doc=960>
6. Guangcheng Wang, "Chinese Policy of the Good Neighbourhood", *Internationale Politik*, February 2002, no.2, p.69.
7. "Priority Directions of Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and China", *op. cit.*

---

# TRANS-BORDER NATIONALITIES AND STATE RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF KAZAKHS IN ALTAI (XINJIANG)

*Xu Qinhua*



Having a long land frontier and numerous nationalities, China is composed of 55 ethnic minorities, 34 of them belonging to the trans-border nationalities. Among these ethnic groups that have a comparatively larger population include the Uyghur, Mongol, Kazakh, Korean, Tibetan and the Hui nationalities, with a total of 66 million people. In China's larger ethnic family, those which possess a trans-border characteristic, occupy a critical position and play a very important role in developing China's relations with its neighbouring countries.

In recent years, study on the trans-border nationalities has revealed that they are now no more confined merely to the "border politics" but have expanded to "international politics." Current study on the situation outside the boundaries of China is generally insufficient and even less attention has been paid to the trans-boundary comparison of trans-border nationalities. Based on an analysis of trans-border nationalities, this paper makes an attempt to discuss the interaction between the "trans-border Kazakh nationalities" in China and in

Kazakhstan (see the map illustrating the Kazakh nationality in Altai area of Xinjiang). It also highlights the effect of such interaction on Sino-Kazakhstan relations.

### **TRANS-BORDER NATIONALITIES: CONCEPT, CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION**

The three concepts of “trans-border nationality”, “trans-boundary nationality” and “trans-frontier nationality” are always interlinked with each other. Chinese scholars hold the view that “trans-border nationality” refers to the ethnic group which lives in two or more than two countries (no matter whether they live near frontiers or in places far away from the frontiers), basically keeping the original ethnic identity and possessing the same historical background. “Trans-boundary nationality” or “trans-frontier nationality” refers to the same ethnic group whose inhabitants live in the border of two or more than two countries, that is, the traditional dwelling of one nationality is divided by one or even several state boundary lines; one nationality dwells on the border area of two or even several countries and is almost in the contiguous areas. The former is the nationality isolated by states, as it resides in trans-boundary area involuntarily, while the latter is the one that immigrates to live in trans-boundary areas.<sup>1</sup> However, from the political perspectives, these three may be called by a joint name: the nationalities, which share trans-border dwelling because of the mismatch of political boundary and their national distribution.

If one compares “trans-border nationality”, “trans-boundary nationality” and “trans-frontier nationality” with “non-trans-border, trans-boundary and trans-frontier” nationalities, the main difference can be found that the former has one or several state boundary lines to divide the same ethnic group into different parts, while the latter doesn't have such a line. Broadly speaking, “trans-border nationality” may be called “trans-boundary nationality” or “trans-frontier nationality.” These three have no fundamental difference, but in a narrow sense, it's obvious that the existing sphere of “trans-border nationality” is much broader than that of the “trans-boundary nationality” and “trans-frontier nationality”, for it includes not only the same ethnic group in the border

area, but also the folk of same nationality who migrate from the second or third country into another country (i.e., residing in the countries which are not contiguous or are separated by oceans or several other countries).<sup>2</sup> For instance, the total population of the Kazakh nationality all over the world is 13 million, the majority of which resides in Kazakhstan and some live in Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Russia, Turkey, USA, etc. While talking about the trans-boundary or trans-frontier Kazakh nationality, one can refer, in particular, to the Kazakhs living in the border area of Kazakhstan and China, or the Kazakhs residing in the border area of Kazakhstan and other countries. Other ethnic groups living in trans-border areas include Uyghur, Mongol, Korean, Tibetan, Russian, Hui, Kyrgyz Turkmen, Tatar nationalities, etc. who are known as “China’s trans-border nationalities with the same origin.”<sup>3</sup>

Trans-border nationalities have political, cultural, social, economic and geographical attributes. Attribute is the nature or character possessed by one object. The political attribute reflects the relation of nationality and state (such as unilateral main body, bilateral main body and bilateral non-main body).<sup>4</sup> Reflecting the relation between nationalities (such as consanguinity and ethnic culture identification), the cultural attribute embodies the essential characters that distinguish the trans-border nationalities from states or other nationalities. They ought to be the innate attribute of trans-border nationalities.<sup>5</sup> The attributes that embody geographic distribution, economic development and social structure belong to the category of non-innate attributes.

This article emphasizes the influence of trans-border nationalities on state relations and classifies trans-border nationalities according to their attributes, numbers and geographic distribution. As to the attribute classification of trans-border nationalities, we must take two factors into consideration: firstly the perspective of classification; the other being the commonness and difference of trans-border nationalities. “Perspective” means taking one country’s stand while studying trans-border nationalities. If we look at trans-border nationalities from different angles, such as from the angle of our country, other country or the world, we’ll get different results. While studying the trans-border nationalities in China’s northwestern border areas, one can see some



ethnic groups that are “main body” nationalities at home but are minority nationalities abroad, such as the Han nationality. There are also some nationalities that are minority nationalities at home and main body nationalities abroad, such as the Kazakhs, Russians, Khalkhas, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Some are minority nationalities both at home or abroad, such as the Hui, Uyghur and Tatar nationalities. Besides, some trans-border nationalities in other parts of China possess the character of two cases (as both main body nationalities and minority nationalities abroad), such as the Mongol nationality; some are main body nationalities in both countries, such as the Korean nationality. Living in contiguous countries, the same trans-border nationality shares common traits in their culture, mental state and economic life, while as individual difference are caused by the different situations and impact of countries they live in.<sup>6</sup> Owing to their historical background, nine cross-border nationalities such as Kazakh, Uyghur, Russian, Hui, Khalkhas, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar and Han nationalities living in the boundary areas of northwestern China are comparatively different from others.

Trans-border nationalities can be divided into two types: i) those who have larger population and have formed synthetic effect on politics and economy in a large scale; and ii) the trans-border nationalities, who have less impact on the security of political and economic life because of their less numbers. Populationwise, trans-border nationalities in Central Asian countries constitute: (in sequence) Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Russians, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs, Tartars, Uyghurs, Dongans; and in China, they include the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Khalkha, Tajik, Uzbek, Russian and Tatar nationalities.<sup>7</sup> The Kazakhs (around 13 million), Uyghurs (around 9 million), Kyrgyz (around 3.5 million) nationalities possess large population and have closer relations, they can exert greater influence on the future development of China and Central Asian countries.

From the angle of geographic distribution, trans-border nationalities can be divided into two types: i) those inhabiting the areas having special political and economic status and ii) the nationalities which do not inhabit the areas having special political and economic status. Generally speaking, in those special areas, countries are close to each other, with numerous trans-border nationalities and abundant

resources. Thus, ethnic relations among nationalities are more complex, and ethnic conflict is fierce. Due to imbalanced economic development, plundering of resources by foreign powers and influence of religious clans in these areas, there is possibility of ethnic crisis. Central Asia and the nearby northwestern border of China is one of the politically sensitive areas. As an important strategic barrier, the northwestern border of China, with numerous nationalities living together and its unique geopolitics, has a profound influence on the security of China at each level. The interaction of trans-border nationalities in this area may become both a bridge to peaceful coexistence among these countries and also the cause of social and political upheavals. The Kazakh nationality can serve as an example.

### **POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OF TRANS-BORDER KAZAKH NATIONALITY**

The word “Kazakh”, according to various explanations, means “refugee”, “outsider”, “beautiful girl”, “swan and brave freemen in grassland.” Among them, the explanation of “brave freemen in grassland” is comparatively suitable for the history of the Kazakh nationality. The Kazakhs are a minority nationality, which possesses rich cultural heritage and complex ethnic origin. From the ethnological viewpoints, the Kazakh is a sub-nationality. Modern nationalities such as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks and Turkmens have been gradually formed by the constant integration of nationalities living in this area such as the Saizhong, Qiankun, Wusun, Hun, Turki, Sute and the later Wugusi, Jiegesi, Qidan and Mogol. Located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, Central Asia has been an important ligament of the civilization from all directions since ancient times. It has had close economic and cultural exchanges with China.

In the middle of 15<sup>th</sup> century, the “white tent” of Roujibie tribe union split. Some so called “Roujibie-Kazakh” tribes escaped and moved to the area of Chu River and Talas River. Later, they founded their independent political entity- “Kazakhan” Kingdom. By late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> century, a stable Kazakh nationality, having a common name, common language, common area, common economic life and

common mental state represented by a common culture evolved. In 1560s, “Kazakhan” Kingdom was divided into three Yuuz that were submitted to Zhungar tribe. In the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Qing government sent its army to pacify Zhungar and the large, middle and little Yuuz pledged allegiance to the Qing Court. In the early part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Russia took advantage of China’s crises both at home and abroad and invaded the eastern area near Balkhash Lake and controlled the majority of China’s Kazakh tribes.<sup>8</sup> Since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Russia forced the Qing government to sign a series of unequal boundary treaties that ceded a large part of Chinese territory to Russia. By this means, Russia controlled the majority of Kazakh nationalities that originally belonged to China. These treaties included *The Treaty of Peking between Russia and China* (1860), *The Convention for Dividing Northwestern frontiers of Russia and China* (1864), *Treaty of Yili* (1881), *Yili Boundary Treaty* (1882), *Kashgar Boundary Treaty* (1882), *Tacheng Boundary Treaty* (1883) etc. After the Russian invasion, the Kazakhs became a trans-border nationality. The Kazakhs, who didn’t want to pledge allegiance to Russia, immigrated into China after that. They inhabited the areas of Yili, Tacheng and Ashan in Xinjiang. After the October Revolution of 1917, more than 200,000 Kazakhs escaped into Yili and Kashi of Xinjiang. Thus, the Kazakhs became a trans-border nationality of Central Asia and China. During the Soviet period, the Kazakh nationality in China was different from those living in the Kazakh Republic and in other countries, but they still kept a long-term close relation towards each other.<sup>9</sup> After the end of the Cold War, social upheavals took place in East Europe. The disintegration of Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asian republics enabled some nationalities in China to develop links with those who were living in other countries. The Kazakh nationality was one of them.

### ***Trans-Border Distribution of the Kazakh Nationality***

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs have become the majority nationality in the newly independent Kazakh Republic. In 2004, the overall population in Kazakhstan was 15.0463 million. With a population of 8.6817 million, the Kazakh nationality constitutes 57.7 per cent of the total population. Besides the Kazakhs

in Kazakh Republic, there are around 4.1 million Kazakhs in other countries. Among them, more than one million lives in Uzbek and 1.2505 million live in China. (See table 1)

**Table: 1**  
**Distribution of Kazakhs in Trans-Border Areas (in Million)**

Kazakhstan	8.681
China	1.25
Uzbekistan	1
Turkmenistan	1.398
Russia	0.74
Mongolian	0.14
Others	0.24
Total	13.449

The Kazakhs in China and Kazakhstan belong to the trans-border nationalities of the same origin sharing common language, religion and culture. Their traits are represented in three ways: Firstly, China has a comparatively wide range of Kazakh distribution, mainly in Xinjiang (Yili Autonomous Prefecture of Kazakh; Mulei and Balikui Kazakh Autonomous Counties and Urumqi), Gansu (Akesai Kazakh Autonomous County) and Qinghai. Secondly, the Kazakh trans-border nationality of same origin is comparatively centralized in one area. It lives in a compact community with small decentralization on the whole. The distribution of the Kazakh nationalities in China and Kazakhstan follow such trait. Thirdly, there are many ethnic groups in both the countries. China has 56 nationalities. Although the main nationality of Kazakhstan is Kazakh, it is still a multinational country having 131 nationalities.

***Migration of Kazakhs to Trans-China and Kazakhstan***

The main reasons for China's Kazakhs coming to Kazakhstan are: settling down, studying abroad, labour and service export, visiting relatives, travel, etc. In order to settle down the non-resident Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Republic announced a special policy after its independence, *The Project of the Return of the Kazakhs to*

*Xu Qinhua*

---

*Historical Motherland.* This project which encourages the immigration of Kazakhs into Kazakhstan has the state migration fund. It also seeks to establish good relations with the Kazakhs outside Kazakhstan. The primary objective of this project is to facilitate their organized migration of the Kazakhs returning to their motherland. In order to absorb the non-resident Kazakhs, some Kazakh organizations such as the *Kazakh International Association*, *Kazakh Homeland Association* have been playing the key role. Another organisation *International Congress of Kazakhs* is sending invitations to the Kazakhs abroad and publicizing it through radio, TV and newspapers. The Kazakh President has made appeals several times, encouraging the Kazakhs abroad to return home. To encourage the Kazakhs all over the world to settle down in Kazakhstan, the government has enacted the “Civilization Law” and other relevant laws. According to the statistics, from 1991 to the first half of 1997, 36,839 Kazakh families comprising over 160,000 people returned to Kazakhstan. In such circumstances, a sizable group of the Kazakhs living abroad and even the Kazakhs in Xinjiang and Gansu provinces of China have returned to Kazakhstan. According to Kazakhstan’s official statistics, 172 Kazakhs migrated from China to Kazakhstan in 1998 and 163 in 1999.<sup>10</sup> For instance in the Jimunai County in Altai area of Xinjiang, which borders Kazakhstan, the Kazakh population is 61.8 per cent of the total. According to the statistics, from 2002 to 2004, 34 persons in this County immigrated to Kazakhstan. However, some non-resident Kazakhs, who had migrated to Kazakhstan recently, have now returned to their former countries. Owing to the differences in politics, economy, culture, lifestyle, customs and habits, etc., two families of Tajimu County which had emigrated to Kazakhstan have returned to Tajimu. The number of foreigners studying in Kazakhstan is increasing, for the tuition fee in Kazakhstan is not high and universities offer scholarships and free accommodation. In terms of labour and services, many areas in western China promote the productive mode with great effort, which ameliorates a large number of country’s labour force. Under the guidance of the government, labour and services exports to Kazakhstan increase yearly. This is an important approach for accelerating the economic development process. Meanwhile, some ethnic college graduates intend to work in

Kazakhstan as part of their future job plan. With the gradual development of the living standards in Kazakhstan, the number of China's Kazakhs visiting relatives or travelling abroad has also increased.

**POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LINKS OF  
TRANS CHINA-KAZAKHSTAN KAZAKH NATIONALITY**

In 2003, the rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Kazakhstan was over nine per cent and this rate has been maintained during the last four years. Andre Jack of *Finance Times* says: "Kazakhstan has become the most attractive economic power in Central Asia. It makes a sharp contrast with neighbouring countries in economic depression."<sup>11</sup> Kazakhstan directly borders upon Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Xinjiang is the province having largest area and shares longest boundary line with a number of neighbouring countries on its border and trans-border Kazakh nationalities in China. The Xinjiang Kazakh nationality was 1.3521 million in 2003, which is 6.99 per cent of the total population. In 2004, the GDP of Xinjiang increased to 10.8 per cent, which is higher than the national level GDP. The economy of China and Kazakhstan has been on the stage of high growth, which provides material content for enlarging further economic cooperation between China and Kazakhstan. Therefore, the political, economic and social links of cross China-Kazakhstan Kazakh nationality have strengthened.

**Table: 2**  
**Comparison of Economic Development between  
Kazakhstan and Xinjiang in 2004**

State	GDP	GNP per Capita	No. of Employed	No. of Laid-off
Kazakhstan	42.3 billion \$	2700\$	7.95 million	4.16 million
Xinjiang	27.5 billion \$	1048\$	7.39 million	0.112 million

*Source:* This Table is based on the data taken from the Statistics Bureau of Kazakhstan Republic and the Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The exchange rate of US Dollar and Chinese RMB has been conversed by 1: 8.

*(a) Political and Economic Exchanges*

China and Kazakhstan share more than 1,700 kms. common border. In recent years, both the countries have been making use of their geographic proximity to advance their development strategies and take specific measures for accelerating development, invigorating and enlarging their border trade as well as tourism. Xinjiang has close trade exchange with Dongha area of Kazakhstan. Both sides have developed a broad range of economic cooperation and communication, and have concluded agreements on technology, trade, tourism etc. For instance, between January to July 2005, the imports and exports of Jimunai County amounted to 3.5523 million US Dollars (28.7736 million RMB), which is about 135 per cent increase over the same period in 2004. By the end of July 2005, the whole Jimunai port (small-trade boundary port designated by Kazakhstan and Xinjiang Autonomous Region) had import and export turnover of 0.53 billion RMB comprising 54.1 thousand tons of goods.

*(b) Cultural Exchanges*

With the constant enhancement of trade cooperation between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan (in particular Dongha region), the cooperation in the sphere of education and culture has also increased. For instance, from 2004 onwards, three art troupes with nine persons performed in Jimunai County and exchanged their experiences with Jimunai County troupe. Meanwhile, the Education Commission in this area signed an Education Exchange Agreement with Kazakhstan. Besides, there has been frequent cooperation in the science and technology sectors. For instance, the “east goat” bean in Jimunai County has spread through the seeds imported from Kazakhstan.

**CONCLUSION**

In general, the positive influences of trans-border nationalities on China’s boundary areas are through their own linkages. The trans-border nationalities strengthen friendship with neighbouring countries, promoting political, economic and cultural exchanges between both sides and help in the construction and development of the border areas.

The trans-border nationalities in China's western border mainly consist of Uyghur, Kazakh and Hui. Apart from their overlapping consanguinity and geography, they are traditional social groups who believe in Islam. The doctrine of Islam holds that those who believe in this religion are all children of Allah and they should call each other "sisters" and "brothers." The idea of "sisters and brothers" in Islam is easily accepted among the ordinary people. So the spread of Islam in Xinjiang makes the society more consolidated.<sup>12</sup> Religious doctrine and consanguinity also deepen the friendship of trans-border nationalities having the same roots. In December 1991, China recognised the independence of Kazakhstan. In March 1992, these two countries established diplomatic relations. The *Treaty of Cooperation between China and Kazakhstan* signed in 2002 officially declares the desire for everlasting friendship of these two countries. It also points out the specific direction of the development of Sino-Kazakh relations in the new century, that is, based on mutual understanding and mutual belief, promoting the cooperation between these two countries deeply and broadly. For many years, Kazakhstan has been the biggest trade partner of Xinjiang and has accelerated regional economic development of Xinjiang. In 2004, the export trade of Xinjiang with Kazakhstan constituted 58 per cent of the total of 5.64 billion US Dollars of Xinjiang's export trade and 73 per cent of the total of 4.5 billion US Dollar of China's export trade with Kazakhstan.<sup>13</sup> Kazakhstan and China have also strengthened cooperation in the traditional or non-traditional security spheres such as joint anti-terrorism manoeuvres carried by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries in Yili, in 2003.

### **REFERENCES**

1. On the definition of "trans-border nationality", "trans-boundary nationality" and "trans-frontier nationality", see Ma Manli (ed.), *Central Asia Study: The Trans-border Nationalities of Same Origin in Middle Asia and China*, Beijing: Nationality Publishing House, 1995, p.33. Cao Xing, "On the Difference of Trans-boundary Nationality and Trans-frontier Nationality", *Nationality Studies*, no. 6, 1999; Liu Zhi, "The Type, Attribute and developing Tendency of Cross-boundary Nationality", *Yunan Social Science and its Developing Tendency*, no. 5, 2004.



2. Ma Manli, *Ibid.*
3. Trans-border nationalities with the same origin refer to those who inhabit more than two countries while belonging to the same ethnic group.
4. Unilateral main body refers to the trans-border nationality, which is the main nationality or majority nationality in one country while it is not so in another country; Bilateral main body refers to the trans-border nationality which becomes main body nationality in both countries; bilateral non-main body refers to the trans-border nationality which is not the main body nationality in either country.
5. In “On the Difference of trans-boundary Nationality and trans-frontier Nationality”, Cao Xing makes distinction of these two ideas of nationality: “political identity” and “cultural identity”. Cultural identity in different countries, owing to the different political, economic and cultural background, has formed different attributes and thus different nationalities. He holds the view that while studying trans-border, trans-boundary, trans-frontier nationalities, “nationality” should be understood as a cultural identity.
6. Liu Zhi, *op.cit.*
7. Ding Jianwei, *The Security of Northwestern Border in Geopolitics*, Beijing: Nationality Publishing House, 2004, p.287.
8. Ma Manli, *Ibid.*, p.125.
9. *Ibid.*, p.128.
10. Wu Hongwei, “Population and Population Migration of stan after Its Independence”, *East Europe and Central Asia Studies*, no. 3, 2002.
11. Yuan Zheng, “Kazakhstan Becoming the Most Attractive Economic Power in Central Asia”, *Central Asia Information*, no. 7, (2004).
12. Sun Kui, “Overlapped Societies of Consanguinity and Geography : A Study on the Social Structure of the Uyghur and Kazakh Nationalities”, *Dalian Nationalities University Journal*, no. 2, 2004.
13. Xie Xia, “Expanding Trade Passage from Xinjiang to Central Asia” , at <http://www.ucatv.com.cn/2005/5/17>.

---

## DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN KAZAKHSTAN

*Kuralay Baizakova*

Destruction of old global order and regional structures of international security inherent in the former scheme of the bipolar world, in many cases, is accompanied by the shaking of the state formations. The world has entered into a stage of extreme instability, uncertainty and lowered security. In these conditions of relative decrease in the role of government mechanisms to maintain security, certain forces and non-state actors try to use the factors of instability in order to secure their goals. The problem of maintenance of national security in the modern world differs radically from the problems of twentieth century. A call for the formulation of an effective policy of safety and security today is part of the process of globalization, which is understood as a dynamic process of forming new accruing associations or societies across the world. This process is a close interlacing of communications in social, political, economic and cultural spheres leading to mutual influence and adaptation in the changing external conditions. Globalization points out the danger of erosion of the state territory, state, nation and the government, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The risks caused by globalization arise when the economic and public processes aspire to be pulled out from the sovereign control of the state and thus represent potential threats. One of the cardinal problems of the present day world is the parity between globalization and national interests, which impacts upon the sovereignty of the states.<sup>1</sup> As these problems of the modern day world have occurred at sub-national and inter-state levels, the opportunities for the nation states have decreased. This compels the nation states to transfer part of the power in favour of sub-national constituents.

Due to various political processes for minimizing the risks and threats of internal political stability and for the steady development of the society, the Kazakh state is faced with so many complex problems. For durable internal security, there is need to bring about democratic

changes in the political system.<sup>2</sup> Political security in modern Kazakhstan is certainly influenced by the political processes in the country, which are characterized by a set of both negative and positive factors. The negative factors are: incompleteness of the process of political formation, discrepancy in the process of political formation, discrepancy and incompleteness in the development of legal basis, inadequate social policy and a dangerous level of differentiation in the society; discrepancy in the political consciousness of the society; the tightened process of economic development. The positive factors include: formation of a modern political system, creation of the legal and social state; formation of a pluralistic society; a multi-party system; democratic elections (parliamentary and presidential), democratic transformation in the economic sphere, market relations and support by the majority of the population for democratic and economic reforms.

The principal cause of the existing political problems is that during the reform and nation building process, no attention has been paid to some important aspects of revamping the political system. The reactions of the Kazakh political elite to criticism from outside are defined not only by specificity of internal political and regional development of the Republic, but also by the duality of policy of the Western countries, particularly the USA. Therefore, reacting to criticism in the field of human rights, it is necessary to reflect on its purposes: whether the basic purpose of the Western policy is to promote democracy or it is a reflection of the “double standards” of the leading global powers.

Kazakhstan is not in a hurry to develop democratic institutions and multi-party system. Influence of political parties on the government is very less. Their presence as political entities in the political arena is not accepted by the people. As a rule, they do not reflect the mood of society and at the same time do not serve as an area for recruitment of the ruling elite. They have not been able to influence the decisions of the executive. Political activity of the population is frozen. Socially active population is alienated from politics. In this case, it is noteworthy to remember what President Nursultan Nazarbayev's stated: “The main thing is that it is impossible to overcome the gap between new institutions and old models of behaviour on a mass level quickly in a

## *DEMOCRATIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN*

---

short period.”<sup>3</sup> Political realities in the Republic noticeably differ from its Western partners. Some Western scholars criticize the excessive concentration of authority in the hands of the President and his loyalists. V. Zhiskar D’Ester wrote, “even if the President does not want it, but from the very moment of his election, there is public aspiration to lift up to the level where all their problems can be solved. Therefore, there is a risk of a command consisting of a narrow circle of persons around him which uses excessive authority. In order to prevent this phenomenon, it is necessary to find corresponding balance in power structures.”<sup>4</sup>

In Kazakhstan, there is no strong party system and the political culture of citizens. Therefore, it is important to upgrade the general level of political consciousness of the citizens of Kazakhstan. One of the major questions of democratization in Kazakhstan is the reformation of local self-management that is the mutual relations between the central government and the self-governing institutions at the grassroots level. Here, the role and status of *Akims* has been given importance. The Kazakh researchers have pointed to the election of *Akims* of oblasts, who would be selected nationally. The appointment of *Akims* by the President of Republic of Kazakhstan is considered to be a justified step.<sup>5</sup>

While reforming and reorganizing the state bodies, it is necessary to avoid unsystematic characters and develop a uniform methodology, having precise functions of state bodies and regulations in view of the features and development of transition economy; change of priorities; rationalization of structural state bodies by functional attributes and distributing between them the whole system of power and functions. Also at present, parallel structures of executive authority directly subordinated to the President have been created. When the state bodies, duplicating each other, do not promote economic growth and political stability, it leads to serious consequences.

One of the reasons of delay in the reconstruction process of democratic society in Kazakhstan is that the overwhelming majority of the population is politically passive. Significant tendencies of authoritarianism of power were outlined in the conditions of a transition period from totalitarianism to democracy in the Republic. It is popularly believed that authoritarianism is the main feature of political culture in

Kazakhstan. Often similar conclusions are drawn while ascertaining the outlook of the Kazakhs, who have had reverence for the supreme authority and its direct carriers during the Soviet period. The process of democratization, which has been breaking traditional mechanisms of social and political attitudes, is considered to be imposing and alien to the people of Kazakhstan.

Taking into consideration the national and cultural features of the development of the Kazakh traditional society, which is a direct object of authoritative influence and a resource for ethnocratic decisions, and also high level of consciousness of national political traditions and social norms, it is necessary to specify that authoritarianism has been of paramount value during a crisis condition of the state. In such a situation, centralization and monopoly of authority by Nursultan Nazarbayev played an important role. The concentration of all authority in Nazarbayev's hands and consolidation of the former party nomenclature has resulted in socio-political stability, peace, redistribution of powers, fixing and legalising new political systems and mobilization of resources for carrying out large scale economic and political transformation. It is necessary to note that the attitude of the population to the government, the management efficiency and concentration of efforts of President Nazarbayev in this direction has evoked wide public support.

As a whole, Authoritative Board in many respects owes to the personality factor, i.e., political experience and personal charisma of President Nazarbayev. As a seasoned politician, he was considered by the Kazakhs as being the key factor for maintenance of internal stability and implementation of foreign policy initiatives. "The special way" development of democracy is specific to each country, and can not be treated as a universal denominator.

Many believe that democracy and transition to the system of party-political representation is risky. There is need to take into account the ethnic attitudes in a society and consequences of any imbalance between Kazakhs and Russians in the power structures as a result of democratization of selective procedures. The image of President Nazarbayev in this situation again represents itself as being the

## **DEMOCRATIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN**

---

stabilising force and the guarantor of political stability in the state. As a matter of fact, it means that the system will continue to be stable in future only if Nazarbayev remains the President of the country.

Actually, authoritarianism in present set up in Kazakhstan is adequate for the processes occurring in the post-Soviet space and the neighbourhood of Kazakhstan. The dynamics of political process in the Republic is guided by the general laws of the post-totalitarian societies in the former Soviet republics. At the same time, recognizing that the government bodies function effectively from the point of view of interests of the state, it is possible to judge low efficiency of authority from the point of view of interests of a society, whose social and economic, political, cultural and other needs are not fully satisfied.

Majority of the population have expressed serious concern and anxiety over the low level of monetary income, growing property stratification and corruption among officials. So, substituting the struggle against corruption by initiating repressive measures among the lowest parts of machinery of state, the authority in the opinion of the population loses the moral right in its anti-corruption rhetoric. In case of Kazakhstan, where legitimacy of authoritarian power leans on traditions and customs owing to President Nazarbayev's charismatic type of political domination, ignoring the specified central questions of growing "rationalization" of activity of the government and state machinery deprives the authority of the right to authoritarianism. So, it indicates the absence of negative reaction of the population on the issues of criticism by international organizations and other powers on the problem of democratization.

In the context of democratization process, it would be desirable to specify three most probable scenarios. The first one assumes to continue a former course with the developed style of management, counting on self-organizing of political system. However, this scenario lacks a strong base. Following a way of cardinal economic reforms, Kazakhstan simultaneously initiated the process of political transformation. It is necessary to consider that the economic reforms, which are carried out in the Republic, are directly connected with politics. Economic freedom assumes other type of relations in a society

that follows from the nature of development of market relations. It is a question of system change - about adaptation of authority in varying political conditions to forms of interaction between state bodies, a society and large business, i.e., the entrepreneur.

All participants of the given “triangle” are interested in the efficiency of political reforms. For a society, it is guaranteed by the legislation and political practice, protection of the civil rights, political freedoms, responsibility of the authority before a society, refusal of authority to unconstitutional command and intervention in political and economic processes. For businessmen, it means a stable political climate. Freedom of business and legal regulation of financial and economic relations corresponds to market democracy. For an authority to guarantee its recognition by the society and businessmen, operating institutes should be legal, steady and conventional to provide legitimacy to ruling elite. For political elite, it is recognition by society of its political domination. Thus, system of state governing requires reforms for optimization of the structure. For administrative reform, i.e., transformation of essence of the government, its qualitative structure is required.

The political system of the Republic now is stable due to continuous updating and reform alongwith modernization and the high rate of development which causes the political disorganization of the population and shift of potentially politically active population to economic sphere. Any checks in this process and change would cause stagnation.

The external factors such as the process of democratization in Russia and in the post-Soviet space and active promotion of democratic values by the Western countries play an important role. The external influence on the political system of Kazakhstan can be seen at two levels: (i) the objective political processes caused by the activities of masses thus causing shockwaves in political circles. Transition of the state from presidential to the parliamentary-presidential form in Kyrgyzstan and in Ukraine is a sharp expression of the question of redistribution of powers, carried out at the institutional level within the constitutional framework. The situation in Central Asia is much serious because of some factors. It can not be ruled out that the absence of

## *DEMOCRATIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN*

---

real progress in the development of democratic values will make this region a hostage of ideology of struggle with dictatorship regime; and ii) strengthening of foreign policy pressure upon the ruling circles, initiated with the purpose to accelerate democratic and other transformation. The “Kyrgyz” and “Ukrainian” experiences demonstrated, the inability of authority to resist foreign policy pressures and to adapt to a new reality. Kazakhstan, conceding to the Western pressure, moved on the path of democratization of a political mode. Kazakhstan carries out political reforms, which will give an impetus to political transformation of the entire Central Asian region. Leaning on its high growth rate, the Republic accepts the role model of democracy and freedom in Central Asia, thus advancing the region’s democratic principles.

The basic condition for realization of this strategic line is, first of all, liberalization of political system in the Republic that has both the internal and external risks. Internal political risks for the ruling elite are: unpredictable as regards the consequences of socio-political activities of the population, strengthening of ethnic and religious factors in the political life of the country, infringement of inter-ethnic balance, and, at large, start of a new phase of opposition between the government and opposition. Under the influence of these problems, the political system of a country can be disorganized. Considering features of functioning of political organizations in the Republic, it can lead to political instability and change of the country leaders. Besides, the acceptance and “blind copying” without serious adaptation of liberal economic values and reforms will lead to washing out of historical roots and traditional societies, which is not at all acceptable. There are also serious foreign policy risks. Without political changes in Russia and Transcaucasus, the liberalization process in Kazakhstan is not only less prospective, but even counterproductive.

The third variant is the “operated democracy”. Keeping in view political developments in Kazakhstan last year, it is represented to be the most real and assuming continuation of the policy of deduction of authority by management of the country through a combination of modernization and introduction of party-political system. Kazakhstan pursues liberal economic policy, but does not carry out the necessary



political reforms. However, from the first variant, it is distinguished from the course of progress and modernization. Finally, it will allow the ruling elite to supervise transition of a society to democratic political system.

In the historical plane, functions of present elite consist of modernization of the Kazakh society, maintenance of stability, transformation from socialist to a new social order, adaptation to a new form of statehood and foreign policy environment. It is a model of development of the country and adapted to its foreign policy interests. Advantage of the given variant is also because the propaganda of the universal values of democracy and freedom in the Central Asian Republics has been ineffective. And “Political Westernisation” will cause tearing away of the extremely conservative modes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. And to build intra-regional interaction, it is more favourable due to ideological, social and economic factors, representing itself as the moderate supporter of liberal reforms, modernization and an advance of southern neighbours on course of economic growth.

Last but not the least, the fourth variant “Creeping Islamisation” assumes greater significance. This pertains to strengthening of the role of Islam in the political life of the country. However, considering ethno-religious structure of the Kazakh society, the Islamic factor, even a secular variant of Islam as in Turkey, has little prospects. It can now be concluded that in Kazakhstan, there is an authoritative system, which corresponds to the specificity of development of the Republic during the transition period.

#### REFERENCES

1. E. Idrisov, *In Conditions of Globalization: Kazakhstan and the World Community*, Almaty, 2000, p.4.
2. B. Jusipov, “Politics of Development: Democracy as the Factor of Safety of Republic”, *Siasat*, April-May 2000, p.44.
3. “President N. Nazarbayev at the Session of Constant Advice of OSCE, 24 February 2000”, *Diplomatic Courier*, no. 1, 2000, p.74.
4. Jeskar D'esten, “President: The Arbitrator and the Guarantor”, *News*, 8 March 1990.
5. J.U. Ibrashev, “The Political Mode Necessary to us”, *New Generation*, no. 1.

---

## ELECTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN

*Saifolla Sapanov*

Immediately after the Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan in 2005, the mass media and scientific journals all over the world put the following questions: “Whether a Colour Revolution is possible in Kazakhstan?”, and “Who is the main competitor to present President Nursultan Nazarbayev for the Presidential chair?” Though nobody had any doubt of President Nazarbayev’s victory, there were certain fears concerning the re-election of President Nazarbayev, the person who has been the President of the country since the beginning of Kazakhstan’s statehood and during whose previous reign, two constitutions and 18 amendments were incorporated. It is necessary to note that the Western scholars saw infringement of the Constitutional law in case of President Nazarbayev’s submission as a Presidential contender. According to the Constitution, the President of Kazakhstan has the right to be elected only for two terms, each term being a period of seven years. The Western scholars believe that two terms of Nazarbayev have already expired and according to this, Nazarbayev’s participation in the presidential elections was illegal. However, the domestic experts have a different view. They contend that according to the Constitution of 1993 or 1995, Nazarbayev has been the President for one term in office. His first term appeared rather long for the reason that the President, due to internal political crises, could not stay in office for the whole term till the end. When there was conflict between the Parliament and the President, the latter had to hold pre-term elections. The President’s first term ended only in 2005. Thus, in domestic circles, the question of legitimacy of Nazarbayev’s re-election did not exist.

Nazarbayev’s absolute victory in the elections has puzzled the world community very much. For them, over 90 per cent victory margin is too impressive a figure to believe in the transparency in the Presidential elections. Even in Kazakhstan nobody believed that Nazarbayev would receive such a huge number of votes. Even most of

the psephologists predicted 80 per cent, but not over 90 per cent. However, nobody tried, except for the opposition which lost the elections, to challenge the election results declared by the Central Electoral Commission. All this shows that the Presidential election was smoothly conducted in Kazakhstan within the ambit of standard norms. The independent international observers from several foreign countries and many international organizations did not notice any malpractice during the elections. To them, the elections in Kazakhstan were conducted peacefully and there was not even a shred of evidence of violence.

The factors behind such an outstanding outcome of the elections are: the charismatic personality of President Nazarbayev, a favourably developed external environment, stable economic growth, absence of sharp social contradictions and disappointments in the society, and absence of a strong opposition.

### **NAZARBAYEV'S CHARISMATIC PERSONALITY**

Kazakh people still remember all those complex phenomena which they faced through out the 1990s. Defaults in payment of wages, pensions, periodic disruption of electric power, decline in production, hyperinflation, unemployment and impoverishment of the population were the main challenges at that time. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who rescued the country from a crisis condition, is perceived by everyone in Kazakhstan as the guarantor of stability and sustainable development. Nowadays, people think stable growth of Kazakhstan's economy and constant improvement of citizens' well being in the country is the direct result of the far-sighted policy and the charismatic personality of President Nazarbayev. Besides all this, President Nazarbayev has taken some rational steps such as increase of pensions and wages to teachers, physicians and other state employees and increase of the grants to students on the eve of the Presidential elections to attract the Kazakhs to his party. A year earlier in 2004, he had launched a successful agriculture programme supported by the state by declaring "Three Years of Village". The annual economic growth in Kazakhstan is on the average estimated at ten per cent. The constant price rise of fuel during the last few years has affected the budgetary proficiency that prompted

the government to increase spending on social programmes and payment of the extraordinary debts to the international financial institutions.

The credit to build the Kazakh society goes to President Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan is a multinational and multi-ethnic state, where more than 120 representatives of various ethnic groups live. Though many called Kazakhstan “the Asian Balkans” at the beginning of the country’s independence, this did not come true. Due to President Nazarbayev’s political ingenuity and able administration, it was possible to adjust inter-cultural dialogue with the inter-ethnic consent to realize the concept “unity in diversity.” This became an important step in the formation and consolidation of a united Kazakhstan nation. Some ethnic groups, who do not belong to the Kazakh nationality, are even afraid of any other person replacing President Nazarbayev. They think the new President may become a nationalist one and oppress the rights of the national minorities. They preferred the stability associated with President Nazarbayev. Therefore, it is no wonder that representatives of national minorities, who constitute 42 per cent of the total Kazakh population as per the statistics of 2005, have voted largely in favour of President Nazarbayev.

### **FAVOURABLE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT**

After the elections in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan which witnessed “Colour Revolutions”, elections in Kazakhstan were approaching. The period between 2005 and the beginning of 2006 witnessed elections in Iran, Moldova, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Palestine and in Latin America with an anti-American orientation. All this reduced the threat of influence of the West on the outcome of the Kazakh elections. It may be noted here that the US blackmail of the Central Asian states to carry out the liberalization of their economy and democratization of their political systems has not succeeded. Leaders of the Central Asian states, Russia and China in their meeting in the summer in the Kazakh capital Astana within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) issued a declaration which focussed on two important points - mutual support of the leaders of the SCO and an anti-American unity. After such developments, the

USA changed its tone and the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice made an attempt to pacify the Central Asian leaders. It is necessary to take into account that in the oil-extracting branch of Kazakh economy, there are a lot of American oil corporations for the successful functioning of which internal stability in the Republic of Kazakhstan is extremely important and the US administration mustn't lose sight of it. Thus, USA agreed to cooperate with Kazakhstan and in turn, Kazakhstan now carries out pro-American policy to secure its national interests.

For the fifteen years of its independent existence, Kazakhstan has created all conditions for functioning of market economic relations and has strongly been assimilated into the world community. Having recommended itself as a peaceful state, Kazakhstan refused the nuclear legacy on a voluntary basis as was inherited from the former USSR, and managed to liquidate separatist tendencies and sought to construct a united Kazakh nation. Having constructed the best banking system on the post-Soviet space, Kazakhstan, as marked by the international election observers, has initiated steps in the field of the human rights and freedom. A bright example can be the announcement of the moratorium on death penalty. Annual meets of "International Eurasian Media Forums" promote freedom of speech, which is one of the basic freedoms of a human being. The regular exchange of experience between domestic and foreign journalists promotes unbiased interpretation of the events taking place inside the state and abroad.

### **ABSENCE OF STRONG OPPOSITION**

Analyzing the past Presidential elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is imperative to take into account the role of opposition in the country. The role of opposition is an important parameter of democracy in a society. Kazakhstan welcomes the ideas of democracy and since its independence, it has been taking positive steps to build democracy. As regards the Kazakhstan opposition, its influence is very weak. Elections to the country's Parliament were held in September 2004, where the opposition could not achieve the overall objective - mandates to *Mazhilis* (the Lower Chamber of the Parliament). It couldn't do anything spectacular in the Presidential elections of 2005.

## *ELECTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN*

---

For a year, the opposition could not mobilize its forces and resources despite the international financial and other support. Though the opposition consists mainly of business elites, which have big financial opportunities, it could not match the charisma and popularity of President Nazarbayev.

In Kazakhstan, there are two types of opposition: the opposition supporting wider liberalization of Kazakhstan or the so called “pro-Westerners” and the Communists. The latter are popular only among the people of the older generation and are represented by the *Communist Party of Kazakhstan* headed by Serikbolsyn Abdildin, and the *Communist Peoples Party of Kazakhstan* led by Vladislav Kosarev. The “pro-Westerners” are represented by the *Democratic Party of Kazakhstan* “Akzhol” under the leadership of Alikhan Baimenov and the *Party of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan* led by Zharmakhan Tuyakbay. At times, the leaders of opposition worked for the country and devoted themselves for the service of the country. For example, up to the middle of 2004, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay was the Speaker in *Mazhilis* being appointed by the President as per the constitutional norms. During the election campaign, the opposition had nothing to offer to the Kazakh people. President Nazarbayev has practically carried out all those ideas which were being propagated by the opposition in the elections of 2004 liberalization of political authority was started by the introduction of *Akims* in Oblasts and cities; 3,000 grants have been allocated under state programme *Bolashak* for students wishing to get education abroad; increase in pensions, wages and welfare payments. All these measures weakened the position of the opposition before the elections of 2005.

At the present stage, there is a discussion concerning position of the Parliament in the Republic. Today the President enjoys enormous powers. He appoints the government, speakers of Parliament, members of the Constitutional Court, *Akims* of oblasts and cities, issues decrees having equal force to law, etc. He is the arbitrator between three branches of political authority: Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Though there was a fear in the country about a social and even political crisis, in his pre-election campaign President Nazarbayev put emphasis

on increasing the powers of the Parliament. It can be noted here that Kazakhstan is at a stage of transition from the Presidential form to parliamentary form of government. President Nazarbayev now believes that the country's Parliament can pass effective and people friendly laws. He now favours a mature party system. For the 2005 elections in the country, there were eleven registered parties, which bears testimony of a multi-party system in the Republic. Many observers argue whether there is a formation of two-party system in the Republic of Kazakhstan based on two blocs. In our opinion, it is improbable as each party has its specificity and strategy for its development. For example, the *Agrarian Party*, which supports the reform measures of President Nazarbayev, aims at the improvement of the position of villages, and asserts the interests of rural people in Parliament, but never of urban people. Today there is only one presidential party. It is *Otan* (Motherland).

It can be summed up that democracy is a constantly evolving process. Perhaps, it is impossible to fix any final stage of democracy. For Kazakhstan, it is still experiencing a transitional stage. This country has not got accustomed to democracy in classical understanding. It requires the advanced civil society, which is in its formative stage. It is necessary to speak about the oriental type of democracy and its necessity, which is explained by different realities of Western and Eastern societies. As regards the first one, it is characterized by individualism and the second by collectivism. Kazakhstan is considered, perhaps, more as an Eastern civilization than a Western one, though it is located at the interface of Europe and Asia. Whether it is good or bad for the Kazakh society, the Kazakhs still have tribal manifestation, and a division on *zhuzes* (historically formed economic regions), further on clans. In 1990s, when Kazakhstan was engaged in copying the Western democracy, it learnt that all borrowings from the West can not be applied to the government set up in the East. Growth of corruption and economic crisis have necessitated the centralization of authority. Therefore, there is still an element of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan which is being criticized by the Western scholars. Today, when the economy and consciousness of Kazakhstani people have become stronger, it is possible to speak about some decentralization. However,

## *ELECTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN*

---

it is necessary to be extremely cautious as there is a probability of split in the society. For example, the population living in the western regions of Republic, rich with oil, are disappointed that all income is transferred into the state budget which is necessary for the equal development of Kazakhstan as a whole. Now we shall hypothetically assume that a candidate for “oblast *akim*” appears and promises to the local people accumulation of half, and even larger share of the incomes taken from oil into the local budget. It is not difficult to guess, that local population will choose him unanimously. And it, in turn, will cross out all those works directed in previous years on rallying and construction of a united nation. Therefore, Kazakhstan today is in search of its own formula of democracy reflecting the specificity of the Kazakh society to make the Republic a progressive and peaceful country.



---

## NAZARBAYEV EMERGES STRONGER AFTER POLLS

*Indranil Banerjee*

Nursultan Nazarbayev was re-elected as the President of Kazakhstan for another seven-year term through general elections held on 4 December 2005. Over six million Kazakhs trudged to polling stations all across their country to vote in the Presidential polls on 4 December 2005, even as cold Siberian winds brought snow and frost throughout the country. It was later estimated that more than 77 per cent or about 6.85 million of 8.87 million eligible Kazakh voters had cast their ballots in the poll. The President incumbent, Nursultan Nazarbayev, secured a whopping 91.01 per cent of the votes, while his nearest rival, Zarmakhan Tuyakbai, received just 6.64 per cent of votes. The other three candidates barely made an impression: Alikhan Baimenov of the *Ak Zhol Democratic Party* got a minuscule 1.65 per cent, Yerassyl Abylkassymov got 0.38 per cent and Mels Yeleusizov of the *Tabigat* (Nature) environmental movement got just 0.32 per cent of the votes. Thus, President Nazarbayev secured another seven year stint in power.

To some Western observers, the very fact that President Nazarbayev secured 91 per cent of the vote suggested something was wrong. The previous Presidential elections had taken place on 10 January 1999, where Nazarbayev had received 79.8 per cent of the votes cast. These kinds of victory margins are unheard of in Western democracies. So the big question was: were the elections fraudulent? According to the government, more than a thousand foreign election observers, 16,458 observers from Kazakh political parties, 5,652 observers from public institutions and 500 Kazakh mediapersons oversaw the elections. Most foreign observers and leaders judged the polls to be free and fair. The big voice of dissent was that of the influential Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which expressed complete displeasure over the election process.

### *NAZARBAYEV EMERGES STRONGER AFTER POLLS*

---

The Almaty office of the OSCE issued a statement on the polling day, slamming the election process: “Despite some improvements in the administration of this election in the pre-election period, the Presidential election did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Candidate registration was mostly inclusive and a field of five candidates provided voters with an opportunity for choice. However, numerous and persistent examples of intimidation by the authorities, including undue restrictions on campaigning and harassment of campaign staff, limited the possibility for a meaningful competition whereby all candidates had equal opportunities to convey their views to the electorate.” The statement, however, admitted that “The Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the election in a generally transparent manner during the pre-election period, taking into account some previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations regarding election administration. While international elections observers assessed that voting was conducted in a calm and peaceful atmosphere, the quality of the process deteriorated during the vote count and was assessed negatively in 27 per cent of observations.” The OSCE also accepted that the state media largely met their legal obligations to provide free airtime to candidates; voter’s lists were generally available to the public well before the polling day; and several other electoral improvements were effected. The OSCE also observed that “Voting was conducted in a generally calm atmosphere... the voting process positively in 92 per cent of polling stations visited, and negatively in eight per cent. However, the international observers found some instances of interference of unauthorized persons, multiple and proxy voting, ballot box stuffing, and pressure on students to vote.” International observers assessed the vote count as bad or very bad in 27 per cent of counts observed and noted serious violations in 21 per cent of counts observed, including tampering with results protocols.

It must be pointed out that while there could have been instances of poll malpractices, this does not imply that President Nazarbayev intended to or did rig the elections. Also, as one observer pointed out, the OSCE poll stipulations were so strict that even the United States government would have found them difficult to meet. Moreover,

Nazarbayev did not have to rig the polls: every indication suggests that he would have won in any case. Lastly, a close reading of the OSCE's conclusions does not throw up anything that could justify junking the elections. Even the head of the EU parliamentary delegation for the elections, Struan Stevenson, did not completely dismiss the poll results. He said: "we witnessed some improvements in the electoral process and were encouraged by these signs. Nevertheless we are of the view that much work remains to be done if Kazakhstan's embryonic democracy is to grow and mature." Remarks like this and the OSCE's conclusions are clearly patronising of Kazakh democracy, which is perceived as being fraudulent because they are not up to European standards. This argument is specious and clearly uncharitable.

If President Nazarbayev secured an overwhelming majority of votes, it was because for the average Kazakh the poll was a referendum for Nazarbayev. The other five candidates were not nationally well known personalities and, in any case, it was not a toss up among the five. The vote was for or against Nazarbayev. This is the manner in which elections are viewed in a host of Asian democracies, including India. The nuances of issues are often unimportant. The average Kazakh expressed confidence in the leadership of Nazarbayev.

### **THREAT OF "COLOURED REVOLUTIONS"**

One reason why the internal security apparatus in Kazakhstan must have been extra-zealous during the polls was the incipient threat of an externally sponsored revolution. Most Central Asian elite feel that the Western powers have engineered a series of "revolutions" in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, including in Ukraine (Orange Revolution), Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution) and Georgia (Rose Revolution). To prevent the "export" of a "Colour Revolution" from post-revolutionary Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh authorities expelled many foreigners from Kazakhstan and sealed the border with Kyrgyzstan. The authorities were also hard on the student community in the country's major cities because it was felt that any coup attempt would utilise the student community. In hindsight, President Nazarbayev need not have worried. For, internally, he was more stable than most CIS rulers;

his country's economy was doing well; and, most importantly, big power stakes in his country were too high to allow for sudden coups.

### ***Reforms Pay Off***

The singular fact about President Nazarbayev's success is that market reforms initiated by him in 1993 have paid off. A UNDP Report released in early December 2005 titled *Bringing Down Barriers: Regional Cooperation for Human Development and Human Security* pointed out that while most of Central Asia continues to struggle to undo economic, political and social shortcomings nearly 15 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has shown the most promise to overcome these challenges. Since 1998, the region has rebounded because of rapid economic growth in Russia and China, high energy prices and economic reforms. With its huge energy resources, Kazakhstan has been able to attract relatively large amounts of foreign investment. "Kazakhstan has made significant progress in reforming and developing its financial sector and is at a much more advanced stage than the other four countries," according to the study.

With more growth, there has been an increase in public spending and welfare measures. The cities and towns of Kazakhstan have benefited immensely in the last five to seven years. Prosperity in the streets is palpable. Investment in public infrastructure is higher than in many developing and CIS countries. Today, Kazakhstan ranks top among the five Central Asian Republics in terms of the Human Development Index, though it continues to lag behind Russia and Central European countries. The population generally tends to associate this new found prosperity with Nazarbayev's policies, especially since things are significantly worse in the neighbouring countries, which were all part of large Soviet Central Asia not too long ago. The per capita income in Kazakhstan is about US \$ 2,250, which is about five times higher than in neighbouring Uzbekistan. Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculated in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was US \$ 6,671 in 2003 as compared to US \$ 7,939 for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries as a whole. It is estimated that per capita GDP has gone up five fold since Kazakhstan became independent.

## GEOPOLITICS

Independent assessments by a number of countries, including the United States and India, had predicted a win for President Nazarbayev – and that too not through fraudulent elections. A few days before the polls, a senior State Department official had said President Nursultan is likely to be reelected for another term by a broad margin. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Bryza said independent polling suggests that Nazarbayev has a genuinely wide lead over his rivals, and could garner well in excess of 60 percent of the vote. The “code of conduct are commitments that have, by and large, been implemented on behalf of the government to provide access to the media, to television in particular, by opposition candidates to facilitate debates on television among the opposition candidates. That’s happened. The government is committed to publish accurate voter lists all over the country so that each voter can go and check whether he or she is on the lists, and correct the lists. That’s happened. They published the lists in fact on November 18<sup>th</sup> (2005). That has never happened before,” he said.

There were two reasons why the US State Department, which has been highly critical of President Nazarbayev in the past, chose to support him this time. First was the fact that Nazarbayev clearly had domestic support and second, the US today needs the support of Kazakhstan in the region, which has turned somewhat cool to the US in recent times. Even the three countries where regime changes have been effected through “Coloured Revolutions” are not doing too well. In early December 2005, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visited Ukraine to urge the leadership to start shaping up. But that is going to be difficult because Russia has started tightening the screws by asking Ukraine to pay market prices for gas and oil imports. In Georgia and Kyrgyzstan things are not better.

Kazakhstan, along with a host of other CIS countries, has in recent times begun cosyng up with Russia and China. The Russian leadership has declared that the new relations with the CIS countries will not be based on dominance and exploitation but on joint

## ***NAZARBAYEV EMERGES STRONGER AFTER POLLS***

---

cooperation and equal partnerships. The Chinese, having successfully worked out border deals with Russia and most Central Asian Republics, is looking at regional consolidation and the creation of an alliance through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to keep the West at an arm's length. The year 2005 has been one of realignments in regional geopolitics. Should the US fail to maintain good relations with Kazakhstan, then its position in the region could suffer even further. The United States has been forced to close down its airbase in Uzbekistan and has one last remaining airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Neither China nor Russia like this fact and there would be pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close down this airbase as well. Kazakhstan has considerable influence over the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic and could influence a decision on the US airbase.

### **FUTURE DIRECTIONS**

President Nazarbayev has got a mandate for another seven years and it is unlikely that he will waste it. If there is anything that could serve as a guiding principle for his future actions, it would be his policy of balance of interests. He has been extremely successful in recent times by steering clear of restrictive relations with one or more power. He has maintained good relations with the West while growing closer to China and reinventing ties with Russia. He has championed the SCO without openly opposing the NATO. He has sought to build bridges with a new set of countries beyond Kazakhstan's core interest countries (the Central Asian Republics, China and Russia) like India, Iran and Turkey. He also believes in the coexistence of different religions and races and has sponsored a number of events to demonstrate this point. It is this belief in balancing interests that has paid off and this is one policy President Nazarbayev is likely to stick to.

Even in the economic sphere, he has succeeded in breaking out of the Russian oil-gas pipeline stranglehold by collaborating with the People's Republic of China to participate in an eastern pipeline (which becomes operational in January 2006), agreeing to participate in the US-sponsored westward looking Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline; opening a trade corridor via China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

*Indranil Banerjee*

---

Region and the Karakoram highway to the Indian Ocean port of Karachi (Pakistan); and looking at ways to open another gas-oil route via Afghanistan or Iran.

Finally, it is certain that he is going to try to give ordinary Kazakhs a better economic deal. While economic growth as a whole has been high, the World Bank and other agencies estimate the percentage of population living below subsistence levels to be as high as 30 and 38 per cent in Kazakhstan. The distribution of income is highly skewed and generally in favour of the urban population. After the polls, President Nazarbayev said in an interview: "During the next seven years we will double salaries of the people of Kazakhstan, and double pensions and scholarships for students. The country's economy will grow 2.5 times". Should the President's promise materialise in the years to come, then the country's voters would justifiably feel vindicated.

---

## KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

*Mara Gubaidullina*

With the end of the bipolar system, international relations entered a new phase of development, especially in the security sector. The very concept of security is becoming more complicated and gaining new grounds. During the 1990s, the international community highlighted the global security needs and its importance not only on a global scale, but also at the regional level besides underlining the importance of regional defence structures.

Regional instability created new forms of crises. The past decade demonstrates the inability of international forces to adequately resolve crises that arose in the Balkans, the Near East, Southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Central Asian Republics emerged as independent states. Kazakhstan, the largest territorial state in Central Asia, attracted the attention of world powers and the regional powers as well. The end of bipolarity and the emergence of independent nation states had an immediate impact upon the geopolitical and geostrategic position of China, the United States as well as Russia. By the mid-1990s, European states and even smaller nations around the globe also realised the emerging significance of Central Asia.

Central Asia occupies a crossroads or fault line of strategic interests between international actors at the end of Cold War. Emphasizing the importance of Central Asia for the United States, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that “geopolitics has moved from regional thinking to global, thus the superiority over all Eurasian continent forms the central basis for global domination. Now the United States of America, the non-European power, predominates internationally, and its authority is directly distributed on three peripheral regions of the Eurasian continent from which position, it carries out the powerful influence on the states.”<sup>1</sup>



Western powers ostensibly support large-scale political reforms within Kazakh Republic, while stressing the need for integrating the country into global economic and political structures. However, geography and geopolitical interests guide the Western priorities. Kazakhstan's policy in response to current issues at the global level depends on the arrangement of forces in the world and the sequence of global events. Traditionally seen as an important tool of foreign policy, geopolitics proceeds from a principle of geographical determinism to define policy options. Many threats to the security of Kazakhstan directly depend on its geopolitical position, which includes the main elements of geopolitics such as territory and the absence of the exit routes to the sea, natural resources and economic potential, population and its ethnic composition, the Islamic neighbourhood etc.

Geopolitical factor is considered to be the key part of the concept of foreign policy in Kazakhstan and its adherence to the principle of "multi-vector foreign policy." The President of Kazakhstan and the Head of the State, Nursultan Nazarbayev has pointed out time and again that countries not only need cooperation at the regional level, but also global cooperation and partnership. According to President Nazarbayev, "to construct mutual relations between Kazakhstan and other countries on such a basis requires a commanding principle of global partnership."<sup>2</sup> This means the expansion of strategic interaction with leading world powers to maintain and consolidate global and regional security.

Located at the heart of continental Eurasia, without its own outlet to the world's oceans, and sandwiched between the People's Republic of China to the south and Russia to the north, Kazakhstan requires "global partnership" as much as possible. The partnership should not only be in bilateral and multilateral relations, but also on equal terms. Early in the 1990s, Kazakhstan's foreign policy solved the main problems of defining the status and role of the Republic in international affairs by virtue of its geographical position. The young Republic sought through diplomacy to take into account economic opportunities as well as the political, military and humanitarian potentials of the country. Kazakhstan sought reliable partners to find a worthy place in the new

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

system of international security, and to establish connections with international organizations, institutes and trans-national companies (TNCs). In view of these objectives, Kazakhstan chose a “multi-vectored foreign policy” as reflected in the concept of foreign policy of the Republic accepted in 1995 (it was later amended in 2001), and in “The Strategy of Kazakhstan Becoming and Developing as a Sovereign State”, “Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement of the Wealth of all Kazakhs.”<sup>3</sup> This “multi-vectored foreign policy” stresses the necessity to establish equal rights, mutually advantageous relations with the external world, with all countries bordering Kazakhstan. It is imperative now to take such policy decisions which would provide security of the country.

### **REFUSAL OF NUCLEAR STATUS**

The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan facilitated the establishment of mutually confidential relations with the USA and other Western countries. Kazakhstan has received guarantees of safety and non-intervention from the outside forces in order to independently carry out internal political reforms and strengthening of its statehood. The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan has called for maintenance of regional and global security, and construction of the international security system and disarmament process.

The question of nuclear disarmament led to special initiatives by Washington to remove nuclear weapons from new states that inherited nuclear stockpiles from the former Soviet Union. Indeed, Kazakhstan originally possessed a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, including 104 CC-18 rockets with 1,216 nuclear warheads at fixed locations, and 40 THAT-95 IN strategic bombers with 240 cruise missiles. Kazakhstan accepted the recommendations made by the United States and abandoned its status as a nuclear state and refused the possession, storage and production of the nuclear weapons.

The 1992 Lisbon Protocol first acknowledged Kazakhstan’s responsibility in abandoning its nuclear weapons. Under the Lisbon Protocol, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and the United States agreed to eliminate strategic nuclear systems in their territories to comply

with the terms of the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START I), which had been negotiated between the US and the former Soviet Union.

In an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1993, Kazakhstan acknowledged the possession of nuclear weapons on its territory, and in September 1994 Kazakhstan signed the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Kazakhstan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, and the official guarantees of security from Russia, the United States and Great Britain led to the signing of a Memorandum on 5 December 1994 guaranteeing the security of Kazakhstan by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, American President Bill Clinton, and British Prime Minister John Major during the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in Budapest. Under this Memorandum, Russia, the United States and Great Britain confirmed the OSCE principles of independence, sovereignty and respect for territorial integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan. All the three powers agreed to abstain from the threat of force, or the use of force to seize sovereign territories, to threaten political independence of Kazakhstan. They also agreed not to impose economic sanctions for political purposes.<sup>4</sup> The above signatories negotiated the extension and prolongation of the NPT at a conference in New York in April-May 1995. In the "Operation Sapphire", Kazakhstan sold to the United States about 600 kgs. of highly enriched uranium previously stored in the warehouses at the Ulbinsk metal works, as after signing the NPT, it had become unprofitable for Kazakhstan to bear the cost of the maintenance and protection of its nuclear stockpiles. Declaring the "Operation Sapphire" a success, US President Bill Clinton said, "the world is relieved of one more threat of nuclear terrorism and distribution of the nuclear weapons."<sup>5</sup>

After the last nuclear test, which was conducted in Adit in the Semipalatinsk range on 30 May 1995, Kazakhstan removed the last 1,216 units of nuclear ammunition from its territory. Political circles and political scientists in Kazakhstan had expressed fears and were critical of the decision to abolish these nuclear stockpiles. However, this decision resulted in greater mutual understanding between the Kazakh government, the United States of America and the European powers.

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

The next step confirming Kazakhstan's involvement in the international security system began with the Agreement on the Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in 1996. After joining the framework to liquidate its nuclear arsenals, Kazakhstan began the rather difficult procedure of injecting the norms of international law in these agreements. With the international organizations OSCE, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Union (EU), it was already possible to build mutual relations on an allied basis. Kazakhstan also became a participant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) programme on cooperation, the "Partnership for Peace, Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe".

The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan also promoted its bilateral relations with the United States. Kazakhstan fully enjoys a 'credit of trust' from the world powers. The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan promotes conditions for the maintenance of regional and global security, and involves Kazakhstan in the process of constructing a meaningful system of international security and disarmament.

### **EU-KAZAKHSTAN PARTNERSHIP**

Kazakhstan represents a link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, many regional actors - Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan - surround Kazakhstan. As such policy makers need to deal with the regional problems while participating in the global order. While acting regionally, Kazakhstan also aspires to establish and strengthen its relations with the leading countries of the world by participating in international political and military organizations, and to promote economic development through participation in economic organizations. In this connection, the experience of regional and inter-regional cooperation by countries of the European Union is crucial for the countries of Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan.

Partnership with Europe is one of the most important directions in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. In order to integrate with the world community, Kazakhstan seeks constructive cooperation with the leading countries of Europe. In seeking secured borders, the European Union

allocates to Kazakhstan a significant share of responsibility for maintaining stability in the world and in Central Asia as well. For example, on behalf of the EU, French President Jacques Chirac once confidently stated that “Kazakhstan possesses the potential of a stabilizer in the region and is the catalyst of regional cooperation.”<sup>6</sup>

Efforts by the Kazakh Republic to carry out democratic and market reforms must appear in this context to strengthen its political independence through diplomacy. So, having started originally to build trade and economic relations with the countries of Europe, Kazakhstan aspired for a closer partnership, which now includes the military-political sphere as a necessary component of these mutual relations.

However, difficulties arise in relations between Russia and the southern countries. Oil exporting states of the Caspian region are engaged in an increasing competition with other energy producers which export energy products to the European market. The Caspian oil boom can strengthen the economy of the southern countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which in turn would lead to easing of economic and military dependence on Russia. As a result, Western powers gain influence, thus pushing Russia from the region further.

On its part, the European Union, in the opinion of the famous German expert Alexander Rar, “could bring an important contribution to the successful formation of a Eurasian economic community – a strategic alliance, giving more attention to the Caspian region with all available means under its command to spread responsibility for the prevention of conflicts.”<sup>7</sup>

The energy sector of Kazakhstan is developing under the conditions of a market economy, a basis for involving the Republic in global markets. As an economic partner of Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan can maintain its security through various international structures, institutes, and organizations. Thus, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Kazakhstan can contribute to the economic, social and political stability and security of the region.

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND KAZAKHSTAN**

The Western and European countries appear as potential military-political partners of Kazakhstan, which could support Kazakhstan's initiatives to strengthen mutual trust and security in Asia. Partnership, is understood as a level of interstate dialogue and cooperation that excludes the application of block standards, and is based on relationship of equality, transparency and trust. Certainly, that experience acquired by the leading European countries in creating European integration and security provides a universal model, theoretically. And practically it is useful in Central Asia over the long term. Central Asia requires a common security structure similar to the European model as a basis for replacing potential conflict with true regional integration.

As Europe's own defence structures obviously depend on cooperation between organizations, it is necessary to pay attention to development of cooperation with the given organizations. The European experience appears rather useful from the following point of view: Kazakhstan actively pursues a policy of regional economic integration, which is inconceivable without the system of collective security. Today the European model provides a useful reference point in this regard. Many elements of European defence may be adopted. For example, Central Asia can develop a mechanism for coordinating the efforts of national armed forces in the event of a common regional threat. Regional forces can also standardize arms and military equipment and coordinate the operation of their war-industrial complexes.

European countries possess enormous experience in responding to such problems as terrorism, extremism, separatism and drug trafficking. Facing similar problems, Kazakhstan and Central Asia can learn from Europe. In April 2001, the EU Council of Ministers set the cooperation with the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as a priority in combating drug addiction.<sup>8</sup> In December 2001 at Bucharest, the European Union and OSCE accepted the "Joint Political Declaration Concerning Terrorism" and the "Plan of Action against Terrorism" at

the regional level, including Central Asia. The European Commission assigned EU Foreign Policy Commissioner, Chris Patten to expand stabilization efforts in Central Asia.<sup>9</sup>

There is cooperation in the field of military security, and in the long term, it will be through the framework of the EUROPOL. Today, the sale of the weapons remains one source of revenue in world trade. In this connection, it would be expedient for Kazakhstan to study and adopt the most effective elements of European export strategies in the field of arms sales and military technology. Kazakhstan should also consider the European experience in conversion technologies and the establishment of a long term bilateral cooperation between defence enterprises specializing in dual purpose output. The weapons' trade is the most profitable trade in the modern world. It is better for Kazakhstan to examine in detail the European experience of forming export strategy in the trade of weapons and military equipment. It is very useful for Kazakhstan to analyze conversional ability of EU members in two ways: how to acquire European conversional technologies; and to establish bilateral cooperation with defence enterprises that are producing goods of double appliance. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Kazakhstan, Kasimzhomart Tokayev states, "an active position of the European Union in development of regional cooperation, settlement of military conflicts, carrying out of peacemaking operations on the European continent marks, and also process of expansion of EU due to the countries of East Block determine the necessity of updating of a policy of Kazakhstan concerning the European community with the purpose of a deepening of interaction and its conclusion to a level of strategic partnership."<sup>10</sup>

### **KAZAKHSTAN AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS**

Bilateral relations within the framework of international agreements represent another dimension of military cooperation between Kazakhstan and the European countries. Such international documents include the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (TCF) and the 1999 Vienna Document about negotiations to strengthen trust and

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

security. For Kazakhstan, the TCF has special significance. This document, which applies to the territory “from the Atlantic to the Urals”, establishes basic levels of arms necessary for rapid response and large scale offensive operations. TCF was signed on 19 November 1990 with the Warsaw Treaty Organization states within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The final document of the Extraordinary Conference of States – participants in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the Final Oslo Communique) - allows the deployment of conventional forces in Europe in a new international situation. The document takes into account the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992 among the successor states of the erstwhile USSR with territory in the operative range of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, distributing between them obligations and rights of the former USSR, and also makes them participants of the Agreement.

In October 1992, Kazakhstan joined this TCF. The participation of Kazakhstan in this Treaty, the Forum on Cooperation in the field of security and the Joint Consultative Group under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, promotes its national military and political interests. The responsibility for implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document of 1999 is assigned to the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defence on behalf of its structural division – the Centre responsible for reduction of armaments and maintenance of inspection activities. According to the Vienna Document, the European experts repeatedly carried out inspections according to the given basic systems of Kazakhstan’s arms and technical equipment. Besides the documentary certificates concerning the combat material converted to peaceful purposes, the privatized enterprises and wholly private firms in Kazakhstan have been submitted to experts on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

For Kazakhstan, the formation of the independent system of safety of the European Union has direct value for the Central Asian countries. Firstly, it is paradoxical, but “miniaturization” objectively promotes demilitarization as the military measurement of the EU’s international relations will play an auxiliary role within the framework of its complex policy of safety. Secondly, the corresponding amplification of a military



role and the responsibility of the EU, to a certain degree, pre-determines the opportunities for interaction between the West and the East in the sphere of security. In fact, the concept of the “indivisibility of European security” has more relevance for the EU than for the Americans because of the proximity of Europe to the CIS states. Thirdly, the new quality of relations between the EU and the CIS countries with regard to security issues opens up further opportunities for developing cooperation with the European countries, and promotes many-sided cooperation at the sub-regional level of security.

### **OSCE AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY**

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) became part of the “architecture” of regional security in Central Asia. Kazakhstan as well as other states of post-Soviet Central Asia gained membership in this organization not due to geography, but as the successors to former USSR. OSCE is the only pan-European security organization entrusted with the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in its area. In accepting the OSCE Declaration on the model of general and universal security for Europe in the 21st century through the 1996 Lisbon Protocol, the OSCE underscored the importance of participation by the Central Asian Republics. According to the decisions in Lisbon, Kazakhstan began annual exchanges of military information, notifying its OSCE partners about plans and certain kinds of military activity.

The final documents of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit demonstrate the importance of Central Asia for OSCE. Signatures of the states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan under the Charter of European Security impose on them the obligation to maintain all round development of all OSCE territories and their adjoining regions including Central Asia. Amid intractable challenges like international terrorist networks, aggressive extremism, organized crime, and illegal drugs and arms trafficking, which are common throughout the OSCE countries, the Istanbul Summit Documents says, “we agree that for struggle against these threats, including what proceeds from the areas adjoining states - participants of the OSCE, require national, regional

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

and joint actions by the international community.”<sup>11</sup> The Charter of European Security, which directly mentions safety and prosperity of the states of OSCE, admits that instability in Central Asia generates threats.<sup>12</sup>

Time has come now for the countries of the region to expand the sphere of security and promote creation of a “Euro-Central Asian system of security” together with the OSCE. Recognizing the presence of destabilizing factors in the region and the long process of establishing military-political stability in Afghanistan, the OSCE and Kazakhstan could promote Stability Pact for Central Asia much similar to the Pact of Stability for Southeast Europe. This will, as the Istanbul Charter elaborates, contribute to the “enormous development and diversification activity of the OSCE.” Creation of the Pact could be carried out within the framework of the Centre for Prevention of Conflicts.

The following arguments clarify the benefits of a Euro-Central Asian system of security.

1. Central Asian states should participate in security organizations outside the former Soviet Union to the effectiveness of the OSCE in case the need arises to carry out or supervise peacemaking operations;
2. Disputes on the possible expansion of the NATO will stop, as will friction in relations between Russia and the NATO, Russia and the USA, Russia and the West as a whole, as negotiations would clarify the situation of Russia in East Europe and in the post-Soviet space. The distinction between “near” and “far” abroad shall dissolve in favour of uniform Euro-Central Asian spaces of security;
3. The creation of a Euro-Central Asian security sphere compliments efforts by Kazakhstan to create organizational bases through the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Indeed, the example of European security initiatives inspired Kazakhstan’s initiative on the establishment of interaction and measures of trust in Asia, which has a lot in common with the experience of the OSCE.

4. A Euro-Central Asian security system will provide a recognizable security structure in the context of rapidly increasing exchanges between Western countries and Central Asia, besides providing opportunities to interface with potentially expanded NATO activity in the region.

Kazakhstan strives to develop a security system compatible with the Atlantic powers to develop all available opportunities for increasing stability amidst the current situation of instability and uncertainty. By this means, Kazakhstan seeks to defend against the threats to international peace. Kazakhstan will get opportunities for new ideas and initiatives to be realized during the period of its Presidency of the OSCE in 2009.

### **KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NATO**

The military-political aspect of communications between Kazakhstan, the European Union and OSCE logically leads towards better relations with the NATO. Relations between Kazakhstan and NATO began well with the visit of NATO's Secretary General, Manfred Werner to Almaty in November 1992. The official visit of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to NATO headquarters in Brussels in February 1993 confirmed the beginning of substantive relations that remain positive today.

In 1992, Kazakhstan joined the Council of North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NACC/EAPC (North Atlantic Council/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Kazakhstan and NATO implemented cooperation on the basis of the “Plan on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation”, which includes periodic consultations, seminars and symposia on a variety of economic, defence, ecological and other questions. Since 1992, the Republic of Kazakhstan regularly participates in the working sessions of NATO at the Foreign Ministers level. In relation to Central Asia, NATO seeks the following:

- To prevent creation of a new military bloc opposing the NATO within the framework of the CIS;
- To prevent alliances between the Central Asian Republics and the Islamic world, especially with countries where the ideology of an orthodox Islam dominates;

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

- To cooperate with the Newly Independent States on maintaining regional and global security. In May 1994, Kazakhstan became the 19<sup>th</sup> state to join “The Framework Agreement Partnership for Peace.”<sup>13</sup>

On 31 July 1996, Kazakhstan and NATO signed two agreements at NATO headquarters in Brussels, (i) “The Treaty on Security” and (ii) “The Treaty on the Status of Armed Forces.” The first treaty seeks to protect classified information exchanged within the framework of cooperation under the Partnership for Peace Programme. The second agreement stipulates the status of military divisions in the operations on participant’s territories under the Partnership for Peace Programme.

Military-political cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and NATO under the Partnership Programme focuses on:

- i) discussions regarding questions of stabilization in the region;
- ii) exchange of opinions regarding arms control and disarmament;
- ii) participation in NATO activities;
- iv) Informing countries - members of NATO and other NATO partners under the Partnership Programme about the position of Kazakhstan on various foreign policy questions, problems of regional safety, including realization of own political initiatives on Eurasian union and within the framework of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).<sup>14</sup>

Several high level military and political officials including NATO’s Secretary General, Javier Solana, Chairman of Military Committee, General K. Neumann and General George Mackenzie visited Kazakhstan between 1997 to 1998. These visits testify to the strengthening of cooperation with the NATO, concretely through the “Individual Programme of Partnership (IPP).” Besides its military cooperation with the NATO, Kazakhstan supports the NATO presence in Central Asia, in view of the situation in Afghanistan.

Within the framework of preparing peacekeeping forces, Kazakhstan has extended cooperation to the NATO for some years. For the first time in August 1996, the battalion of peacemaking forces

*Mara Gubaidullina*

---

created by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, joined the United States within the framework of the PFP programme. The USA sponsors the training of the Kazakh officers at military schools and colleges of the NATO.

In declaring the need for joint efforts to create a universal European-Atlantic Security System, Javier Solana stressed the principle of cooperation as the basis for a new approach to the common defence. The NATO actively connects the countries of the region to anti-crisis actions. During his official visit to Kazakhstan in July 2000, NATO Secretary General, George Robertson noted that the NATO attaches significance to relations with Kazakhstan as both Kazakhstan and the NATO share common interests in combating terrorism, smuggling and the drugs mafia.

After the Taliban were ousted in December 2001, and the subsequent creation of an Interim Government in Afghanistan, the American presence in Central Asia strengthened the belief that NATO, the USA and their allies would control the security of the region. On 7 June 2002, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country to join the NATO's "Process of Planning and Analysis (PARP)." This international programme was developed to evaluate the activities of the armed forces, to provide multinational combat training, and to carry out search and rescue and humanitarian operations with NATO forces. The PARP procedure is designed for six years. The expansion of cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO, the use of huge military and economic potential that this organization and its members possess, substantially promotes the strengthening of national security and the maintenance of stability in Kazakhstan.

The analysis and response to current challenges and threats, including international terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, drugs trafficking and the distribution of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), will be the main agendas of the basic dialogue of Kazakhstan with NATO and OSCE in the present and in the future. The NATO members may maintain a long term military presence in Central Asia, which demonstrates that the Western powers regard

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS***

---

Central Asia as a crucial buffer against the threats and crises of the 21st Century...<sup>15</sup> Kazakhstan's participation in the "Partnership for the Peace" programme is an opportunity to integrate in the global security system, implement international military and political cooperation. Armed with the experience of the European security structures OSCE, EU and the Republic of Kazakhstan can create effective security system suitable to all concerned.

### **REFERENCES**

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books, 1997.
2. Speeches of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev at the UN Millennium Summit, New York, 6 September 2000, *Diplomatic Courier*, no.3, 2000, p.88.
3. "The Strategy of Kazakhstan Becoming and Developing as a Sovereign State", *Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement of the Wealth of all Kazakhstanis*, Almaty, 1998.
4. "Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty Memorandum on Security Guarantees as a result of Joining of the Republic of Kazakhstan the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty", *International Law Documents Collection*, Almaty, 1998, pp.249-255 and 265-266.
5. "Materials on the Official Visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev to the USA", *Diplomatic Courier*, no.4, 1994, pp.3-6.
6. The Visit of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev to France, *Diplomatic Courier*, no.3, 2000, p.14.
7. Rar Aleksandre, "If there is a New Choice in Putin's Policy", *Internationale Politik*, no.10, 2001, pp.51-52.
8. *General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2001*, Brussels, 2002, pp.174, 320; Bulletin 4-2001, point 1.4.7.; Bulletin 12-2001, point 1.6.86.
9. *Chris Patten in Central Asia*, General Report, 2003; Bulletin 12-2003, point 1.6.22, p.270.
10. Kasymzhomart Tokayev, *The Diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Globalisation Circumstances*, Almaty, 2000, pp.272, 315.
11. "Declaration of Istanbul Summit", 18 November 1999.

***Mara Gubaidullina***

---

12. “Charter for European Security”, Istanbul, 18 November 1999.
13. “Partnership for Peace: Frame Document”, *International Law Documents Collection*, Almaty, 1998, pp.300-302.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Birgit Bawer, “The Struggle for the Influence in the Central Asia Region: China’s Influence is still Limited”, *Internationale Politik*, no.2, 2002, p.19.

---

## KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

*Klara Makasheva*

In the beginning of the new millennium, the world underwent a spectacular change. With this, each nation state now aspires to keep abreast of the changing dynamics of international relations across the world as well as to find a place among the members of the world community. The world community is at a critical stage of development and formation of a new type of human civilization. In the era of globalization and integration, which becomes the dominating tendency of global development, interdependence of interests of the states grows.<sup>1</sup> As each state comprehends its role in the world, finding a worthy place in the world community is important for Kazakhstan today. It is obvious for Kazakhstan that active participation in world and regional affairs is an indispensable condition for survival and strengthening of its sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

Since globalisation overcomes unilateral character of dependence, it is mutual coexistence rather than inter-dependence of states which is required to tackle one of the problems the present world has been facing, i.e., parity between globalisation and national interests that is national sovereignty. Kazakhstan, on its part, considers respect for sovereignty of each state as the cardinal principle of international relations. No global system will prove to be viable, if there is no interaction between the states. And that is where national interest, which is the synthesis of internal and external factors, plays an important role. The global responsibility of respecting sovereignty of each state is, therefore, driven by national interests of states. As a whole, globalization and national interests of the states, though not mutually exclusive, have complementary structural elements and are guarantors of steady development of international relations.

The beginning of the new century coincides with the beginning of a new stage in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan - a stage of the political



pragmatism directed towards strengthening and developing of bases of independence and sovereignty of Kazakhstan. Political pragmatism means extraction of maximum advantages and benefits for a country through its vibrant foreign policy. Recently in the West and on the post-Soviet space, objective opinion affirms that in the age of globalization, the role of the state in the economic and social sector should grow. According to American analyst J. K. Galbraith, for the last half-century, successful and long periods of general development always occurred in the countries having stable and strong governments, mixed economy and poorly advanced markets. Here it is pertinent to recollect the words of Charles de Gaulle that “the state dies from lack of authority or even from insufficient comprehension by authority of the responsibility.” The state should develop and put into practice long-term strategies of development of the country. It can be assumed that the foreign policy of Kazakhstan should be inextricably related to the economic needs of the country, and Foreign Policy Department needs to take more pragmatic position to uphold the country’s strategic interests. First of all, it emphasises the functional priorities of our foreign policy - definition of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, routes of transportation of the Kazakhstan oil, delimitation of the frontiers of Kazakhstan, attracting investments etc.

With the end of Cold War new states including the Republic of Kazakhstan joined the world community. The sovereign Republic of Kazakhstan became the full member of the United Nations on 2 March 1992, taking up the obligations stated in the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup> Within its fifteen years of independence, relations between Kazakhstan and the United Nations developed remarkably and have remained stable and mutually advantageous. The basic directions of activity in Kazakhstan by the international organizations under the United Nations are to offer grants for steady development of human potential and to render technical help, advisory services and preparation of the national staff.

From the date of signing the agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United Nations with regard to the opening of the UN activities in Kazakhstan, active teamwork for developing and

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS***

---

realizing the programmes in the spheres of political transformation, democratization, economic reforms, steady social development and preservation of the environment began. With the collaboration among foreign scientific research institutes, private sector and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), various seminars and conferences were held, constant meetings convened, joint councils created, declarations made besides making recommendations for social development, education, culture, science and communications, status and position of women and children, struggle against narco trade, trafficking and crime, health protection and environment, improvement of working conditions agricultural growth etc.

Ever since its independence, Kazakhstan became the active participant in the international programmes, projects, conventions and the agreements developed under the aegis of the United Nations Organizations. For the last few years, the international community has been observing development of democracy and steady market economy in Kazakhstan. The specialized structures of the United Nations have provided Kazakhstan their help for its political, economic and socio-cultural development.

The United Nations Organization plays the vital role of a forum, capable to stimulate general concern and practical actions for maintenance of regional and international safety, development and maintenance of the global norms, conditions of economic development, human rights and preservation of the environment. Fundamental activity of the United Nations is the maintenance of balance of interests of the states.<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Organization which includes 191 states of the world, has been formed to maintain international peace and safety, strengthen cooperation between the nations, provide assistance for social progress, increase the standard of living and protection of human rights.

Kazakhstan supports the maintenance of a more fair representation of the members states of the United Nations in Security Council, a more balanced character, its greater authority and productivity. Kazakhstan also supports expansion of the structure of the members of the Security Council.<sup>5</sup>

The United Nations is now more concerned about the maintenance of regional and global safety. Presently one of the most dangerous threats to mankind is the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Kazakhstan has supported the idea of creation of nuclear free zones as emphasized by the global body, particularly in Central Asia.<sup>6</sup> During the 52<sup>nd</sup> and 53<sup>rd</sup> sessions of the UN General Assembly, three Central Asian Republics including Kazakhstan became the co-author of two resolutions in this regard.

In the sphere of non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan has found the reflection in the work of sixth survey conference of 2000 in Kazakhstan. In the final document of this conference, a call was made to end all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the Central Asian region. Kazakhstan persistently and consistently supports the creation of effective structures of safety in the Asian region. At the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev put emphasis on the need for interaction and measures of trust in Asia.<sup>7</sup> In September 1999 for the first time, the legal basis of the system of Asian security was incorporated in the Declaration of the principles regulating the relations between the states signed at the Foreign Ministers level. Kazakhstan firmly supports the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations. It supported the UN strategy of preventive diplomacy to resolve crises in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo etc.

Geo-economic realities of the modern globalized world dictate the necessity of creating uniform transport space. Therefore, the development of a transport infrastructure of Kazakhstan as the country which is not having an exit to sea, is considered as one of the long-term priorities in the strategy of development suggested by President Nazarbayev in “Kazakhstan – 2030.” The 55<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly submitted a resolution on the system of transit in the states in Central Asia which are not having an exit to the sea. The document would draw attention of the world community to the necessity of forming transit-transport system in Central Asia for creating real preconditions for exit of goods and services of the Central Asian states to the international markets. Kazakhstan together with the

## ***KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS***

---

United Nations and its regional structures pays attention to regional economic cooperation. In the first Eurasian Economic Summit held in April 2000, the world community argued to cooperate within the framework of investment projects in the spheres of transport, water and power resources. This Summit paved the way for an international economic conference in Tajikistan.

One of the negative consequences of the process of globalization is environmental problem in various regions of the world. Kazakhstan is interested in mobilization of the world community to sort out the problems in ecological disaster zones particularly in the region of former Semipalatinsk range. The members of the United Nations at 52<sup>nd</sup> and 53<sup>rd</sup> sessions at UN General Assembly expressing their concern on these problems, supported the resolution “international cooperation and coordination of activity with a view to rehabilitation of the population and ecology and economic development of Semipalatinsk region in Kazakhstan.”

The framework of national strategy of development and priorities of the United Nations is going to help Kazakhstan to continue its reforms programme particularly in the social sphere. Several bodies of the UN are cooperating with the Kazakhstan government, and have developed projects and programmes to help the poor and homeless, providing micro-credit system for the poor sections of the population, the programme on assistance of employment and development of small and average business and encouragement of business among women. The United Nations assists in reforming the public health services and education. In particular, the public health departments have taken steps to increase the availability and quality of medical services for the population, to strengthen the system of medico-sanitary help. Besides, the UN bodies are focussing on decentralization of education.

The United Nations aspires to adjust practical cooperation with national parliaments. Kazakhstan is party to ten multilateral international treaties. Kazakhstan has supported the Declaration of the UN Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 and has vowed to extend all help for cooperation and development in the world. At this Summit,

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that “the process of globalization puts new tasks before the world community. In these conditions, he added, an extremely important role is to be played by the community of the nations to deal with new calls and threats. He further said that the main task of the United Nations is to maintain of positive character of the process of globalization which opens ample opportunities for less developed countries and the states with transitive economy.” Working along with the United Nations, Kazakhstan consistently supports strengthening the sovereignty and international authority. In 1992, President Nazarbayev put forward the initiative about convening the meeting on interaction and measures of trust in Asia which reflects the spirit of the United Nations and its practical actions directed on strengthening of regional safety.

Kazakh diplomacy puts emphasis on the issue of disarmament and liquidation of the weapons of mass destruction. Thus Kazakhstan confirms its obligations to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Kazakhstan also supports the idea of preparation of an international code of conduct regarding non-distribution of ballistic missiles. Accumulation of arms and ammunitions threaten safety and stability in a number of regions of the world, including Central Asia. As the situation in Afghanistan is alarming, United Nations has paying special attention to this problem.

Kazakhstan raised in the UN the issue of maintenance of social and economic development of Central Asia. The United Nations Special Programme for Economy of Central Asia (SPECA) gave boost to economic development of the states of the region, in addition to mutual cooperation and their integration into economy of the countries of Europe and Asia.

The world community has recognized the importance of creation of a regional system of transit in Central Asia as these countries experience difficulties with regard to access to the high seas and the world markets. In 2003, Kazakhstan organized an International Conference of Ministers of Transport of the Group of least developed countries, which are not having access to the sea. Representatives of

several international organizations and donor countries participated in this Conference.

Kazakhstan is also going to extend active cooperation to the World Trade Organization (WTO). There were serious concerns over nuclear tests on Semipalatinsk range. Under the initiative of the Kazakh delegations to UN in 1997, 1998 and 2000 respectively, the resolution “International Cooperation and Coordination of activity with a view of rehabilitation of the population and ecology and economic development of Semipalatinsk range in Kazakhstan” was accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. On its basis, the programme of actions consisting of diversified projects in the field of public health services, ecology, economy, humanitarian help and information has been developed. In 1999 the International Conference passed a resolution on these problems in Tokyo under the aegis of the United Nations.

New geopolitical realities and radical changes all over the world, accentuated a new role of the United Nations in the new conditions. The 9/11 tragedy further sharpened the internal contradictions of a modern world order and the danger of international terrorism confirmed the necessity of fuller use of potential of the United Nations. Kazakhstan is devoted to cooperation with the USA and other members of the international anti-terrorist coalition. Within a short span in the United Nations, Kazakhstan has successfully been integrated into the international community of the states.

The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan launched the Frame Programme of the United Nations on rendering assistance with a view of development for 2000-2004. In Kazakhstan, the Programme of the United Nations is directed towards the maintenance of the projects for nation building process of the country that includes interaction between the United Nations and local organizational structures which are strengthening the system of social security, development of a transport infrastructure, irrigation and potable water supply to the people.

In the changing world scenario after 9/11 terrorist attacks, several questions cropped up regarding maintenance of the international and

regional stability in the future. As President Nazarbayev declared that “in the world of 21<sup>st</sup> century, the approach to world affairs in the conditions of globalization requires an understanding of problems facing the community. Adherence of Kazakhstan to the idea of multipolarity is not directed against any states or the unions and does not pursue the purpose to belittle their role in global affairs. On the contrary, movement in this direction will serve democratization and all the systems of the international relations.”

The future world order should be the world without wars and conflicts, dictatorship and the violence, the closed borders with “Iron Curtain” and dividing lines. It should be based on a wide and mutually advantageous cooperation of all the countries of the world. The countries together can be able to face the global challenges - distribution of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, international terrorism, narco-terrorism, extremism, ecological degradation etc.<sup>8</sup> As a responsible member of the United Nations, it is the duty and responsibility of the Republic of Kazakhstan to promote world peace and progress besides its own development – social, economic and political.

Last but not the least, as the largest state (area wise) in the Central Asian region, Kazakhstan should step forward to bring all other Central Asian Republics under one umbrella to sort out the outstanding problems in the region. Kazakhstan should be at the vanguard to tap the natural resources in the region along with her Central Asian neighbours and reap the benefits for one and all.

#### **REFERENCES**

1. Speeches of President Nazarbayev on “Priorities of Kazakhstani Diplomacy at the Turn of the Century”, 2000, pp.8-9.
2. Anatomy of European Integration, Almaty, 2003, p.22.
3. “Post-Soviet Central Asia: Losses and Gains,” *Oriental Literature*, 1998, p.55.
4. A.H. Arystanbekova, *United Nations and Kazakhstan*, Almaty, Dike Press, 2002, p.203.
5. A. H. Arystanbekova, “To be Problem of Reforming the Organisation of United Nations,” *Diplomatic Courier*, Astana, 1998, no. 3, p.80.

**KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS**

---

6. E. A. Idrisov, "The Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan in Globalisation Conditions", *Priorities of Kazakhstani Diplomacy at the Turn of Centuries*, 2000, p.38.
7. K. K. Tokaev, "International Policy of Kazakhstan: Cooperation, Integration, Well-Neighbourhood," *Diplomatic Courier*, Astana, 1998, no. 4, p.124.
8. "Kazakhstan Aspires to the Future", *Evening Astana*, 30 December 2000; *Diplomatic Courier*, Astana, 2000, no. 4, p.127.



---

## OSCE ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA

*Ailuna Utegenova*

### INTRODUCTION

More than ten years have passed since the incorporation of Central Asian Republics (CARs) into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After their independence, the CARs have faced a variety of security threats and challenges. The international security organizations and the OSCE as well as other institutions have been increasingly active in the region, and have established centres in all the five Central Asian states in late 1990s.

During 1990s, the region was included in the political agenda of the OSCE. In the second half of 1990s and early 2000s, Central Asia was elevated to one of the top priority regions in the zone of the OSCE activity. During their visits to the region, the high profile OSCE officials confirmed that Central Asia was considered as an integral part of the OSCE community.

The Central Asian Republics, in their turn, consider OSCE as an important mechanism for their inclusion in the wider architecture of security. They view the OSCE as the forum, in which they can carry their regional problems of military, economic and ecological importance. The OSCE is not an economic organization, but it confirms its readiness to contribute to attracting international financial institutions to solve the economic problems of Central Asia. Former Secretary General of OSCE, Wilhelm Höynck pointed out, “the relationship of the OSCE with five of its member states from Central Asia, in OSCE language ‘Participating States’, has seen ups and downs, successes and failures, performance and non-performance.”<sup>1</sup>

However, a Turkish scholar Ömer Burhan Tüzel stresses that there is growing disinterest among a number of Central Asian states towards the OSCE. This comes surprisingly at a time, when the international community in general and the OSCE in particular have been paying

increasing attention to Central Asia in the wake of 9/11 attacks in the United States and ensuing developments in neighbouring Afghanistan. In his opinion, the OSCE has not been successful in addressing the concerns and needs of the Central Asian Republics, notably in the economic and security spheres.<sup>2</sup>

In the beginning of 1990s, the ground was laid for the institutional, functional and geographical expansion of the OSCE. To provide practical support to the newly independent states in consolidating democratic institutions and human rights, strengthening civil society and the rule of law became one of the main priorities of the OSCE. During that time, the OSCE put too much emphasis on the human dimension in Central Asia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. The problem of the OSCE in the region was that there was not enough emphasis on other dimensions of the OSCE – politico-military, economic and environmental. The OSCE's broad and comprehensive concept of security and a balanced approach towards all these dimensions was not maintained during 1990s.

### **COOPERATION BETWEEN CARs AND THE OSCE**

The 1990s were marked by the complete change of conditions that determined European security architecture. The former Soviet Republics actually proved to be out of any security mechanisms and did not have the intention to join the integration processes in the world.

On 28 January 1992, the CSCE supported the idea of inclusion of all the Republics of the former Soviet Union excepting Georgia in the European integration process. There were serious objections in the diplomatic circles against the decision to accept the Republics of the former USSR in the CSCE. As some experts thought, *Asianization* of the European process put a question mark on the need for consensus during major decision makings. Theoretically, each Republic would have the right to veto the European problems. However, in the opinion of some diplomats, it was not worthwhile to overestimate this threat. There was a fixed mechanism of economic and political pressure that acted effectively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union. There were more positive gains from the participation

of Central Asian Republics in the CSCE. The main advantage of their entry was a possibility for the Western powers and Russia to effectively control the defence policy of the CSCE's new members and to monitor the human rights situation. The Eastern European countries and Austria, which were sceptical of the idea about the membership of the Central Asian Republics in the CSCE, later dropped their objections.

In the beginning of 1992, Central Asian countries became full fledged members of the CSCE. They signed the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and took upon all political obligations of the CSCE. One of the main goals of their entry into CSCE-turned-OSCE was to get international recognition. Membership of the OSCE was a good opportunity for the newly independent countries to establish relations in a multilateral format. International organizations in Central Asia played an important role to bring the five Central Asian Republics into the international community.

At CSCE's Helsinki Summit in 1992, it was proclaimed that "the transition to and development of democracy and market economy by the new democracies is being carried forward with determination amidst difficulties and varying conditions. We offer our support and solidarity to the 'Participating States' undergoing transformation to democracy and market economy. We welcome their efforts to become fully integrated into the wider community of states. Making this transition irreversible will ensure the security and prosperity of all."<sup>3</sup>

The "Participating States" also decided to establish a programme of coordinated support for those "Participating States", which have been members of the CSCE since 1991. It was pointed out that the programme would be coordinated by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) under the overall guidance of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The ODIHR would act as a centre of information for relevant activities of the CSCE and the "Participating States" as well as international organizations. Efforts for effective integration of the new "Participating States" were highlighted by the visit of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office to Central Asia during that period.

## *OSCE ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA*

---

At the Budapest Summit, the CSCE ceased to be a process and became an Organization. A Memorandum on Security Guarantees for Kazakhstan was signed by the major nuclear powers during the CSCE Summit meeting. The Memorandum guarantees independence and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan, and non-aggression, both conventional and nuclear, against it. Under the Memorandum, if aggression is committed against Kazakhstan, the UN Security Council must respond immediately. Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev said that the Memorandum is vital for Kazakhstan's security and for its participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Lisbon Summit of the OSCE in 1996 emphasised the role of the Central Asian countries in the OSCE. Heads of the OSCE "Participating States" expressed their desire to make sincere efforts towards the development of democratic structures, strengthening the rule of law, maintenance of stability and preventing conflicts in the region.<sup>4</sup> On 16 March 1995, the OSCE Permanent Council decided to establish OSCE Liaison Office for Central Asia in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). The objective of opening such an office in Central Asia was the establishment of closer relations between five Central Asian "Participating States" and the OSCE within the framework of 1992 strategy of integrating the recent "Participating States." The Liaison Office started its activities in June 1995.

The activities of the OSCE Central Asian Liaison Office were different from other missions, because its mandate provided the activity in accordance with all OSCE obligations such as the development of democratic institutions and civil society as well as maintaining and improving economic and ecological security. The Liaison Office in Central Asia itself was the part of the Secretariat, but not the Centre for Conflict Prevention. It was also directly accountable to the OSCE Secretary General, but not to the Director of the Centre.

Central Asian Liaison Office participated in the OSCE seminars and conferences dedicated to regional security and strengthening the confidence against illegal drug trafficking and crime control, stable and

transparent legislation on economic issues, and regional ecological problems. However, this Liaison Office was unable to carry out all its regional obligations. After the establishment of the OSCE Centres in the Central Asian Republics, the functions of Central Asian Liaison Office were reformulated. On 14 December 2000, Permanent Council decided to change the name of Central Asian Liaison Office in Tashkent as the OSCE Centre. This decision was made in connection with the change in the Central Asian Liaison Office's activities and expansion of the OSCE in Central Asia. Central Asian Liaison Office played an important role in strengthening the relations between "Participating States" of Central Asia and the OSCE.

In April 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, who was the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CIO), visited Central Asia. He described Central Asia as a priority region in the zone of OSCE activities. The visit was followed by the decision to establish the OSCE Centres in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan). The centres, opened in early 1999, were designed to implement the OSCE principles and commitments as well as to strengthen cooperation among Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan within the ambit of the OSCE. Special emphasis was given to the regional context in all OSCE dimensions, including the economic, environmental, human and military-political aspects of security. The centres now maintain close relations with the local authorities, universities, research institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The establishment of the post of the Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia at the end of 1990s can be considered as an evidence of the OSCE's growing desire in strengthening cooperation with the Central Asian region. In April 1999, Ambassador Wilhelm Höynck, who was the OSCE Secretary General in 1993-1996, was appointed as Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia. The Personal Representative was responsible for developing the conceptual plan for further integration of the Central Asian Republics and expansion of OSCE activity in this region. The establishment of the post of Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia was OSCE's

intention to strengthen political dialogue with the countries of the region. It is necessary to note that the activity of the Personal Representatives of the CIO is a very delicate matter in political sense. Emphasis was given to the principle of “non-intervention in internal affairs”, which is one of the ten principles of the Helsinki Act of 1975 with regard to the relations between “Participating States.”

However, the OSCE regional initiatives towards Central Asia did not always find support in these Republics, which did not welcome “special attention to Central Asia” within the framework of the Organization. For example, some states of the region objected to the assignment of the Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia.

In June 1999, Ambassador Wilhelm Höynck visited all the Republics of Central Asia, and had the opportunity to discuss further prospects for OSCE activity in the region. In his report of 15 July 1999 to the Permanent Council, prepared on the basis of his meetings in the region, Ambassador Höynck emphasised that the discussion must deal with the regional dimension taking into account the individual needs of the individual countries and differences between them. On the basis of the report, the intensive discussion about developing closer relations between the OSCE and Central Asian Republics began.

The Istanbul Charter for European Security of 1999 and the Declaration of Istanbul Summit had the special role in determining Central Asia as the priority zone of the OSCE activity. The Participating States proclaimed that in 1999 they had witnessed significant increase in their cooperation with the five “Participating States” in Central Asia. Paras 13-14 of the Istanbul Declaration were devoted to Central Asia: “We share the concerns expressed by the Participating States in Central Asia regarding international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime, drugs and arms trafficking. We agree that national, regional and joint action by the international community is necessary to cope with these threats, including those stemming from areas neighbouring the OSCE Participating States. We further recognise the importance of addressing economic and environmental risks in the region, particularly the issues related to water resources, energy and erosion. We are

convinced that strengthening regional cooperation will promote stability and security in Central Asia, and we welcome the active approach taken by the Chairman-in-Office to this effect.”<sup>5</sup>

It was proclaimed in the Istanbul Charter that “security in areas nearby, particularly in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in direct proximity to Participating States of the Central Asian region, is of increasing importance to the OSCE. We recognize that instability in these areas poses challenges, which directly affect the security and prosperity of the OSCE states.”<sup>6</sup> Until recently, almost all OSCE activities in the economic and environment spheres of CARs were reduced to limited small projects. Although such activities were flexible, they could be more effective in the more long term plan. Therefore, the OSCE started to combine small projects into more structured, middle and long term programmes.

The countries of Central Asia have a great interest in the economic and ecological dimension of the OSCE that can be explained by socio-economic problems in the countries of the region. The OSCE Centres play an important role in promoting concrete projects in Central Asia in the fields of economy and ecology. However, the OSCE human dimension remains to be the most significant and most developed, both in quantitative and qualitative senses. One of the reasons is that the OSCE occupies better position than other international organizations in this dimension. Though in the economic and ecological dimension, the OSCE remains to be an insignificant player. Nevertheless, it is often said that precisely the economic-ecological dimension will be the possible sphere of expanding the OSCE activity in Central Asia. By developing its activity in economic-ecological dimension in the region, the OSCE will contribute to strengthen regional cooperation.

### **OSCE ROLE IN TAJIK PEACE PROCESS**

In comparison with many of the internal conflicts of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the inter-Tajik conflict is notable both for its rapid escalation into a war in 1992 and also for its relatively quick settlement through a negotiated settlement in June 1997. The Tajik peace process brought together a range of international partners, who were able to

coordinate their interventions effectively to support the efforts of Tajiks to end the war.

In the first half of 1990s, the CSCE became involved in the settlement process of Tajikistan's conflict through its Representative. The tasks of the CSCE Representative in Tajikistan were to coordinate and cooperate with the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General and the team of the UN officials in Tajikistan to resolve the conflict situation. The Representative kept the CSCE informed about the developments in Tajikistan.

The UN Officer V. Goryayev stressed the important contribution of the OSCE to the Tajik peace process. It was agreed that the UN would have its leading role in the peace process, while the OSCE would play the primary role in promoting development of democratic institutions, which included organizing elections, developing a new constitution, and monitoring human rights in Tajikistan.<sup>7</sup> On 19 February 1994, the CSCE Mission to Tajikistan started its work in Dushanbe. In implementing its mandate, the Mission established contacts with the "regionalist and political forces" in the country, facilitating dialogue and building confidence. Another important activity of the Mission was to assist in the development of legal and democratic political institutions and processes. In close cooperation with the ODIHR, the Mission offered, in particular, advice to the Tajik authorities on drafting the new constitution. The Mission also tried to promote respect for human rights and followed the inter-Tajik talks under the Chairmanship of UN.<sup>8</sup>

In June 1997, the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed in Moscow. The OSCE Mission to Tajikistan had been an observer of all the inter-Tajik negotiations and it became a signatory to the Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan signed in Tehran in May 1997. As a condition of this Protocol, the OSCE, through its Mission in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), was entrusted with the task of facilitating the implementation of the General Agreement in the areas related to human rights and the establishment of political and legal



institutions and processes along democratic lines. In order to monitor the implementation of the General Agreement and to provide the parties with expert consultants and other good offices, the guarantor states and organizations agreed to establish a Contact Group to be stationed in Dushanbe. The Mission regularly participated in its deliberations.

Since the Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR) started its work in September 1997, the Mission provided assistance and advice to the CNR in its review of the amendments to the constitution and changes to laws dealing with political parties, elections and mass media. With the aim of encouraging the development of political processes, the Mission organized various conferences and seminars on topics such as “Peace and Reconciliation Process in Tajikistan”; “Issues of Consolidation of the Tajik Nation”; and “Role of Youth in the Future Tajikistan.” Cooperating closely with the Government in implementing its mandate, the Mission has succeeded in establishing contacts with regional and political forces in the country, thereby facilitating dialogue and building confidence.

### **KAZAKHSTAN AND OSCE**

In February 2003, during the session of the Permanent Council, Kazakhstan proposed its candidature for the post of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009. It is necessary to note that until this time, none of the former Republics of the Soviet Union had occupied this coveted post. The Chairman-in-Office is vested with overall responsibility for the executive action and coordination of current OSCE activities. This includes coordination of the work of OSCE institutions, representing the Organization and supervising activities related to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The CIO may form adhoc and steering groups and appoint personal representatives to deal with specific crisis or conflict situations.

The ambitions of Kazakhstan for the OSCE Chairmanship attracted reactions from the international community. The leading position of Kazakhstan in many aspects in the CIS is obvious. The successful economic and political reforms, political stability as well as

## *OSCE ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA*

---

inter-ethnic harmony demonstrate the significant potential of modern day Kazakhstan. At present, a wide discussion of the Kazakh proposal is going on in the OSCE and final decision in this regard would be made soon.

Kazakhstan wants the OSCE to increase its preventive work against security threats and challenges to expand its role in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, mainly in Central Asia; to develop a system that prevents illegal trafficking of drugs in the region; and to establish a special structure under the OSCE to deal with the threat to regional security.

The OSCE can also play an important role in providing security in the Caspian region. In this aspect, Kazakhstan proposed to sign the “Caspian Region Stability Pact.” The key point of the Pact would be to abolish the use of military forces in the Caspian Sea region. Besides, preventing technogenic emergencies and catastrophes, formation of shielding barriers in the way of the spread of epidemics are seen as the promising directions of the OSCE activities in Central Asia. In this way, Central Asia could become one of the outposts of the OSCE’s stand against global threats and challenges.

Kazakhstan gives much importance to cooperation with the OSCE in the process of forming the architecture of Asian security. The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia initiated by Kazakhstan could serve as the basis for it. The idea of the Conference was taken from the experience of the European process of security and cooperation and has similar aspects with the CSCE process. It should be pointed out that President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested the idea of a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia at the CSCE’s Helsinki Summit in July 1992. At that time, the President declared Kazakhstan’s readiness to carry out all political activities to convene an Asian Security Conference.

The OSCE Centre in Almaty, established in 1998, monitors political, legal and economic developments with a view to maintain stability in the country and the region as well. It also promotes OSCE standards and commitments within Kazakhstan. Much of the Centre’s

efforts focus on the security field, which includes issues such as international terrorism, border security, control of small arms and light weapons and police activities. To increase effectiveness at the regional level, the Centre works in coordination with other OSCE Centres in Central Asia. Joint activities comprise events such as meetings on the issues of fight against terrorism and respect for human rights as well as the exchange of experiences among the law enforcement officials of the Central Asian Republics.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was signed at the end of 1998. It included regular consultations on human dimension issues and joint implementation of corresponding projects with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In accordance with the MoU, ODIHR together with the OSCE Centre in Almaty implemented projects on the establishment of Ombudsman Institute in Kazakhstan; improving legislation related to elections; and conducting legal reforms.

### **REFORM IN OSCE AND POSITION OF CARs**

The OSCE has to adapt a new security environment in order to be able to address new threats and challenges. The reform in the OSCE is a necessary process aimed at strengthening OSCE's effectiveness and to respond current criticism of its field operations concentrated only in post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav countries.

According to the OSCE, a comprehensive security concept, the protection and promotion of human rights, along with economic and environmental cooperation should be considered as important elements for the maintenance of peace and stability in Central Asia. However, the OSCE's regional activities in a number of countries contradicted the initial concept of its missions as the means of aid to participating countries. Central Asian countries are now in the group of CIS countries speaking in favour of reforms in the OSCE's field activities.

Nine Presidents of the CIS countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan pointed out serious shortcomings

of the OSCE in their “Joint Statement on the State of Affairs in the OSCE” during an informal meeting in Moscow on 3 July 2004 and made elaborate constructive suggestions to strengthen the OSCE. The suggestions were included in the Joint Appeal of the CIS member states to the OSCE partners signed by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan during the meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Astana on 15 September 2004. Turkmenistan did not sign the documents, although it seems to support other CIS member states’ campaign to reform the OSCE. The Joint Appeal comprised following considerations and suggestions: to reinforce the OSCE activities in combating international terrorism and eradicating its underlying causes; to develop a full-fledged OSCE economic and environmental wing; to ensure the development of uniform objective criteria for the evaluation by the ODIHR and the OSCE missions of electoral process throughout the Organization’s space etc. The CIS member states called for moving away from the practice of limiting OSCE field activities to the monitoring of the political situation, with a priority emphasis in the course of its reform on specific project activities which should be carried out transparently, taking into account the needs and requirements of the receiving states.<sup>9</sup>

Western scholars consider Russia to be the main initiator of the CIS campaign to adopt the Moscow Declaration and Astana Appeal. Arie Bloed stresses that “Russia managed to get Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on board, but the colleagues from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova refused to sign the Astana letter... Whether Kazakhstan’s support for this initiative will contribute to a consensus in the organization concerning its candidature for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 is doubtful.”<sup>10</sup>

It is obvious that the main issues of the OSCE activities in the CIS were reflected in the Moscow Declaration and Astana Appeal. There was growing discontent among the Central Asian countries with regard to the OSCE policy in the human dimension in the region. There is a clear imbalance between the OSCE’s security dimensions – politico-military, economic, environmental and human. In 1990s, the OSCE shifted its priorities towards human dimension issues which reduced the

Organization's ability to oppose new challenges and threats. Therefore, the CIS member states including four Central Asian countries intended to organize their further joint policy within the OSCE towards its specialized institutes and field presence and monitoring of the electoral process.

During the Sofia Ministerial Council in 2004, the need for the broad discussion on strengthening the OSCE role was emphasised. As a result of the Council's decisions in 2005, the seven-member Panel of Eminent Persons was appointed to review the work of the OSCE. The representative of Kazakhstan, Kuanysh Sultanov was appointed as one of the seven eminent persons to find out ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the OSCE. Kazakhstan considers its participation in the Group as an important achievement that makes possible for it to contribute the implementation of the OSCE's reforming process.

### **CONCLUSION**

After the end of the Cold War, the OSCE was expected to become a unique security structure in its zone of activity. However, in 1990s, the OSCE faced many difficulties in the fulfilment of its purposes and tasks. It faced a whole number of fundamental problems such as inability to solve new risks, the small budget and a vast bureaucracy. The OSCE did not achieve any tangible result in the region. However, Wilhelm Höynck notes that for the OSCE, as compared with its objectives, its records in Central Asia is "mixed at best." But he thought that the OSCE was in principle moving in the right direction.<sup>11</sup> The OSCE is now in the reforming process aimed at determination of the effective methods of adequate response to new challenges and threats. The OSCE in Central Asia has played a significant role in the human dimension, promoting the principles of democracy, building democratic institutions.

Kazakhstan considers co-operation in the field of providing regional security as the integral part of efforts to strengthen global stability. In this sense, the OSCE is a unique European organization and its comprehensive concept of security with its focus on soft security issues, has great importance. In 1990s and even in early 2000s, the

OSCE became a useful tool of strengthening regional cooperation. The OSCE also proposed to use its abilities as catalyst to the development of contacts and cooperation among the Central Asian participating states which could strengthen regional security sooner or later.

### **REFERENCES**

1. Wilhelm Höynck, "The OSCE in Central Asia – On the Right Track?" *Helsinki Monitor* (Special Issue), p.300.
2. Ömer Burhan Tüzel, Perceptions. *Journal of International Affairs*, volume 8, no. 1, March-May 2003, p.3
3. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, "The Challenges of Chance", [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046\\_rn.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_rn.pdf)
4. OSCE Lisbon Document 1996, [http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/4049\\_en.pdf.htm](http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/4049_en.pdf.htm)
5. OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 November 1999, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050en\\_pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050en_pdf)
6. OSCE Istanbul Charter for European Security, 19 November 1999, [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050en\\_pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050en_pdf)
7. V. Goryayev, "Architecture of International Involvement in the Tajik Peace Process Accord 'The Tajik Peace Process'", [www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/architecture.htm](http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/architecture.htm)
8. *Annual Report 1994* on OSCE Activities.
9. "Appeal of the CIS Member States to the OSCE Partners", Astana, 15 September 2004, <http://www.belarusembassy.org/news/digests/pr092004.htm>
10. Arie Bloed, "CIS Countries Continue to Push for a Reform of the OSCE", *Helsinki Monitor*, 2004, no. 4, p.299.
11. Wilhelm Höynck, *op.cit.*, p.311.

**KAZAKHSTAN TODAY**  
(*Seminar Report*)

Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation in collaboration with the Central Asian Studies Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi organized a one-day Seminar on *Kazakhstan Today* on Monday, 29 August 2005 at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus. The Seminar was well attended by over 80 participants representing the diplomatic community, academia, research scholars, strategic analysts and media. Notable participants/speakers included Mr. Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nurgali and Ms. Aneliya, both from the Embassy of Kazakhstan, Prof. Syedaminov, Charge D'Affaires, Embassy of Uzbekistan, Mr. Suhrob Rajabov, Charge D'Affaires, Embassy of Tajikistan, Prof. Qui Yonghui, Director, Department of Contemporary Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing), Mr. Vidya Sagar Varma, formerly India's Ambassador to Kazakhstan (2002-05), Prof. K. Warikoo, Prof. Devendra Kaushik, Prof. I.N. Mukherji, Dr. K. Santhanam, Mr. Indernil Banerjee, and others.

**Prof. K. Warikoo**, Director, Central Asian Studies Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Secretary General, Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, who presided over the Seminar proceedings, in his introductory remarks, described Kazakhstan as the largest Republic in Central Asia and the ninth largest country in world. He drew attention to its central position in Eurasia, with its borders touching Russia in the north, Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which contributed to the unique strategic importance of Kazakhstan. Its largest non-Asian and non-Muslim population in Central Asia accorded Kazakhstan a distinct Eurasian character. The Republic is truly multiethnic, with Kazakhs accounting for over 53.4 per cent followed by Russians with 30 per cent and others. Kazakhstan is striving to forge a common Kazakhstani identity which would be shared both by the Kazakhs, Slavs and other minorities.

Prof. Warikoo highlighted the age old historico-cultural contacts between India and Kazakhstan, which flourished due to Silk Route connection and due to transmission of Buddhism from India to Kazakhstan. Discovery of Buddhist monasteries/ruins in Sairam, Antonovka, Chu valley, Kyzil Kent by the Soviet/Central Asian archeologists Bernshtam, Goryacheva, Baipakov and Kazhemiakov testifies to these contacts. In contemporary times, the Ispat Karaganda steel plant is a great success story of Indo-Kazakh economic partnership. Prof. Warikoo stressed the need for Kazakhstan's political leadership to facilitate the setting up and operationalisation of Indo-Kazakh joint ventures in oil, gas, industry, trade and information and technology (IT) sectors.

**Kairat Umarov**, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to India congratulated the organizers for holding the seminar to coincide with the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of adoption of the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan. He stressed that this constitution proclaimed Kazakhstan a democratic, secular state with a presidential form of government. He stated that Kazakhstan today is a dynamically developing, market oriented, multiethnic and secular state. Political, economic and social stability are the three main pillars of nation-building. There are 11 political parties and 372 public associations. There has been no ethnic or religious conflict in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan Nationalities Assembly, comprising representatives of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan plays an important role in maintaining the inter-ethnic peace in the country.

As regards its economic development, it has been possible by following the principle - "First Economics, Then Politics." There has been ten per cent annual growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for five years. In 2004, foreign trade volume reaches 33 billion US dollars, with a trade surplus of seven billion US dollars. Since 1991, there has been direct investment worth 30 billion US dollars in Kazakhstan. The annual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) influx is 1.5 billion US dollars.

Kazakhstan's Foreign policy is aimed at creating stable, secure and friendly surroundings. "We have pro-active, multi-vector and balanced foreign policy." Kazakhstan is making efforts to expand friendly relations with all countries. President Nazarbayev visited India



## **HRCF FILE**

---

in 1992. India participated in Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) process, which is a Kazakh foreign policy initiative. And in July 2005, India was given Observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

“In Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, India is defined as a reliable and strategic partner. To match the bilateral political interaction, our economic cooperation needs to be encouraged. Overall trade between India and Kazakhstan in 2004 was only 96.6 million dollars, which is 22.4 per cent higher than 78.9 million dollars in 2003. But it is still far behind the potential. There is need to establish direct trade routes between our countries, in particular within North-South Corridor.

There is vast scope for cooperation in various fields including manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, construction materials, leatherware, plastics, pharmaceuticals, IT, oil and gas machinery building, food processing, textiles, transport logistics, metallurgy and construction materials”.

**Vidya Sagar Varma**, formerly India’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan (2002-05), highlighted the strength of political relations between India and Kazakhstan. He stated that both India and Kazakhstan are multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies. There is keen interest for Indian studies in Kazakhstan. The *Rigveda*, *Gita*, *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* have been translated into Kazakh/Russian languages by Prof. Nilibaev of Kazakhstan and published there. Indian Embassy at Almaty runs yoga, dance and Hindi classes in Kazakhstan, with the help of Kazakh teachers. According to Varma, one of the important steps towards confidence building measures (CBMs) between India and Kazakhstan has been Kazakhstan’s support to India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Kazakhstan and India are also going to sign an accord on counter-terrorism. There is scope for bilateral cooperation in oil, gas, tourism, industries and IT sectors.

**Prof. Devendra Kaushik** viewed commonness in the multi-vector approach in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and the concept of Eurasianism which was advocated as an idea of multi-culturalism by Vernadsky, Alexiev, Trobotsky and others. The central Eurasian

landmass which is a geographical continuum with historical commonality is not divided by any land, mountain or sea barriers. Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia are the three Eurasian countries in geographical sense, and this concept can be extended to India and China as well from historical and cultural point of view. Kaushik recalled that Academician Andrei Sakharov had in 1989 at the Congress of Supreme Soviet suggested the idea of retaining the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (USSR) replacing the word “Socialist” with “Sovereign.” The word Soviet was retained by him, as it was a pre-October revolution idea having grassroots connotation. In 1994, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan broached the idea of Eurasianism, during his address at the Moscow State University. The years 2003 and 2004 were celebrated as the “Year of Russia in Kazakhstan” and “Year of Kazakhstan” in Russia respectively. The establishment of Collective Security Organisation, SCO, Single Economic Space, CICA are all manifestations of the Eurasian approach, which is very close to the Nehruvian approach of moving towards security through non-military means. Eurasian cooperation is the Kazakh-Russian way of getting integrated into the globalisation process, in favourable circumstances. The actual realisation of Customs Union will be an important step in this direction. Kazakhstan is one of the five leading countries engaged in economic/trade cooperation with Russia. Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea Shelf. Russia has invested over 700 million US dollars in Kazakhstan. Eurasianism will be a stabilizing influence in the emerging global order, due to its multi-culturalism. It can be a bridge between the West and Islam.

**Sandeep Chakravarty**, Deputy Secretary, Eurasia Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India described the Indo-Kazakh relations as multi-dimensional. Besides engaging each other in bilateral relations, both the countries interacted in regional forums like CICA, SCO etc. However, lack of direct transportation access is hampering the full realization of bilateral trade, potential, as it takes 60 days to reach Kazakhstan through China. And going through long distance via Iran is also cumbersome. But, India is party to the international North South Corridor agreement, which when worked out

## **HRCF FILE**

---

will help in resolving the problem.

**Kairat Umarov**, Ambassador of Kazakhstan answers several pointed questions. In response to one by Prof. Warikoo, Umarov stated that Kazakhstan supports full membership of India in SCO. He also hoped that ONGC would select an oil field out of the two fields at Mahmet and Satpaev near the Caspian Sea by December 2005, as these have been offered to India. He stated that the Kazakhstan government is dividing the Caspian Sea Shelf into sectors, which would be put to tender soon for international companies. Umarov stressed the need for direct dialogue between Indian and Kazakh companies, as the Kazakh government cannot influence the tender process. Umarov admitted that though there is perfect political understanding between India and Kazakhstan, there is lack of activism in Indo-Kazakh relations. There is enough scope for joint ventures in IT, tourism, textiles, construction, transportation and small scale industries, as Kazakh government is setting exclusive Parks for these sectors where all processes from beginning to finished products would be done at one place.

Prof. Warikoo stressed the need for proper institutionalization of the cultural/scholarly exchanges between India and Kazakhstan, so that these exchanges take place in a proper, organized and not in an ad hoc manner.

**Dr. Mahesh R. Debata**



Section of the Audience at the Seminar on **Kazakhstan Today** at the JNU Campus, New Delhi on 29 August 2005



From left Dr. K. Santhanam, Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Prof. K. Warikoo, and Prof. Syedaminov

## HRCF FILE

---



From the left Prof. Syedaminov, Charge d' Affaires of Uzbekistan, Prof. D. Kaushik, Mr. Sohrab Jabarov, Charge d' Affaires of Tajikistan, Mr. Sandeep Chakravarty, Prof. Nirmla Joshi and Prof. I.N. Mukherjee



Mr. Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan making his presentation.  
To his right is Dr. K. Santhanam, and on his right Prof. K. Warikoo



**Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS)  
(under the President of Kazakhstan)**

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the RK (KazISS) was established by the President's Order of June 16, 1993.

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies is a national scientific research institution providing scientific research and analyses for the President of Kazakhstan.

Ever since its establishment, KazISS has a team of professionals and specialists in political and strategic studies, historians, economists and sociologists. The Institute is recognized as the leading scientific and analytical center in Kazakhstan.

Many high-rank employees of the Kazakhstan President's administration, ministries and agencies, diplomats of Kazakhstan and faculty of higher educational institutions began their career in the KazISS.

Students of Almaty higher educational institutions have a probation and under-graduate probation on the basis of the KazISS, and some of them are later employed by the Institute or some other institutes.

Now the Institute has all necessary infrastructure and facilitates for the professional and scientific advancement of its staff and also for award of Ph.D. degree.

The Institute carries out basic researches on strategic issues, foreign and domestic policies, problems of the social-economic development of Kazakhstan, besides making prognosis and analyses for the country's leadership.

The Institute organizes Seminars, Conferences, Round Tables, International Forums particularly on the main issues covered by the KazISS.

The KazISS cooperates with foreign scientific and analytical institutions, and implements international research projects on different problems of the development of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

## MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE KAZISS STUDIES

### 1. Strategic Aspects of Foreign Policy:

- monitoring of domestic political, social and economic development of the neighboring countries;
- analysis of bilateral relations of Kazakhstan with Russia, China, USA, India, Turkey, countries of EU, CIS states;
- study of integration problem on the post-Soviet space;
- study of security issues.

### 2. Political and Social Processes in Modern Kazakhstan:

- monitoring of social-political situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan;
- study of the processes of democratization and political institutions in the country;
- analysis of current political situation in Kazakhstan.

### 3. Economic Strategy of Kazakhstan:

- study of the economic security problems of the Republic of Kazakhstan ;
- study of the development tendencies of world economies and their impact on the Kazakhstan economy;
- study of the problems of globalization and their influence on Kazakhstan;
- monitoring of social-economic situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

### 4. Editorial-publishing activity:

- editing information and publication of analytical journal *Analytic*
- editing scientific journal *Kazakhstan-Spectrum*
- editing scientific and analytical journal *Kogam jane Daur* (in Kazakh)
- editing analytical journal *Central Asia's Affairs* (in English).

*For cooperation and partnership you may communicate with the KazISS on the following contact details:*

### **Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies**

87-B, Dostik Avenue, 050010 Almaty, Kazakhstan

Tel.: + (7-327) 264 34 04; Fax: + (7-327) 264 49 95

email: [office@kisi.kz](mailto:office@kisi.kz)

website: [www.kisi.kz](http://www.kisi.kz)

---

## FORM B

1. Title of the Newspaper : *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*
2. Language : English
3. Periodicity of Publication : Quarterly
4. Publisher's Name : Prof. K. Warikoo
5. Nationality : Indian
6. Address : 20, Dakshinapuram  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi - 110 067
7. Printer's Name : Prof. K. Warikoo
8. Nationality : Indian
9. Address : 20, Dakshinapuram  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi - 110 067
10. Name of the Printing Press : Print India,  
A-38 / 2, Mayapuri - I,  
New Delhi - 64
11. Editor's Name : Prof. K. Warikoo
12. Nationality : Indian
13. Address : 20, Dakshinapuram  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi - 110 067
14. Owner's Name : Himalayan Research and Cultural  
Foundation

I, Prof. K. Warikoo, solemnly declare that above items are correct to the best of my knowledge.

Sd/-  
Prof. K. Warikoo

---



---

**HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES** is a quarterly Journal published by the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, which is a non-governmental, non-profit research, cultural and development facilitative organisation. The Journal is devoted to the study of various issues pertaining to the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture, language and literature, demography, social structures, communication, tourism, regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc.

While the principal concern of the Journal will be on its focal area, i.e., from Afghanistan to Myanmar including the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, China, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan and the Indian Himalayan States of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttaranchal and North East states; papers with a broad sweep addressing environmental, social, cultural, economic, geopolitical and human rights issues are also welcomed.

The objective is to make a scientific appraisal of the issues confronting the Himalayan and adjoining region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, and to make specific policy oriented studies and need based recommendations as the means to promote the human, educational and economic advancement of the peoples of the region besides preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage. Promotion of human rights, social justice, peace, harmony and national integration are the other key areas in which the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has been active.

**CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PUBLICATION AND ANY ENQUIRIES  
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO :**

**Prof. K. WARIKOO**

*Editor and Secretary General*

Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation

B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave

New Delhi - 110029 (India)

Tel. : 0091-11-26162763, 0091-11-41651969

Fax : 0091-11-26106643

E-mail: [kwarikoo@gmail.com](mailto:kwarikoo@gmail.com)

*Books for review should be sent to the same address.*

---

Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers R.No. 67256/97

## ***HRCF* PUBLICATIONS**

**AFGHANISTAN FACTOR IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS**

Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1994. 73pp.)

**SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE HIMALAYAS**

Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 316pp.)

**CENTRAL ASIA : EMERGING NEW ORDER**

Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 352pp.)

**JAMMU, KASHMIR AND LADAKH: LINGUISTIC PREDICAMENT**

Edited by P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1996. 224pp.)

**ARTISAN OF THE PARADISE: A STUDY OF  
ART AND ARTISANS OF KASHMIR**

By D.N. Dhar (New Delhi, 1999. 230pp.)

**GUJJARS OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR**

Edited by K. Warikoo (Bhopal, 2001. 317pp.)

**BAMIYAN: CHALLENGE TO WORLD HERITAGE**

Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xviii, 313pp. 61plates)

**THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS : ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES**

Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xxvi, 523pp.)

**MONGOLIA-INDIA RELATIONS**

By O. Nyamdavaa (New Delhi, 2003. 228pp.)

**CHILD LABOUR REHABILITATION IN INDIA**

Edited by B. Zutshi and M. Dutta (New Delhi, 2003. 257pp.)

**MONGOLIA-CHINA RELATIONS**

By Sharad K. Soni (New Delhi, 2006. xix, 328pp.)



**HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION**

Post Box-10541, Jawaharlal Nehru University Post Office, New Delhi-110067 (India)

Central Office : B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029 (India)

Tele : 0091-11-26162763, 0091-11-41651969, Fax : 0091-11-26106643

E-mail: [kwarikoo@gmail.com](mailto:kwarikoo@gmail.com) Website: [www.himalayanresearch.org](http://www.himalayanresearch.org)